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QUASI-CORPORATIONS, QUASI-EMPLOYEES AND
QUASI-TAX RELIEF FOR PROFESSIONAL
PERSONS*
Lester B. Snydert and Donald T. Weckstein$
It has long been recognized that our federal income tax laws provide
industry and society in general with many economic incentives. One such
non-revenue producing concern of the tax laws has been to encourage the
development of retirement income through pension and profit-sharing
plans. Unfortunately and unrealistically the tax law provisions limited
these benefits to employees. This tax favored group included not only the
punch-card number with his blue-collar but also the white-on-white collar
corporate executive. It did not include however, self-employed persons
such as members of partnerships who were not employees in the tradi-
tional sense. Among those persons denied the tax benefits were many
professionals who were prohibited from selecting or constructing a form
of business association whereby they could' achieve employee status.
Consequently, they engaged in vigorous lobbying, spearheaded by the
medical and legal profession, to procure legislation permitting self-em-
ployed persons to set aside tax-free contributions from current income
toward building retirement funds.' After more than ten years in the
congressional clearing house, there has finally emerged a watered-down
and tight-fisted version of pension and profit-sharing tax relief in the
form of the "Self-employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962,"
* The meaning of "quasi" is not entirely clear. Webster says: "As if; as though; as it
were; in a manner; in a certain sense or degree; seeming; seemingly . .. .' Ballentine adds:
"relating to or having the character of." Among learned law professors of our acquaintance,
we have heard: "I'm not sure what a 'quasi-something' is, but I do know what it is not. It
is not the thing modified by 'quasi."' Justice Jackson has stated that: "The mere retreat to
the qualifying 'quasi' is implicit with confession that all recognized classifications have broken
down ...2 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
tAssociate Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. B.S. 1951, Syracuse Uni-
versity; LL.B. 1956, Boston University; LL.M. 1961, Columbia University.
:Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. B.B.A. 1954, University of
Wisconsin; LL.B. 1958, University of Texas; LL.M. 1959, Yale Law School.
1 See Keogh, "Tax Equity for the Self-Employed," 47 A.B.A.J. 665 (1961); Rapp, "The
Quest for Tax Equality for Private Pension Plans: A Short History of the Jenkins-Keogh
Bill," 14 Tax L. Rev. 55 (1958).
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commonly known as "H.R.1." 2 In evaluating this new legislation and
the other attempts of professionals to obtain tax relief, we have assumed
that the intended basis of the retirement plan benefits in our federal
income tax structure was neither to provide a loophole for high bracket
taxpayers nor merely to increase retirement funds of low-scale wage
earners. Instead the proper purpose was and is to reduce the tax differ-
ential and economic inequality between income earned through personal
services and income attributed to capital wealth.' Accordingly, sole
proprietors and partners, while not within the orthodox conception of
"employees," are, nevertheless, included in the personal service group
which was thought deserving of some tax equalization with the capital
wealth class.
The benefits which the tax laws have made available to employees and
employers operating under a qualified pension or profit-sharing plan
include:
(a) Treating contributions (within specified limits) by employers to a
qualified plan as a deductible business expense; 4 even though the in-
dividual employee has no allocable vested interest in the funds so con-
tributed; 5
(b) Not taxing the employees or their beneficiaries until the money is ac-
tually received, and giving certain lump sum withdrawals of the funds
special capital gains treatment;0
(c) Allowing the accumulated earnings of the trust or fund to be exempt
from income tax, thereby producing a much larger fund for retirement
purposes; I
(d) Extending Federal Gift and Estate Tax exemptions*to qualified retire-
ment funds. 8
As tax rates increased during the World War II period, professional
persons became acutely aware of the tax benefits which high bracket cor-
2 Pub. L. No. 87-792, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 10, 1062). The provisions of HR-10
have been integrated with the regular pension and profit-sharing plan provisions of the
Code. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 401-05 (hereinafter cited as "IRC"]. The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue has issued Proposed Regulations with regard to the newly enacted
Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act (Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401-6 to -12 and
1.405-1 to -3, 28 Fed. Reg. 3401 (1963)), and proposed amendments to the regular pension
and profit-sharing plan provisions which take into account the HR-10 provisions (Proposed
Treas. Regs. §§ 1.401-1, 1.401-3 to -4, 28 Fed. Reg. 3401 (1963)). It is not the purpose
of this paper to give, a detailed analysis of all the provisions of HR-10 but merely to make
some observations regarding its merits in comparison with the corporate plan.
8 For a good synopsis of the status and economic effect of the retirement plan in the
United States see, Tax Revision Compendium (Compendium of papers on Broadening the
Tax Base) submitted to Committee on Ways and Means, Vol. 2, 1337-89 (1959). See
discussion at notes 327-52 infra.
4 IRC § 404.
5 However, contributions must be irrevocably made to a fund which is for the exclusive
benefit of the class included in the plan. (The vesting requirements of HR-10 are much more
rigid. § 401(a) (7).)
6 IRC § 402.
7 IRC §§ 401, 901(a).
8 IRC §§ 2039, 2517.
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porate employees were receiving, and which they as self-employed persons
were being denied. For example, an employee with a taxable income of
$35,000 per year (50% tax bracket for a married person; 65% for a
single person) by diverting $5,000 of this income each year to a qualified
pension plan would have an immediate annual tax savings of $2,500 per
year ($3,250 for a single person). In addition, his accumulated pension
fund thirty years hence could in all likelihood produce $100,000 to
$150,000 more than a normal after-tax dollar 4% investment would have
produced.
Initially frustrated in their endeavor to obtain pension and profit-shar-
ing plan tax benefits by direct legislation, several professional groups (in-
cluding the legal profession) began to seek other means to eliminate this
discrimination against the self-employed. One solution was to become
an "employee"; but to be an employee one must have an employer. More-
over, a professional practitioner requires a special kind of employer, an
evanescent one, who is there for tax purposes but disappears when pro-
fessional services are rendered and earnings are distributed. The obvious
candidate for this position is "that invisible, intangible, and artificial
being, that mere legal entity," the corporationf Although the corporate
entity is available to many self-employed persons, most professional per-
sons have been traditionally prohibited from practicing in corporate form.
As was recently stated by a Judge of the Ohio Supreme Court, "[S]o far
as members of the bar are concerned the idea of the practice of law within
a corporate structure is an emotional thing. It is much like 'cats, olives
and Roosevelt'; it is either enthusiastically embraced or resolutely re-
jected." 0,
Notwithstanding this long-standing prohibition against the use of the
corporate entity for professional practice, a group of Montana doctors
formed a medical "association" and succeeded in convincing a federal
court" that they should be taxed as employees of a corporation, an asso-
ciation being within the definition of corporation under the Internal Reve-
nue Code. 2 The eventual Treasury Department response to this case was
to issue new regulations 3 defining an association as an organization pos-
sessing certain corporate characteristics under its state's laws. This in
turn encouraged the professionals to seek state legislation permitting them
9 Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 65 (1809) (Marshall,
Cj.).
10 Ohio ex rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114, 115, 180 N.E.2d 157, 158 (1962).
11 United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954) ; See also Gait v. United States,
175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
.12 IRC § 7701(a) (3).
Is Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 to -11 (1963).
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to acquire the necessary corporate characteristics. Several states have
responded by authorizing the formation of professional corporations or
associations.14
The enactment of the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act
of 1962 now raises the question as to whether or not the association device
need be further pursued and developed. If practice in corporate form
provides significantly more tax benefits than HR-10 there is a great like-
lihood that professional persons will prefer to follow that labyrinthine
way to tax relief. 15 Alternatively, the professional partnerships might
explore the idea of amending the definition of "partnership" for tax pur-
poses to permit it to be consistently treated as an entity separate from
the partners and its employees. While this approach will obviate the
ethics problem of practicing a profession in corporate form, it will not
help the "solo" practitioner who will still be searching for a formalistic
"employer."
The first part of this paper will explore some of the significant factors
of being taxed as a corporation, including a comparison of HR-10 with
the corporate retirement plan, and other corporate and non-corporate tax
consequences which are important to the professional person. The second
part will deal with the problem of whether the newly authorized state
professional associations and corporations can satisfy the tax regulations
and be taxed as corporations, and at the same time avoid violating tradi-
tional concepts of ethics especially relating to the legal profession. Finally,
we will examine some of the objections to tax relief through professional
associations and corporations, and will explore the possibility of more
desirable ways for the professional person to obtain fair and equal treat-
ment under the tax laws. While our discussion relates primarily to the
practice of law, much of it will also be applicable to other professions.
I
TAx CONSEQUENCES
A. Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans: HR-10 v. Corporate Plans
In order to evaluate HR-10 properly we must compare it with the bene-
14 See notes 148-54 infra.
15 In addition to ethical considerations, some of the tax factors to be considered by
professionals regarding the corporation are: the corporate rate structure, application of
"Subchapter S" to professionals, accumulated earnings tax, personal holding company tax,
tax accounting problems, possible capital gain treatment on accounts receivable upon with-
drawal or termination, special problems of "buy and sell" agreements, the sick pay exclusion,
the $5,000 death benefit, deductibility of health and accident insurance premiums, possible
loss of IRC § 1301 (bunched income) provision on large fees collected in one taxable year,
state and local tax consequences, etc. It should be noted that HR-10 covers "solo" practi-
tioners whereas the association and corporation statutes in many states require three or
more persons. See detailed discussion, notes 71-143 infra.
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fits available under the corporate retirement plan. A valid comparison
should include at least the following observations:
1. Who is covered? The new law (effective for tax years ending after
January 1, 1963) includes within the term "employee" an individual who
has "net earnings from self-employment" for self-employment tax (social
security) purposes. Section 1402 of the Code defines the phrase "net
earnings from self-employment" as "gross income derived by an individual
from any trade or business... less [any] deductions allowed... which
are attributable to such trade or business," and in the case of a partner,
as his distributive share of the partnership ordinary income. Since the
objective of qualified retirement plans is to cover only personal service
income, there is a further limitation that where income is derived from
both capital investment and personal services (e.g. a grocery store, con-
tractors, and stock brokerage firms) an amount not in excess of 30% of
the net profits from such a trade or business or $2,500 (whichever is the
greater) shall be deemed to be net earnings from self-employment.16
Therefore, all unincorporated individuals who receive personal service
income from a trade or business (professionals and farmers included)
and who are covered by the self-employed persons version of federal
social security are included in the group intended to be benefited. How-
ever, not all unincorporated persons who render personal service are
included within the Self-Employment Tax provisions of the Code. For
example, doctors of medicine, Christian Science practitioners, and certain
ministers are excluded from the Tax on Self-Employment Income, yet,
HR-10 expressly allows such persons (whether performing their services
in individual or partnership form) to be included within the pension and
profit-sharing plan provisions. On the other hand, those who perform
"the functions of a public office" are not included within the Self-Em-
ployment Tax.' 7 Since HR-10 makes no exception for this group (as it
did for doctors and ministers), self-employed governmental officials are
prohibited from making use of the before-tax dollar investment provi-
sions of HR-10 to the extent of their public office income, and are left
to their regular after-tax dollar investment in such public retirement
plans as are available to them. One possible rationale for excluding
16 IRC §§ 401(c) (1) (2) and 911(b). The general Senate Finance Committee explanation
of HIR-10 states, "[Tihe entire amount received by a self-employed individual as professional
fees or commissions will be treated as earned income if the taxpayer is engaged in the
practice of a profession, such as medicine or law, even though he employs assistants to
perform part or all of the services, provided the patients or cients are those of the tax-
payer and look to him as the person responsible for the services rendered." (Reprinted in
3 CCH 1963 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ff 2601.)
17 IRC §§ 401, 1402(c) (1). See also IRC § 1402(a) (1) as to certain real estate dealers,
and Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(c)-1(b) (1963) as to definition of "public office."
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those who perform public office functions from the tax-sheltered benefits
of HR-10 may be that most self-employed persons have only minimum
retirement benefits in the form of social security, while many public
office holders are covered by a more generous and adequate retirement
program. Even under this reasoning, however, the fact remains that
the amounts being contributed by or on behalf of these persons are
subject to current taxation, thereby leaving a significantly smaller net
,investment and a resulting smaller fund for retirement purposes. It
should be noted that public office holders who are deemed to be em-
ployees in the common-law sense could not be included under HR-10
in any event. The only retirement plan tax benefits that may accrue
to this latter group ,of individuals are with regard to amounts con-
tributed, by their employers to a qualified employee plan.1 8 Amounts
contributed by the employees themselves are not subject to the favorable
tax shelter.
If a self-employed person incorporated or formed an association treated
as a corporation for federal tax purposes, his income would be classified
as salary or dividends instead of net earnings from self-employment. For
those whose income is derived solely from personal service, it would seem
that only the amount withdrawn as reasonable salary would qualify for
pension plan benefits, whereas amounts received as a dividend might be
deemed income derived from capital (a conclusion not consistent with
reality in a law partnership, for example), and thus not entitled to pension
benefits. For those whose income is attributable to both capital wealth
and personal service, the corporate tax structure might be more beneficial
-where a reasonable salary might end up being higher than the arbitrary
30% of earned income rule applicable under HR-10. The use of the
corporate form requires a close tab on the corporate profits before the
end of the year in order to withdraw the maximum salary for computation
of the retirement plan contribution and in order to avoid the double tax
penalty on corporate profits. 9 Although the non-corporate form of doing
business avoids this "salary-dividend" dichotomy, there are still mechan-
ical and accounting problems in determining the amount of net earnings
for retirement plan contribution purposes.
18 The phrase "qualified employee plan" has a very technical meaning in the pension and
profit-sharing plan area. As used in this article it is meant to include all tax-favored retire-
ment plans including the employee annuity plans (IRC § 403) which are on an individual
rather than on the usual group basis of the "qualified plan." Amounts contributed by the
employer under the individual employee annuity plan are in many instances authorizations
by the employee to withhold or divert part of his salary, thereby technically becoming
employer contributions. Amounts actually contributed by employees are deductible under
the tax laws of Great Britain and Canada. (See Tax Revision Compendium, supra note 3,
at 1380.)
19 The "Subchapter S Corporation" (IRC §§ 1371-77) could in some cases alleviate the
double-tax problem. See notes 110-15 infra.
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2. Inclusion of Employees. Since the primary objective in encouraging
the creation of retirement plans is to cover as many members of the work-
ing class as possible, it is not surprising to find that before an owner or
highly paid corporate executive or officer can take advantage of these
provisions they must be made available to the ordinary employees of the
organization. Section 401 (a) (4), which is applicable to all corporate and
employer plans, therefore requires that "the contributions or benefits
provided under the plan do not discriminate in favor of employees who
are officers, shareholders, persons whose principal duties consist in super-
vising the work of other employees, or highly compensated employees-"
In conjunction with these non-discrimination requirements applicable
to all pension and profit-sharing plans (including self-employed persons
plans) the new law requires that in the case of self-employed individuals
who own more than 10% (those designated as "owner-employees") of
either the capital interest or the profits in an unincorporated trade or
business or partnership the plan must include all employees who have
been employed by that person for 3 or more years, with the exception of.
certain part-time and seasonal employees2 0 This requirement is more
strict than the provisions applicable to corporations and other employers.
The regular employee plans (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the
"corporate plan") specifically allow under reasonable circumstances the
exclusion of employees whose wages are under $4,800 (the present social
security maximum).21 Corporate plans are also expressly allowed to ex-
clude, under reasonable circumstances, -all employees other than salaried
or clerical employees, and employees who have been employed for less
than 5 years. All of these exclusionary provisions are still subject to the
non-discrimination requirements. A further restriction not present in the
corporate plan is that amounts contributed for employees must be non-
forfeitable."
20 IRC § 401(d) (3). A part-time employee is one "whose customary employment is for,
not more than 20 hours in any one week. . . ." A seasonal employee is one "whose customary
employment is for not more than . . . 5 months in any calendar year." IRC § 401(d) (3).
The Proposed Treasury Regulations [§ 1.401-10(b), 28 Fed. Reg. 3401 (1963)] provide that
past services rendered (including services rendered in pre-1963 years) may be taken into
account for the purpose of eligibility to participate in the plan, but not for contributions
for past years. In addition, self-employed individuals must place themselves within the
same years of service eligibility rules as their common-law ordinary employees in order to
have the plan qualify.
21 IRC § 401(a) (5). HR-10 permits coordination or integration of the retirement plan
contributions with social security contributions if the contributions for the owner-employees
do not exceed 1/3 of the total contributions. IRC § 401(d) (6) (A). However, those who
earn under $4800 cannot be completely excluded from the plan if they have been employed
for 3 years or more. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.401-12(h), 28 Fed. Reg. 3401 (1963).
22 IRC §§ 401(a) (7), 401(d) (2). An amendment to the Code (made concurrently with
the enactment of HR-10) applicable to all trusteed pension plans requires that where a
forfeiture does occur it cannot be applied to the benefit any employee would otherwise
receive under the plan (IRC § 401(a) (8)). The Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.401-7, 28 Fed. Reg.
1963]
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While it is true that self-employed persons are not granted the greater
flexibility allowed to corporate plans in the inclusion of employees, many
self-employed individuals may find the cost of including their employees
in the plan less than appears from a surface analysis. In evaluating the
total cost of including employees, the self-employed will be well advised
first to calculate his own tax savings that would result if such a plan were
instituted. The requirement that all full-time employees with three or
more years of service be included in the self-employed individuals retire-
ment plan does not apply to situations where no one person owns more
than 10% of the capital or profits of the business involved. Therefore,
a law partnership with 10 partners each owning a 10% interest (i.e., self-
employed employees but not owner-employees) would not be required to
include automatically all employees with three or more years of service,
but presumaby they would still be bound to the less strict non-discrimina-
tion rules applicable to corporate plans. In other words, where the owner-
ship interest is vested in several people the organization more nearly
resembles the traditional corporate organization where, theoretically at
least, owners and employees are separate entities for the most part. This
is not true in an organization which renders solely personal service, such
as a law firm, a medical clinic, and the like. The basic inequity in this
area is clearly revealed when we look to the one man or closely-held cor-
poration which is still allowed the more favorable treatment under the
corporate retirement plan, despite the efforts of the Treasury Department
and others to put this group of taxpayers on a par with self-employed
individuals.23 The desire of the Treasury Department to put closely-held
corporations on a par with unincorporated entities, and the desire of the
self-employed individual for corporate tax treatment has culminated in
the compromise known as HR-10.
Where a self-employed individual who owns more than 10% interest
(an owner-employee) in one business also owns more than a 50% interest
in another unincorporated business, he is required to provide retirement"
plan benefits for the employees of each such trade or business "which (bene-
fits) are not less favorable than contributions and benefits provided for
[the] owner-employee" himself.24 Consequently, if T is a one-third partner
3401 (1963) provides that the forfeited amount must be used to reduce the employer's
contributions under the plan. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.401-12(g), 28 Fed. Reg. 3401 (1963)
sets forth an instance where contributions by self-employed individuals might have to remain
forfeitable to comply with the nondiscrimination requirements. Also see Proposed Treas.'
Reg. 1.401-4(c), 28 Fed. Reg. 3401 (1963).
23 See note 111 infra and accompanying text.
24 IRC §§ 401(d)(9)(B), 401(d)(10). This situation should be distinguished from the
case of a self-employed individual who is himself currently participating in a corporate
retirement plan elsewhere. The Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.401-10(b) (3) (ii), 28 Fed. Reg.
3401 (1963) indicates that such an individual would be allowed to participate fully in a
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in the law firm of T, U & V, and T is also a 50% owner of the TY Com-
pany, a partnership, unless the employees of TY Company who have 3
or more years of service are included under a qualified pension or profit-
sharing plan of that company, and unless the plan of that company pro-
vides benefits which are no less favorable than those provided for T under
the plan of T, U & V, T is precluded from participating in the plan of
T, U & V. Presumably the benefits to the employees of TY Company
to be no less favorable must be based on, for example, the same per-
centage of earnings rather than the actual amount of the contribution
made on T's behalf. If T were able to incorporate the TY Company he
could apparently avoid the above mentioned restriction.
The requirement of including employees of other businesses is con-
sistent with the basic objective of retirement plans in the federal tax law.
In the case of the self-employed individual it prevents the creation of two
or more businesses in order to attempt to segregate the employees from
the employer. But where a self-employed person has two or more bona
fide businesses, each with its own legitimate employees, he is treated
much less favorably than he would be if he were to operate in corporate
form. The Internal Revenue Code provisions applicable to corporate re-
tirement plans do not contain a requirement that stockholders who own
a controlling interest in another business be required to provide a retire-
ment plan for the employees of the other business, and this is true even
where the corporation is owned by only one stockholder. Furthermore,
where a self-employed individual finds himself in the position of being
unable to incorporate either or both of his businesses, he might well find
himself in the dilemma of putting pressures on his associates in Partner-
ship B to establish a retirement plan, while at the same time trying to
convince his associates in Partnership A to postpone the establishment
of a plan in Partnership A until he can get one established in Partner-
ship B in order that he may participate in the Partnership A plan, etc.,
etc.25 Where a self-employed individual has an existing plan under prior
law covering only his employees, he may either adapt that plan to the
requirements of the new law in order that he may be covered, or he may
abolish the old employees plan and establish an entirely new one cover-
self-employed individuals' plan even though he is benefited as a common-law employee under
a corporate plan. Of course, on the corporate level a stockholder-employee is generally
allowed to participate in as many corporate plans as he is able to.
25 Problems may develop as to how much will be contributed toward his plan in each
of these partnerships when we take into account the fact that his maximum contribution
and deduction must be aggregated. Further difficulties'may be encountered with regard
to equalizing the contribution among the partners. The provisions of IRC § 401(d) (4) (A)
require the consent of an owner-employee. But the plan can still be made available to the
consenting partners.
1963]
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ing himself and his employees, depending on the relative costs and merits
of each one of these alternatives.
3. Maximum Contribution and Deduction. Undoubtedly, the most
severe limitations imposed upon self-employed individuals by HR-10 axe
those relating to the maximum amounts that may be set aside for retire-
ment purposes. The general rule is that an owner-employee can contribute
no-more than 10% of his earned income for his taxable year or $2500,
whichever is the lesser amount. The self-employed individual who is not
an owner-employee (i.e., one who owns 10% or less) is not subject to this
10%-$2500 maximum. The amounts contributed on behalf of any self-
employed individual (including non owner-employees) however must
comply with the provisions relating to non-discrimination in favor of
highly paid employees. 6 Therefore, even though the plan can provide
for a contribution of more than, 10% of the non owner-employee's earned
income, if this rate of contribution is higher than the rate contributed
for the ordinary (i.e. the non-partner) employee, then the plan might be
deemed discriminatory and thus ineffective for tax purposes.
Although there are some exceptions 27 to the 10%-$2500 maximum
contribution rule. on owner-employees, all of the concern over maximum
contributions is immediately rendered nugatory by the real curve ball in
HR-10-the provision which limits the ultimate benefit to be obtained in
any one year to 50% of the maximum contribution or $1250, whichever
is the lesser amount.2" This maximum deduction is applicable to all self-
employed persons, whether owner-employees or not. The foregoing might
best be explained by the following example: The law partnership of A, B,
C & D contributes 10% of each partner's share of earned income to a
retirement plan. The total partnership profit is $100,000. A owns a 50%
interest, B a 25% interest, C a 15% interest, and D a 10% interest.
Since A, B, and C own more than a 10% interest, they are owner-em-
ployees and as such their contributions cannot exceed $2500 per year.
The amount of the contribution on D's behalf however, is not so limited
because he is not an owner-employee. The maximum contribution that
may be made on A's behalf is 10% of $50,000 (his share of the partner-
ship profits) or $2500, whichever is the lesser amount. Since $2500 is less
than $5000, his maximum contribution is $2500. Of this $2500, however,
he can only deduct (i.e., exclude from his current income tax) 50% or
$1250. The maximum contribution for B and C is $2500 and $1500
26 IRC §§ 401(a)(4), 401(d).
27 IRC § 401(e). There are certain penalties for excess contributions. Excess contributions
are allowed on annuity, life insurance, and endowment contracts and certain medical and
sickness plans as well as on the new series U.S. Bonds.
28 IRC §§ 404(a), 404(a) (10), 404(e).
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respectively. The maximum deduction for B and C is $1250 and $750
respectively. There is no limit on the amount that can be contributed on
D's behalf. It is unlikely, however, that the senior partners will contribute
more than 10% of D's share of the profits since they themselves cannot
exceed that figure. If D received a salary as an employee over and above
his 10% share of profits, his contribution could be based on both his
salary and the 10% interest. If D did not have a regular salary in this
case, the maximum contribution on his behalf would be $1000 (10% X
$10,000), but since he is a self-employed-person, only 50% or $500
would be excluded from his income for federal tax purposes?29
It becomes apparent that not only can you do more for your employees
than you can for yourself under HR-10, but in addition a senior partner
with the highest share of partnership income is in effect relegated to the
same pension benefits available to those partners owning much less of
the partnership interest than he does. In the example set forth above,
A, a 50% partner, is limited to the same maximum contribution and
deduction applicable to B, a 25% partner. This will no doubt seriously
impair the mass implementation of retirement plans in many partnerships.
The severity of these limitations becomes annoyingly clear when we
compare the contribution-deduction restriction of HR-10 with the cor-
porate plan. Generally speaking, contributions" to a corporate plan are
limited to the amount that is actuarially reasonably necessary'to provide
for retirement benefits of the corporate employee including contribution
credit for past service. In the case of a pension plan there is a 5%
minimum but no dollar maximum. In the case of a profit-sharing plan
the maximum is generally 15% of compensation paid, and in the case of
a combination pension and profit-sharing plan the maximum is 25% of
compensation paid.30 There is no overall dollar maximum comparable to
the $2500 overall contribution maximum under HR-0. Above all, the
amounts contributed under a corporate plan are not subject to the 50%
of the amount contributed deduction limitation. The corporate plan is
allowed to carry over excess contributions to succeeding years in which
the contribution is under the maximum.31 There is no such carry-over
provision available to self-employed persons under HR-10. Relating this
to our prior hypothetical, if our law firm of, A, B, C & D were allowed
to incorporate, partner A with $50,000 of compensation would be allowed
to contribute and deduct from his current income under a profit-sharing
29 If D were covered by a regular employee plan prior to the adoption of BR-10, there
is a possibility that he might not be restricted to the maximum contribution and deduction
rule of HR-10.30 IRC § 404.
3' IRC § 404(a) (1) (D).
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plan 15% of his compensation or $7500. Under a partnership plan
pursuant to HR-10 he is allowed to deduct only $1250 (no matter how
much he contributes) or a difference of $6250. Assuming that A is in
the 60% tax bracket the ultimate tax differential between HR-10 and the
corporate plan is $3750 per year. Where his effective maximum contribu-
tion rate is 15% under a corporate plan, A's effective rate under HR-10
is 2.5%.
Of course it should be noted that the one half of the contibution that
is not deductible under HR-10 (i.e., the other $1250 in partner A's case
in the above example) although subject to the current tax and therefore
an after-tax dollar investment, is insulated from the federal income tax
during the period that it is invested for retirement purposes. Therefore
the accumulated income on these contributions is tax-free while it is in
a qualified type of investment. This feature should not be overlooked in
evaluating HR-10, but the fact that ordinary annuities and life insurance
contracts, for example, are also available as a tax shelter for accumulated
income without complying with the rigors and expense of establishing a
retirement plan makes this factor much less significant in light of the
other severe restrictions in HR-10. 2
It should be obvious at this point that those who formidably opposed
the extension of pension benefits to self-employed individuals on the ques-
tionable theory that it would grant tax relief to those who need it least
have won a stunning victory despite the formal enactment of HR-10.
The original versions of HR-10 set an upward limit on contributions and
deductions at a more realistic figure of $7500. It was not until the final
hours of debate on the floor of the Senate that the 50% deduction found
any substantial support. The prospects of losing some $350 million in
revenue each year did not appeal to the Treasury watch dogs, although
losses of much more than that have been overlooked and considered
worthwhile for many other pieces of legislation. By the time the Senate
got through amending HR-10, their estimate of the loss of revenue
dropped to $35 million per year.3
Although we may be able to see the relationship between the $2500
maximum contribution and the government's concern over loss of revenue,
it is much more difficult to understand the policy behind the further limi-
tation of deducting only 50% of the amount contributed, with a maximum
of $1250. The purported rationale behind this latter restriction is re-
flected in the hearings held before the House Committee on Ways and
32 See IRC § 805.
83 Britain and Canada experienced a revenue loss of about 1/6 of advance estimates. See
Tax Revision Compendium, supra note 3, at 1367.
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Means and in a letter to Chairman Byrd of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee from a John K. Dyer, Jr., a Philadelphia lawyer and pension con-
sultant (undoubtedly covered by some corporate plan).3 The reasoning
goes something like this: since employee contributions to corporate plans
are not deductible, and since there are many corporate plans in which the
employee's contributions are somewhere in the neighborhood of 50% of
the total contributions, an equitable approximation or practical com-
promise in extending retirement plans to self-employed persons would be
in effect to treat the self-employed person as "half employer and half
employee-a result not inconsistent with reality."3
This is, of course, a convenient philosophy for halving the balance of
the revenue loss, and therefore becomes an acceptable argument for those
who have their eyes on the Treasury coffers. But for those who are ob-
jectively searching for some sort of tax justice this reasoning is fallacious
in at least two respects. First, the assumption that the employer and
employee are separate entities is entirely unrealistic in the closely-held
corporation. 6 One would have to be totally naive not to recognize that
the employer and employee are for all practical purposes one and the
same animal standing in the indelible corporate cage. Certainly even the
highly paid corporate executive in the larger corfioration is more
realistically an employer and an employee all wrapped up in one. When
a self-employed individual contributes 10% of his partnership profits to
a retirement plan, how different is that from 'a contribution by a corpora-
tion on behalf of its sole stockholder? The corporate "salary" to its
"owner-managers" is in substance no different from a self-employed
person's share of net profits. While it is true that a "salary" must be
reasonably related to the services rendered, and thus limited to some
extent, with regard to personal service taxpayers the self-employed
person's share of net profit would in most every case parallel what would
be a salary for reasonable services rendered.
A second fallacy in the above reasoning is based on the conclusion that
since many corporate plans have "employee" contributions of 50% of
the total, the self-employed person should be treated as contributing one
half as employer and one half as employee. This may be true of many
plans, but it certainly is not true of most corporate plans. In fact, at the
House Ways and Means Committee hearings in 1959 reliable evidence
was produced to show that annual contributions to private pension plans
34 Tax Revision Compendium, supra note 3, at 1368, 1381.
35 Id. at 1368.
36 Stockholder-employees of closely-held corporations have been allowed to create retire-
ment plans for themselves (even in a one or two-man corporation). See Rev. Rul. 157,
part 4(a), 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 67; Rev. Rul. 81, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 392.
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in 1958 amounted to approximately $4.7 billion with employees con-
tributing only $0.7 billion or less than 15%.of the total amount.Y7 In
addition, the bulk of these employee contributions were made through
plans of the nation's largest corporations.
Some members of the Senate Finance Committee who were behind
this 50% deduction limitation recognized this fundamental inequity be-
tween corporate plans and HR-10 by proposing that this same 50%
limitation be placed on a person who owns 10% or more of the stock of
the corporation that employs him. This proposal was quickly defeated
when it was brought to the Senate's attention that this would have an
adverse effect on the entire private pension system in the United States. 8
When we are reminded of the fact that the principal purpose of the
pensionplan in this country is to equalize the tax burden for those who
render personal services, it-is not unfair to ask why all contributions to
all retirement plans, public and private, employee funded or employer
funded, should not be allowed a current tax deduction. However, until
such a change is made in the basic retirement plan tax structure, the
self-employed person is surely entitled to more realistic treatment on
contributions to pension or profit-sharing plans.
4. Methods of Funding. Although there are various vehicles that can
be used to fund these retirement benefits, all of them require a "plan."
The Code does not define the word "plan;" however, the Proposed
Treasury Regulations on HR-10 9 confirm the view that the plan be a
definite written program setting forth all the essential details. Generally
speaking there are five methods of funding HR-10 type plans:
(a) Trusteed plans
(b) Annuity plans
(c) Bank Custodial Accounts
(d) New Series of U.S. Treasury Bonds
(e) Face Amount Certificates of Investment Company.40
In order to guarantee the tax exempt nature of the accumulated income
on amounts set aside for retirement purposes, the creation of a formal
legal trust according to local law is often used as a funding vehicle. In
the ordinary corporate plan the trustee can be almost anyone. Under
HR-10 however, where a trust is used, the trustee must be a bank, unless
all of the self-employed individuals covered under the plan own less than
87 Tax Revision Compendium, supra note 3, at 1347.
88 See EHR-10 as passed by Senate on Sept. 7, 1962, §§ (2) (2), (3).
39 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.401-12(b) (2), 28 Fed. Reg. 3401 (1963). See also recent ruling
on corporate plans providing for generally the same requirement. Rev. Rul. 157, 1961-2
Cum. Bull. 67.
40 IRe §§ 401(a), 401(f), 403(a), 404(d), 405.
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an 11% interest in the particular trade or business involved. A trustee
need not be a bank where the trust uses annuities, life insurance contracts,
or endowment contracts of a life insurance company as a sole means
of investment.41
Requiring a bank as trustee for unincorporated businesses with one
or more owner-employees is obviously intended to keep a tighter control
over the funds of the small firms. But it is these same small firms that
are undoubtedly going to be hard put to justify a professional trustee's
fee for a comparatively limited tax benefit. The result will be to shift a
substantial part of retirement contributions to the life insurance company
annuity contract. Although contributions can be made for life insurance
contracts, these amounts are merely allowed as contributions to the plan
(even over the $2500 amount) but are not taken into account in calculat-
ing any part of the deduction. Since the objective of the retirement plan
is to provide retirement rather than death benefits, any contributions
applicable to life insurance contracts as distinguished from annuity
contracts will presumably be allowable contributions only if they are
merely incidental to the entire'plan.42
Instead of using the trust plan as a method of funding, self-employed
persons may purchase non-transferable annuity contracts directly from
an insurance company. 3 HR-10 introduces at least two, new funding
devices for self-employed persons. One is the bank custodial account
(with a bank as custodian) where the investments are made solely in
certain mutual funds or annuity contracts. This device eliminates the
requirement of creating a formal trust, but the custodian agreement will
undoubtedly require draftsmanship in order to have the fund qualify for
tax benefits." The second type of new investment created by HR-10 is
a new series of U.S. Treasury Bonds to be issued for direct purpose by
employers for their employees including the self-employed persons them-
selves. The maximum contribution rules do not apply to this type of
investment, but only the lesser of 50% or $1250 of the amount con-
tributed will be deductible. The apparent reason for allowing an un-
41 IRC § 401(d) (1). The Proposed Treas. Reg. provide an exception to the requirement
of having a bank as trustee where a self-employed person had a qualified trust for his
ordinary employees prior to October 10, 1962, even though the trust is amended after that
date to include owner-employees [§ 1.401-12(c)(1), 28 Fed. Reg. 3401 (1963)].
42 IRC § 401(e) (1). The Proposed Treas. Reg. incorporate the existing rule for corporate
plans that life insurance protection can be ihcluded in the plan if it is incidental, without
defining what is meant by incidental [§§ 1.401-12(c)(4)(i)(2), (ii), 28 Fed. Reg. 3401
(1963)]. For a related ruling under the corporate plan, see Rev. Rul. 67, 1954-1 Cum. Bul.
149.
43 The Proposed Treas. Reg. provide that the proceeds from such annuity contracts must
be payable directly to the employee or his beneficiary [§ 1.401-12(c)(4)(ii), 28 Fed. Reg.
3401 (1963)].
44 See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.401-12 (c)(S), 28 Fed. Reg. 3401 (1963).
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limited investment in this new bond is the fact that such bonds may also
be purchased by other persons without the tax deduction benefit. The
bond itself will have restrictions as to withdrawal, deferral of interest
payments until retirement, non-transferability, and redemption no earlier
than age 5932 or earlier death or disability.4 5
The methods of funding available under HR-10 are not unduly re-
strictive and closely resemble the funding vehicles allowed corporate
plans. Corporations are allowed in some instances to invest the contribu-
tions to the qualified trust in the corporation's own capital stock or
securities. The fact that this investment technique may not be available
to self-employed individuals should not of itself cause too much concern,
especially among those who derive their income solely from personal
services rather than from capital. About the only real objectionable
feature in the funding area is the requirement to have a bank as trustee
where a trust or custodial plan rather than an annuity plan is used. We
pan sympathize with the concern of the Treasury over the policing of
these small business plans; but here again, is the incorporated grocery
store or gasoline station any easier to police than the same business in
unincorporated form?
Once you decide on the particular funding vehicle (i.e., ordinary trust
investments, annuity contracts, bonds, etc.) a very important decision
must be made as to the measuring rod to be used for computing annual
contributions or investments. Should it be based on a predetermined
fixed amount or formula (a pension plan) or should the contribution
fluctuate with the annual net profit (a profit-sharing plan)? Since self-
employed persons who are also "owner-employees" are already subject
to special limitations on the amounts they contribute to their retirement
plans, the requirement of a definite predetermined formula for computing
contributions applies only to self-employed persons who own less than an
11% interest and to contributions on behalf of ordinary employees
required to be covered by the plan. However, this must be read in con-
junction with the non-discrimination provisions so that the contributions
on behalf of "owner-employees" do not reflect favoritism to highly paid
employees.
The profit-sharing plan is the most flexible plan for most self-employed
persons, especially professional individuals with fluctuating incomes4 7
45 IRC § 405. The bonds will bear interest at 3-3/4% per annum. See Treas. Reg.
§§ 341.0-.15 (1963) adopted as part of Public Debt Series No. 1-63, and Proposed Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.405-1 to -3, 28 Fed. Reg. 3401 (1963).
46 Note 22 supra.
47 However, where the self-employed is too old to build up a reasonable retirement
fund under the 15% profit-sharing plan limitation, the pension plan in some cases may
provide a higher effective annual maximum contribution.
[Vol. 48
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
HR-10 does not expressly answer the question whether or not the self-
employed plan can pick and choose its contribution years. The Proposed
Treasury Regulations, however, provide that the plan be permanent and
have recurring and substantial contributions, thereby precluding sporadic
contributions. 8 In order for the contribution to be deductible it must be
made during the taxable year for which the deduction is sought. This
requires a close watch on the net profits before the end of the taxable
year-a task which will be burdensome for most self-employed persons.
The fact that the carryover and past service contributions49 provisions
are not extended to self-employed persons will make the early profit
calculation more essential to HR-10 individuals than to their corporate
kinfolk.
It seems somewhat paradoxical that while the legal profession actively
lobbied for the enactment of HR-10 and alternative state legislation
permitting lawyers to form professional corporations and associations,
the American Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics in
November 1961 was interpreting Canon 34 of the Canons of Ethics
(prohibiting any division of fees for legal services with a non-lawyer)
as precluding lawyers from having a profit-sharing plan if non-lawyers be
included as beneficiaries of the plan.50 Although this interpretation is
part of an overall opinion dealing with the ethical considerations of the
practice of law in corporate or associate form, there is no indication that
the Committee would change its views on the profit-sharing plan in the
setting of HR-10.51 Of course, lawyers who must include their non-
lawyer employees in their retirement plan might have a pension plan for
these employees and a profit-sharing plan for themselves, provided that
they do not violate the non-discrimination provisions. 2 But how much
difference in substance really exists between a contribution based on a
48 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 (b) (2), 28 Fed. Reg. 3401 (1963). Compare the
corporate plan requirements. Rev. Rul. 157, part 2, 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 67.
49 See note 20 supra.
50 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 303 (1961), 48 A.BAJ. 159, 161 (1962).
51 The Proposed Treas. Reg. relating to plans covering self-employed individuals have
adopted the ABA's interpretation of Canon 34 by providing that in the case of a trusteed
plan if applicable state law (quaere-does this include the Canons of Professional Ethics)
bars fee-splitting between attorneys and nonattorneys, a profit-sharing plan covering both
attorneys and nonattorneys will not qualify [§ 1.401-11(b) (2), 28 Fed. Reg. 3401 (1963)1.
It should be noted that the ABA interpretation of Canon 34 (see note 50 supra) includes
all profit-sharing plans and not just trusteed plans, thereby precluding ethics-conscious
lawyers from using this device even in a nontrusteed annuity plan where the annuity
proceeds must be made payable directly to the employee or his beneficiaries.
52 In this connection, the Proposed Regulations state that where an owner-employee
controls another unincorporated trade or business he cannot have a profit sharing plan
covering his employees in one business and a pension plan in the other or vice-versa
[§ 1.401-12(1)(1)(ii), 28 Fed. Reg. 3401 (1963)]. This same prohibition may very well
carry over to self-employed persons who have only one business, and provide a different
type of plan for their employees.
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percentage of profits and a fixed contribution which can come from
nowhere else but the net profits?53 The embattled lawyer must not only
seek refuge from the severe limitations of HR-10 imposed by his op-
ponents from without, but before he can begin to fight for a more realistic
Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act he must align the incon-
sistent forces from within.
5. Taxation of Distributions from Plan. The day of reckoning arrives
when the benefits are paid to the participants of a qualified plan. The
amount that remains to be taxed is that part of the annual contributions
to the plan that were allowed as deductions (i.e., not taxed in prior years).
For example, if T, a junior partner in a law firm were allowed to con-
tribute $5000 per year (assuming he was a non-owner employee not
subject to the $2500 maximum) for 20 years to a qualified plan for self-
employed persons under HR-10, and if on his retirement at, say, age 65 his
total accumulated interest was $145,000 which was to be paid to him
over his remaining life as an annuity, his tax consequences would be as
follows: each year that the $5000 was contributed on his behalf he would
have been allowed to deduct only $1250 (50% X $2500). Therefore, he
should have been taxed on $3750 for each year of the 20 year period,
or a total of $75,000. Thus, of the $145,000 investment in his annuity,
$75,000 represents his prior taxed capital, and the remaining $70,000
represents income to be taxed on a pro rata basis over the years he
receives his annuity.
The chief advantages of having amounts taxed during the retirement
years include:
(a) the taxpayer is generally in a lower bracket;
(b) double personal exemptions;
(c) retirement income credit of $1524 maximum per year;
(d) no 3% medical limitation.
In many situations the first $4000-$4500 of retirement income can
effectively escape any federal income tax. It is therefore possible that
some of the income deferred from working years to retirement years will
go untaxed.
This basic framework is applicable to corporate and self-employed
persons retirement plans. At this point however, HR-10 diverges from
the corporate plan and becomes subject to some rigid distribution re-
quirements. For example, self-employed persons are penalized if they
happen to consider themselves eligible for retirement before age 59 2
53 See notes 200-07 infra and accompanying text.
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(insurance age 60) or later than age 70 2 ." If distribution is made before
age 5932 other than for disability or death,i5 which are specially handled,
the new law imposes a penalty tax of not less than 110% of the increase
in tax that would have resulted if the income had been received ratably
over the 5 years ending with the year of distribution.56 This penalty tax
is imposed only on the "owner-employee." Where a retirement plan is
terminated for any reason and there is a distribution of the fund, the
penalty tax would seem to apply even though the termination is due, for
example, to a dissolution of a law partnership. Dissolving a law partner-
ship would seem to be an extraordinary circumstance and not a purpose-
ful effort to reduce the federal tax burden. Partnerships should make
sure that death or withdrawal of a partner will not cause a termination of
the partnership for retirement plan purposes before they embark on this
elaborate endeavor.57 A self-employed person (who is or once was an
owner-employee) who happens to want to change firms is apparently
covered by the penalty tax on any distributions received on his with-
drawal from the firm. Can a withdrawing partner allow his vested funds
to remain intact until he reaches 592? Will this be deemed constructive
receipt, thereby not escaping the penalty tax? Questions like these are
going to confront the self-employed individual who comes within HR-10.
A further penalty imposed only on the "owner-employee" in case of
premature distributions is a disqualification from participation in a
retirement plan on his own behalf for 5 years following the year in which
the distribution is madeP8 In connection with this penalty the new law
provides that the plan itself will not be "qualified" unless the plan does
not permit such premature distributions. Presumably, if the plan is
silent on this point it could be asserted that the absence of this negative
provision will cause the entire plan to be disapproved. It is therefore
important to have the plan expressly incorporate all of the limitations and
restrictions set forth in Section 401. In the event that there is a pre-
mature distribution, the Code provision disqualifying the distributee
from participation in a retirement plan for 5 years apparently applies
to participation in that particular plan and not in other plans created by
other entities such as another law partnership.
The corporate plan has no predetermined retirement age dates, it has
no penalty tax or other penalty for early withdrawal, and, in fact, if
the withdrawal is due to the employee leaving the employ of the cor-
54 IRC §§ 401(a) (9), 401(d) (4) (B).
5 Disability is defined in IRC § 213(g) (3).
56 IRC § 72(m).
57 IRC § 708; Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.401-10(e) (2), 28 Fed. Reg. 3401 (1963).
58 IRC § 401(d)(5)(c).
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poration before retirement, the lump sum proceeds he receives are taxed
at the more favorable capital gain rates. Capital gains treatment is not
available to any lump sum distribution under HR-10 even if it is made
during the specified retirement period. In place of the capital gains
benefits HR-10 has created what may be deemed in some cases a rea-
sonable facsimile in the form of a special averaging device. 9
6. Some Special Problems.
(a) Professionals as employees.
The Senate Finance Committee ReportO0 makes it clear that
HR-10 extends the definition of employee to all self-employed
persons who were precluded from this sacred category under the
common-law. The doctor or lawyer is technically not within the
common-law definition of employee because of the great emphasis
placed on the degree of supervision or control over the person
involved. While HR-10 seems to eliminate this problem for pro-
fessionals who cannot be controlled by a fictitious employer, if
professional persons were to form associations and corporations
would the same result obtain? Although it would be advisable to
have a special ruling on this precise point, there is sufficient authority
from the Internal Revenue Service and the courts for the proposition
that lawyers and doctors will be deemed employees for pension and
profit-sharing plan benefits 11
(b) Must contributions to retirement plans be in cask?
Under the corporate plan it has been held that the contributions
to a retirement plan need not be in cash, and the fair market value
of any property contributed will be the amount deductible. 2 How-
ever, the Proposed Regulations on plans covering self-employed
owner-employees prohibit the contribution of property other than
money to a trusteed plan. 3 More difficult problems arise on shifting
pre-existing ordinary annuity contracts or life insurance contracts
with a cash value to the nontrusteed retirement plan. Will these
qualify for the contribution and/or the deduction? The Regulations
are silent on this point. Some insurance companies might be able
to provide more flexible conversion options in order that self-em-
59 IRC § 72(n).
60 This report is reproduced in 3 CCH 1963 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ff 2601.
61 James v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1296 (1956); Rev. Rul. 178, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 404;
also see special ruling, March 2, 1961, reprinted in 7 CCH 1961 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ff 6375
which held that an employer-employee relationship existed between a medical group and
its doctor-members for social security and withholding tax purposes.
62 Colorado Natl Bank v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 933 (1958). However, promissory notes
may not constitute "payment." Wasatch Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 817 (1962).
63 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.401-12(k), 28 Fed. Reg. 3401 (1963).
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ployed persons may utilize their past investments in an HR-10 plan.
(c) Qualifying the retirement plan.
There is no requirement that a pension or profit-sharing plan first
be approved by the Internal Revenue Service before it will be given
effect. However, there are several advantages in obtaining a favor-
able ruling from the Service before the plan is put into operation.
First, it will guarantee the tax deduction for contributions to the
plan; second. it will establish that the employees do not have to
include the employer contribution in their gross income (within the
specified limits); and third, it will serve as an assurance that the
retirement fund will be exempt from Federal Income Tax on its
accumulated earnings.
Although the Proposed Regulations say very little about the
specific procedures to be followed in setting up a self-employed
persons plan under HR-0, the Internal Revenue Service Guidelines
on corporate plans will probably be amended to include special
HR-10 requirements.
(d) Partnership agreements may need revision.
Since the partner's distributive share of partnership income is
affected by the partnership agreement, the agreement itself should
be reviewed before HR-10 is implemented. For example, problems
of allocation of depreciation, ownership rights, buy and sell pro-
visions, tax year problems, etc. may need revision.
Over a decade ago professionals and other self-employed persons set
out to convince Congress that they were entitled to and in need of retire-
ment plan tax benefits. Some have hastily concluded that HR-10 places
their progress at the half-way mark. Others have indicated a sense of
satisfaction with HR-10 based on the philosophy that half a loaf is better
than none. In our opinion, lawyers and other self-employed persons are
nowhere near the half-way mark, and in fact may be in a worse position
than they were a year or so ago. It may well be that HR-10 will tem-
porarily take the heat off the Treasury for approval of the professional
association or corporation. Where the corporate plan has an effective
maximum rate of around 25% of compensation paid, the effective rate
under HR-10 is less than 5% of net profits. In addition, the Federal
Estate and Gift Tax exemptions,8 5 the $5000 death benefit, 6 and the
64 Rev. Rul. 157, 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 67; Rev. Proc. 12, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 1029.
There is a possibility that the Treasury will permit banks, insurance companies, and
mutual funds to get a blanket approval for standard type HR-10 plans, thereby precluding
the necessity of approving each and every plan.
65 IRC §§ 2039, 2517.
66 IRC §101(b).
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long-term capital gain benefit on lump sum distributions67 applicable to
corporate plans are not extended to self-employed persons.
In the past two years Congress has expanded the pension and profit-
sharing concept to include employees of public educational institutions,
giving them an effective rate of contribution of 162% of salary plus
liberal past service credits."' The Internal Revenue Service has recently
ruled,69 with regard to corporate plans, that past service with former
employers may be used for the purpose of determining eligibility to
participate in a retirement plan of a present employer. These past service
benefits are not included within HR-10. At a; time when Congress and
the Treasury are liberalizing the pension and profit-sharing plan to in-
clude more and more taxpayers who render personal services, ten million
or more self-employed persons are hamstrung by rigid requirements
which may effectively eliminate not only many self-employed persons
but many of their employees as well. Lawyers should give some thought
to the following questions: How much longer are we going to close our
eyes to the fact that the tax laws flagrantly (though subtly) discriminate
against the self-employed and indeed all personal service income? Should
members of the legal profession allow themselves to be called "half em-
ployer and half employee" for tax purposes? Should a profit-sharing
plan be realistically deemed a fee-splitting device under Canon 34?7o
How different are self-employed persons from corporate executives and
stockholders of closely held corporations, especially for tax purposes?
If the primary objective of the United States Government in encourag-
ing the creation of retirement plans is to equalize the, tax differential
between personal service income and income from capital wealth, the
Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962 is still far off
course and quite deceptive-we suggest, "she is neither fish nor fowl'nor
good red herring."
B. Some Comments on the Formation of a Professional Association
Or Corporation
Once we cast aside the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement
Act of 1962 as a patently inadequate retirement plan scheme for lawyers
and other self-employed persons, we are again forced to consider the
case for the professional association or corporation. The road to corporate
tax treatment for the law firm is not easily traveled. It has many curves,
67 IRC § 401(a). Additional benefits available to corporate employees are stock options
(IRC § 421) and deferred compensation contracts.
68 IRC § 403(b).
69 Rev. Rul. 62-139, 1962 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 34, at 16.
70 See notes 200-07 infra and accompanying text.
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detours, and roadblocks; and not all of them are clearly posted. Before
we discuss the ethical, legal, and jurisprudential aspects of the corporate
practice of law, the first logical inquiry is: is the trip worth taking?
If we focus our attention solely on the pension, profit-sharing, and
stock-option plans available to corporations and their employees we are
at once convinced that the journey into the corporate wonderland is well
worth any effort it may take. But the federal tax structure is far too
complex to permit an easy transition from the individual and partnership
forms of doing business to the corporation or association without any
serious tax consequences. The great temptation to acquire the more
liberal retirement plan benefits available to certain entities taxed as
corporations should not cause us to overlook the need to compare the
entire partnership tax structure with the entire corporate tax structure
before any intelligent decision can be made. This comparative analysis
should include not only the different rate structures and other problems
of everyday operation but, in addition, the tax consequences on formation
and termination of the partnership and corporation. It may well be that
the practice of law in corporate form would provide many significant tax
benefits apart from the retirement plan. Likewise, we may find that
certain features of the corporate tax structure will vitiate the potential
benefits available under the retirement plan. Although there are un-
doubtedly a vast number of significant problems that need to be explored
in this area, lawyers, doctors, and other persons who derive their income
from personal service rather than from capital wealth have certain pecu-
liar problems of their own.
One item that will undoubtedly cause some concern to professional
firms is amounts to be collected from clients, sometimes referred to as
"accounts receivable" or "unrealized receivables." Furthermore, the tax
implications of this one asset are not limited to the problems of formation
of a corporation. Accounts receivable will continue to be an important
tax factor during the operation of the firm, and at its termination (by
death or otherwise), and even beyond death into the estate of a deceased
member of the firm. Under the general principles of federal income taxa-
tion, amounts to be collected from clients normally represent "income"
and not capital or "property." If a solo practitioner or partnership
decides to form an association or corporation pursuant to state law and
the Treasury Regulations,71 will there be a taxable event on the transfer
of the accounts receivable and the other assets (including good will) to
the new entity? If so, will the gain on the accounts receivable and the
71 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -11 (1963); T.D, 6503 (1960); see part II of this paper,
infra at 655.
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good will be ordinary income or capital gain? In the case of a partnership,
should the partnership first be liquidated and the partners make the
transfers to the association or corporation, or should the partnership
itself transfer its assets to the new entity and the partnership distribute
the new entity's stock (if there is stock) or other ownership interest to
its partners?
Section 351 of the Code in effect postpones recognition of any gain or
loss on the transfer of property to a corporation in exchange for corporate
stock or securities if the transferor or transferors control the corporation
immediately after the exchange. The chief reason for this section is that
although there has been a technical sale or exchange of property for
stock, in reality it is merely a change in form (i.e., a transfer within the
same economic unit from one pocket to another). The application of this
section to the professional person raises several questions. First, does
the word "property" include accounts receivable? Section 351 does not
define "property" other than stating that "stock ... issued for services
shall not be considered as issued in return for property. ' Section 1221
(4) expressly excludes from the definition of property for capital gain
or loss purposes "accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary
course of trade or business for services rendered .... " It could be argued
that since this express exception is not included in Section 351, and since
the only exception is for services rendered, money due from clients is
property and thus not taxable when transferred to the controlled cor-
poration or association.7' But it has been held74 that the transfer of
accounts receivable to shareholders in complete liquidation of a corpora-
tion was an anticipatory assignment of income and not a transfer of
property even though the corporation liquidation sections75 do not ex-
pressly exclude accounts receivable from the definition of property. Al-
though transfers of accounts receivable to corporations must certainly be
a frequent occurrence, there is very little authority on the taxability of
such a transfer. However, what little authority there is seems to indicate
that it will be treated as property for Section 351 purposes.7" Treating the
transfer as a taxable event to the transferors would not seem to be con-
sistent with the policy underlying Section 351. Unlike the case where
72 IRC § 351(a).
73 IRC § 317 defines "property" for certain corporate distribution purposes only.
74 Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 524 (Ct. Cl. 1961); J. Ungar, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 244 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 19 7); cf. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Commissioner, 247
F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1957).
75 IRC §§ 331-37. However, the installment sales regulations (Treas. Reg. § 1.453-9
(1963)) specifically state that no gain or loss shall be recognized on the transfer of in-
stallment obligations in an IRC § 351 transfer.
76 P. A. Birren & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1940).
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services are rendered or to be rendered for the stock to be received from
the corporation, the government can keep a closer tab on the accounts
receivable by giving it a zero basis in the hands of the corporation.77 On
the other hand, where accounts receivable are distributed in complete
liquidation of a corporation to various shareholders, different policy rea-
sons might justify taxing the distributing corporation on the value of
these receivables as an anticipatory assignment of income.
Although Section 351 might therefore apply to postponing recognition
of gain on both ordinary income and capital gain types of transfers, it
should be noted that once the accounts receivable get into the hands of
the corporation or association, it is possible, at least with regard to some
of the stockholders or associates, that their portion of the accounts re-
ceivable could be converted from ordinary income to capital gain by a
sale of their stock or beneficial interest. Even though the corporation or
association would be taxed on the receivables at the corporate ordinary
income rates (in many cases lower than the individual rates), there is an
opportunity to shift the ultimate tax burden over to a low bracket mem-
ber. Whatever this flexibility is worth, it is not available to the partner-
ship because of the so-called "collapsible partnership" provisions of
Section 751. A partner who sells his interest in a partnership is normally
selling an interest in a capital asset, except for unrealized receivables and
certain inventory items. The sale of an interest in a corporation, on the
other hand, is treated entirely as a sale of a capital asset, even though a
portion of what is being sold is really an interest in receivables or other
income items.
Once we conclude that accounts receivable can be property for Section
351 purposes, the next problem is the 80% control requirement.7" Those
who transfer "property" to the corporation must end up controlling 80%
or more of the stock of the corporation. This, of course, guarantees the
continuity of interest in the transferee corporation. But in addition to
the usual problems applicable to this provision79 lawyers and other pro-
fessionals will have some problems of their own. Only a few of the state
professional corporation and association statutes call for the issuance of
shares of capital stock. In view of the 80% of stock requirement together
with the provision that the transfer must be "solely in exchange for
stock or securities" [emphasis added], if the statute were to be interpreted
literally, then Section 351 would not apply to transfers to associations or
77 IRC § 362. IRC § 351(a) treats the issuance of stock for services as a taxable event
at ordinary income rates. See note 83 infra.
78 IRC § 368(c).
79 See Bittker, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders 89 (1959).
638 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 48
professional corporations where no-stock or other certificates are issued.
Even though complying with the continuity of interest doctrine and the
policy behind the 80% and solely for stock rules, professional persons, at
least from the government's point of view, may be in a precarious position.
The goal of Congress in defining an "association" as a corporation for tax
purposes was not to extend corporate tax benefits to those who could not
incorporate for state law purposes. Rather it was intended to prevent
avoidance of the corporate double-tax burden by those who obtained all
of the benefits of state corporation law without in fact organizing a cor-
poration. Therefore, we are involved with a situation in which professional
groups are not only using an indirect route to obtain tax relief, but, in
addition, they are using a section of the Code that was enacted to produce
an opposite result. In fact, up until 19540 of the litigation on the meaning
of the term "association" for federal tax purposes involved taxpayers who
were arguing that they were not an association. Therefore, any pre-1954
judicial or administrative authority dispensing with the requirement that
"stock" be issued for Section 351 or any other corporate tax purpose
might not be carried over to the professional association or corporation."1
In other words, although the present regulations defining association do
not require the issuance of stock in order to have general corporate tax
treatment, the Internal Revenue Service could through very technical
reasoning say that Section 351 is not applicable to professional associa-
tions without stock even though: it is applicable to oil and gas lease
associations where the joint operators do not receive stock. This same
rationale could carry over to other situations where, for example, a sale
of an interest in an association not represented by actual stock certificates
results in the sale of a pro rata share of each association or corporation
asset, thus precluding capital gains treatment on items such as accounts
receivable.8" In order to avoid this strict interpretation, the state statutes
should provide for the issuance of shares of stock.
Further difficulties with regard to the 80% rule might arise where one
or more members of the new entity do not contribute money or other
property but instead receive a share of the association or corporation in
return for services. For example, some state statutes require at least
three associates; and A and B, who are operating a law partnership, might
decide to transfer all of their assets (including receivables and appreciated
property) to an association and give C a one-third interest. If C contrib-
80 United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
81 For such a ruling with regard to an oil and gas lease association, see Special Ruling,
January 11, 1949, reported in S CCH 1949 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. fI 6061.
82 E.g., Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945).
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utes nothing but his future services, then C is immediately taxed on his
one-third share as compensation (the new entity apparently gets a deduc-
tion), and A and B cannot use Section 351 because they own less than 80%
of the association. Therefore, all of the gain on the property, including the
value of the accounts receivable, is subject to current taxation with the
receivables taxed at ordinary income rates. Perhaps it is possible to avoid
some of these adverse consequences by either postponing C's ownership
interest for two or three years, or by having A and B retain the receivables
and/or other property in their own hands, whereby the income would be
reported by them as received. However, both of these devices could be
attacked as mere tax-avoidance schemes,83 and could also have a further
adverse effect on the association's or corporation's complying with the
state statutes, the Treasury Regulations, and the pension plan provisions.
It could be argued that since the partners are now operating as a new
entity their services with regard to the collection of the accounts receivable
(which may include the value of uncompleted work in the partnership)
are really performed for the corporation, and thus the accounts receivable
would be constructively transferred to the new entity. Indeed, the Com-
missioner may have authority to allocate income to the new entity by
Sections 482 and 446. Of course, if C were able to raise sufficient cash
or property to contribute enough to bring his share over 20%, then the
80% rule would be complied with and no gain or loss would be recognized
under Section 351.84
If a transfer to a corporation or association does not comply with
Section 351, the tax consequences for a lawyer could be so adverse as to
warrant a decision to forget about the golden harvest of corporate pension
plans and other corporate tax benefits. First of all, what is the value of
the property transferred as compared with the basis of that property?
If accounts receivable are included within the definition of "property,"
then what do the accounts receivable include? Will any good will be
deemed to be transferred? If so, how will it be valued? Those lawyers
and law firms who report their own income on the accrual basis (a rarity
83 For a discussion of transactions outside of IRC J 351 and te possibility of a "sale"
unrelated to the "transfer," see, Paul & Kalish, "Transition from a Partnership to a
Corporation," N.Y.U. 18th Inst. on Fed. Tax 639, 651 (1960); Bittker, supra note 79, at 102.
84 In some instances lawyers may prefer the transfer to be treated as a taxable one in
order to get a stepped-up basis on appreciated property for depreciation purposes. In
this connection the new IRC § 1245 (pertaining to certain personal property), Rev. Rul. 92,
1962-1 Cum. Bull. 29 and Cohn v. United States, 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958) (dealing
with the loss of the depreciation deduction where the sale price exceeds the adjusted basis
of the property) will have to be considered. Also IRC § 1239, regarding transfers by an
individual (and by partnerships?) to a controlled corporation, may tax the transfer at
ordinary income rather than at capital gain rates. On the other hand, where there are
potential losses (i.e., high basis-low value properties), IRC § 267 may disallow such losses
where the corporate entity is used.
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in professional firms) would already have reported amounts billed or
due as of the close of their last taxable year. Any of these accounts
which would not have been collected at the time of their transfer to the
new entity would result in no gain or loss at the time of the transfer and
would have a basis in the hands of the corporation equivalent to the
amount already taxed to the partnership or transferor. However, the
property rights actually transferred to the professional association or
corporation include more than the amounts presently due from clients.
In fact, the Treasury Regulations covering the partnership provisions
define unrealized receivables as including "services rendered or to be
rendered, to the extent that income arising from such rights to payment
was not previously includible in income under the method of accounting
employed by the partnership. Such rights must have arisen under con-
tracts or agreements in existence at the time of sale or distribution,
although the partnership may not be able to enforce payment until a later
time. For example, the term includes trade accounts receivable of a
cash method taxpayer, and rights to payment for work or goods begun
but incomplete at the time of the sale or distribution." 5
Under this broad definition all work in process, pending contingency
litigation, and retainer contracts would have to be valued and included
in the amount tiansferred.8 6 While it is true that many law firms collect
their fees on a comparatively' current basis, many doctors and dentists
have large amounts due on billed accounts receivable for a year or
more, and therefore if Section 351 is not complied with they might
experience an immediate tax on amounts which in the ordinary course of
their business would not be collected in the current taxable year. On the
other hand, law firms normally have significantly large amounts of
contingent fees and other work in process which might not be realized
and collected for some time to come. The valuation of the amounts to be
collected for these services will often be difficult, but this factor will not
prevent the taxation of these amounts at the time of formation of the new
entity unless Section 351 is fully complied with.
The broad definition of unrealized receivables for partnership purposes
raises the question of whether or not the same definition would carry
over to non-partner or non-partnership transfers to professional associa-
tions or corporations. Certainly a solo practitioner or group of individuals
85 Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(c) (ii) (1956).
86 The Advisory Group on Subchapter K has proposed a change in the definition of
unrealized receivables in IRC § 751(c) which would include all property which would
result in ordinary income if sold at a gain. Advisory Group, Subcommittee on Internal
Revenue Taxation of the Committee on Ways and Means Revised Report on Partners and
Partnerships 41 (December 31, 1957).
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who were not previously associated in the practice of law as partners
would not be bound by the partnership provisions. But in the usual case
the lawyers who form associations or corporations would bring with them
not only their billed accounts receivable, but in addition any contract or
property rights such as unbilled receivables, work in process, and re-
tainer rights, which would have to be valued and taxed in the event that
Section 351 does not apply. In the case of a partnership the partners
will have to consider the question of whether they should have the
partnership itself make the transfer to the new entity or whether the
partnership should first be liquidated and the partner make the contribu-
tion of property directly to the new entity. In either case, the partner-
ship would be deemed to be liquidated, and in most instances there would
be no gain or loss to the partners or to the partnership no matter which
route was followed. If the partnership distributed all of its assets to the
partners in complete liquidation, the partners would merely take as their
basis for the property distributed their pro rata share of the partnership
basis for such property. However, where the total partnership basis for
the property to be distributed differs from the partners' bases for their
partnership interests, or where there have been disproportionate distribu-
tions of property to any of the partners, it might well make a difference
to some partners whether or not the partnership or the partners make
the contribution of property to the professional association or corpora-
tion.87 As far as Section 351 is concerned, the transfer can be by the
partners or by the partnership itself.'8
Another item of property that could cause problems on the formation
of a professional association or corporation is good will. Despite some
ethical prohibition against professionals and especially lawyers being able
to transfer good will,89 it could be successfully argued that where a
professional person forms a corporation or association he is transferring
an element of good will to the new entity. If the transfer as a whole com-
plies with Section 351, then no gain will be recognized as to the good will
at that time. However, when the corporation or association is liquidated
there will probably be a taxable gain with regard to the then existing
good will.9 ° Therefore, those who contemplate a trial period with the
professional association or corporation and later find that they would
rather operate in partnership form may find themselves paying a capital
87 See Jackson, Johnson, Surrey, Tenen & Warren, "The Internal Revenue Code of 1954:
Partnerships," 54 Colum. L. Rev. 1183, 1228 (1954).
88 Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1 (1955).
89 See notes 275-84 infra.
90 For a more complete discussion of the tax consequences on termination of a corpora-
tion and the nature of good will see note 129 infra and the accompanying text.
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gains tax on something they never anticipated. One important observa-
tion with regard to good will is the different tax consequences of a sale
or transfer of good will among partners in a partnership as compared to
a transaction between stockholders or associates of a corporation or
association. The partnership provisions allow the partnership agreement
to determine the nature of gain on the sale or transfer of good willY' If
the partnership agreement does not specify a payment for good will, the
distribution to the retiring or deceased partner will be taxed as ordinary
income (i.e., a distribution out of profits), whereas if the partnership
agreement does call for a payment of good will the distributee partner is
normally allowed to treat such payment as a capital distribution 2 In
most instances, therefore, the remaining partners would prefer to have
the distribution treated as a pro rata" distribution of profits, thereby
lowering their share of ordinary income, while the retiring partner or a
deceased partner's estate would normally prefer to have the distribution
classified as a capital transaction. Although this does provide some
flexibility in shifting the tax burdens to low-bracket partners, in most
cases it results in give and take bargaining and some dissension among
the partners. If law partnerships are allowed to transfer their good will
to an entity which will be taxed as a corporation they will lose some of
this flexibility, but they will for the most part assure each associate or
stockholder capital gains treatment on amounts received for good will
without the necessity of an agreement to that effect.
C. Other Transitional Problems
The transfer of an existing law firm (either sole proprietorship or
partnership) to a corporation or association may not be a taxable event
where the requirements of Section 351 are met. But even though there
is a mere change in form of conducting a law practice, there are serious
tax accounting problems that may develop. First, there is the problem of
allocation of income and deduction items to the proper entity. Next
there is the problem of bunching income into an abnormally short period
for tax return purposes. A further problem exists in the choice of a
taxable year for the new entity.
If accounts receivable are deemed to be property for Section 351
purposes, and that section is otherwise complied with, then the income
will be reported by the corporation or association as collected or as
accrued if the new entity adopts the accrual method of reporting. But if
91 IRC § 736(b).
92 See Tenen, "Tax Problems of Service Partnerships," N.Y.U. 16th Inst. on Fed. Tax
137 (1958).
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the transfer of accounts receivable is not a "351 transfer," then the value
of all the receivables will be taxed to the partners or individuals at the
time of transfer unless the partners or solo practitioners can effectively re-
tain ownership of these accounts until collected. The transfer of liabilities
to the professional association or corporation raises the problem of
whether or not payment by the corporation or association will be a
deductible item for the new entity. Even where the transferor is on the
cash basis there is some authority for allowing a deduction of the liability
at the time of liquidation before actual payment was madef 3 However,
because of the sparsity of precedent, items such as accrued wages, interest,
rent, and taxes incurred by a law partnership, for example, should per-
haps be paid by the partnership before final liquidation in order to insure
the deductibility of the expense.
The time of the year at which partners choose to form a professional
association or corporation demands serious consideration. For example,
let us assume a partnership which has a January 31 fiscal yeare4 winds up
its affairs on September 30. The final partnership year would therefore
close on September 30, and, assuming that all the partners were calendar
year taxpayers, there would be a bunching of one and two-thirds years
income in each partner's current calendar year. 5 The difference in the
rate bracket applicable to this additional income being taxed in one year
might in some cases wipe out the current tax advantages of a pension or
profit-sharing plan or other sought-after corporate tax benefits.
The choice of a taxable year for a corporation or association is much
less restrictive than in the case of partnerships formed after April 1, 1954.
Section 706(b) provides that a partnership may not change to or adopt
a taxable year other than that of its principal partners (5% or more)
unless it establishes a business purpose to the satisfaction of the Com-
missioner. Since this rule is obviously impossible to follow in cases where
the principal partners have different tax years, the partnership would
probably have to be on a calendar year. In the case of corporations,
however, the taxable year can be any twelve month period. This is
another example of where the rules which are properly applicable to large
corporations carry over to the closely-held corporation (including a Sub-
chapter S Corporation) which in substance more nearly resembles a
93 Colonial Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 47 B.TA. 518 (1942) (acq.). With regard
to certain real property tax situations see IRC §§ 164(d), 461(c).
94 The requirement of IRC § 706(b) that the partnership taxable year be the same as
that of all its principal partners is not applicable to partnerships organized prior to 1954.
(TRC § 771(b)).
95 IRC § 706(a) requires the partner to include his share of the partnership income for
any taxable year of the partnership ending within or with the taxable year of the partner.
1963]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
partnership. At a time when future tax rate reductions are in the offing,
the selection of a corporation or association fiscal year which will enable
a deferral or postponement of tallying up with the government by calendar
year associates or stockholders might be in order. However, there might
be practical limitations on this flexibility in cases where salaries would
have to be currently withdrawn in order to avoid the double-tax on
corporate profits (where Subchapter S elections are not in force), or where
the Subchapter S election is in force to protect the pension plan contribu-
tion which is based on actual salary withdrawn and not "constructive
dividends."
D. Some Comments on the Operation of a Professional Association or
Corporation
When law firms transform themselves into a corporate or association
entity they are stepping into a maze of problems that bear constant
consideration. Members of the firm will have little time for discussing
such homey things as covenants running with the land, directed verdicts,
statute of frauds; and instead they will be heard uttering (to themselves
as well as to one another) phrases such as double-taxation, reasonable
salaries, pension plans, personal holding company, Subchapter S Corpora-
tion, and tax avoidance purpose. Much has already been written on the
tax consequences of operating a professional corporation." However,
some further observations are in order.
The problems of the corporate rate structure, taxes on personal holding
companies, taxes on accumulated earnings, and the Subchapter S election
to be taxed as individuals are all unimportant ones in a professional
association or corporation where all of the income can be distributed
currently in the form of "reasonable salaries 0197 (including pension plan
contributions) to the members of the firm. If all the profits are with-
drawn in the form of salaries, then there are no accumulated earnings, 9
no corporate tax, and no personal holding company income,9 so that the
net result is generally the same as that which exists in a partnership with
each member's salary being in effect the same as his would-be share of
partnership income. Therefore, the primary question becomes: what is
a "reasonable salary"? In most law firms the amounts paid to each mem-
ber will bear a reasonable relationship to services rendered. But in iso-
96 E.g., see Jones, "The Professional Corporation," 27 Fordham L. Rev. 353 (1958);
Kahn, "The Wisconsin Service Corporation Law of 1961," 1962 Wis. L. Rev. 65; Maier
& Wild, "Taxation of Professional Firms as Corporations," 44 Marq. L. Rev. 127 (1960);
Notes, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 844 (1961), 12 Stan. L. Rev. 746 (1960).
97 IRC § 162(a) (1).
98 IRC §§ 531-37.
99 IRC §§ 541-47.
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lated cases, such as where a large salary is paid to an older or inactive
member (who more often than not is the one who generates the business)
who renders little direct service to the firm, the profssional association or
corporation might conceivably lose the salary deduction as being un-
reasonable in amount. This problem may also arise in certain family law
firms where the father, for example, takes a salary disproportionate to
that of his young lawyer son. Where the family law firm is run in the
form of a partnership, the Code provides for an allocation of the partner-
ship income first to the father for his reasonable compensation for
services rendered, with the remainder divided according to each partner's
distributive share.10 This same principle is carried over to family cor-
porations electing Subchapter S treatment.01 In the case of the family
partnership or family Subchapter S Corporation the reasonable salary
problem is not as serious as it is in the case of the regular corporation
where the double-tax would xesult upon disallowance of any part of a
salary deduction considered unreasonable in amount. Therefore, for ex-
ample, if a father and his two sons (all lawyers) were to form an as-
sociation and it was determined by the Internal Revenue Service that
the salary paid to the two sons was too high (i.e., unreasonable in
amount), unless the association elected to be taxed as a Subchapter S
Corporation the unreasonable amount of salary could not be re-allocated
to the father to avoid both the corporate tax and the tax to the sons on
that amount."°
Those professional associations or corporations who cannot draw out
all of the profits in the form of salary or other deductible expenses may
minimize the double-tax burden to some extent by purchasing insurance
on the lives of their members. Although life insurance premiums are not
deductible'03 in computing the association or corporation taxable income,
the excess of the premiums paid over any cash surrender value will reduce
the earnings and profits account (i.e., the amount available for the second
tax as dividends); and if care is taken not to give the member-insured
any irrevocable rights in the policy, the premium payments will not be
taxed as a dividend to the member. 04
100 IRC § 704(e) (2).
101 IRC § 1375(c).
102 Further implications of this problem involve the question of whether or not the
amount taxed to the sons represents dividend or salary. If a dividend, is it eligible for the
$50.00 exclusion and 47 credit? How is this amount treated for pension plan purposes?
103 IRC § 264(a).
104 E.g., Sanders v. Fox, 253 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958); Prunier v. Commissioner, 248
F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957); Casale v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957); Rev. Rul.
184, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 65. Related to these problems are estate tax consequences on incidents
of ownership of life insurance policies (IRC § 2042), and transfers of policies to a corpora-
tion in which the insured is a shareholder as compared to transfers to fellow stockholders
(IRC § 101(a) (2)).
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If the professional association or corporation still has a taxable income
after deducting salaries, expenses, and insurance premiums, another way
to overcome the double-tax burden is the Subchapter S election. It is
somewhat paradoxical that the declared Congressional purpose in allow-
ing certain "small business corporations" to avoid the corporate tax on
the condition that the shareholders report their pro rata share of the
corporate income( whether distributed or not) on their own returns, was
to allow certain taxpayer groups to choose their legal entity without tax
influences.105 Another example of this same Congressional purpose is
Subchapter R of the Code which permits certain individuals and part-
nerships to elect irrevocably to be taxed as a corporation.108 Lawyers
and other professional folk are precluded from utilizing this Subchapter
R election because of its express limitation to enterprises where capital
is a material income-producing factor. 0 7 Furthermore, although Sub-
chapter R permits general corporate tax treatment, it specifically denies
corporate pension and profit-sharing benefits to the owners of such un-
incorporated businesses." 8 Although it is difficult to understand who
would desire the Subchapter R election, it is reported that, "Rumor has
it that a cotton brokerage partnership prevented by state law from incor-
porating was the intended beneficiary."'09
Although those who derive their income from personal service are
precluded from Subchapter R, they are permitted to be a Subchapter S
Corporation, provided all of the requirements are met. To be eligible
for Subchapter S treatment a corporation cannot derive more than 20%
of its gross receipts from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities,
and sale or exchanges of stock or securities. 1 Since personal service
income is not included professional associations or corporations with ten
or fewer associates or stockholders are presumably eligible for the elec-
tion. Despite the declared Congressional purpose in enacting this elec-
tion to enable non-tax considerations to govern the choice of entity, most
professionals who elect the corporate form will be doing so for the tax
advantages of qualified pension plans. In this connection it should be
noted that the Treasury Department has in the past proposed legislation
to prohibit Subchapter S Corporations from obtaining corporate pension
plan benefits." 1 The passage of HR-10 might give new incentive to
105 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1956).
106 IRC § 1361.
10 IRC § 1361(b)(4).
108 IRC § 1361(d).
109 Surrey & Warren, Federal Income Taxation 1470 (1960).
110 IRC § 1372(e)(S).
111 E.g., H. R. 9003, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 104 Cong. Rec. 17,638 (1959).
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Treasury efforts to block professional self-employed persons (and other
small business groups) from the more liberal corporate pension plan
provisions.
The Subchapter S Corporation undoubtedly has its advantages for
some taxpayer groups. For example, those corporations that anticipate
operating losses will be guaranteed the deduction of these losses against
the stockholders' other income by electing Subchapter S treatment.12
However, lawyers and other professionals (especially those interested in
corporate fringe benefits) hardly ever have operating losses. In addition,
lawyers should not make the erroneous assumption that a Subchapter S
Corporation is taxed as if it were a "partnership." There are many signifi-
cant differences between a Subchapter S Corporation and a partner-
ship.1 ' Death or withdrawal of an associate or shareholder not only
immediately terminates the Subchapter S election for the entire firm, but
any undistributed and previously taxed earnings cannot be distributed
tax-free to the retired associate or to a deceased associate's estate.114
A Subchapter S Corporation must have unanimous consent of the asso-
ciates or shareholders" 5 (thus making it cumbersome for the expanding
law firm), and even though an estate of a deceased member can consent
to the continuance of the Subchapter S election, in the case of lawyers,
for example, the Canons of Ethics and state statutes themselves nor-
mally prohibit a non-lawyer from having a proprietary interest in a law
practice. What effect would this have on the Subchapter S election?
Since Section 1371 requires "one class of stock" (emphasis added), will
professional associations or corporations which do not issue actual shares
of stock be ineligible for the Subchapter S election? This observation
may be criticized as an unduly technical and literal reading of the statute,
but here again lawyers may find the Treasury using all the ammunition
it has (no matter how illogical) to stop the run on pension plan benefits.
The law firms with more than 10 "owners" are the ones most likely
to have "unreasonable salary" and double-tax problems. However, even
though Subchapter S is not available to these firms, the personal holding
company 75-85% penalty tax will also be avoided where more than 5
members own over 50% of the interest in the firm.""
Once the embattled lawyer works his way through the specific complex
statutory requirements pertaining to the formation and operation of a
112 IRC § 1374.
113 See Caplin, "Subchapter S vs. Partnership: A Proposed Legislative Program," 46 Va.
L. Rev. 61 (1960).
114 IRC §§ 1372(e), 1375(d).
115 IRC § 1372(a).
116 IRC §§ 541, 542(a)(2). For other exceptions to the personal holding company
tax see IRC § 542(c).
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corporation and is just about to make the decision to form a corporation
or association, he is faced with Section 269. That section provides, among
other things, that if "any person or persons acquire or acquired... con-
trol of a corporation.., and the principal purpose for which such acqui-
sition was made is evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax by se-
curing the benefit of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which such
person . . . would not otherwise enjoy, then such deduction, credit, or
other allowance shall not be allowed." The apparent purpose for the
enactment of this section was to prevent avoidance of the excess-profits
tax and to stop purchases of loss corporations purely for tax reasons. If
Section 269 were taken literally, however, it could apply to all cases
where tax considerations were the principal factors in selecting the cor-
porate form of doing business. The fact that there have been very few
government victories in this area indicates the difficulty of proving a
principal tax avoidance purpose. Although most lawyers who form asso-
ciations or corporations are readily apt to admit that the corporation
retirement plan was the principal purpose for their action, it is con-
ceivable that many professional persons, especially solo practitioners, may
find the association a more efficient and natural way to conduct a profes-
sional practice aside from tax considerations. The traditional business
corporation, however, always has the convenient concept of limited lia-
bility as a dominant purpose in forming a corporation. The professsional
corporation and association statutes of the various states, together with
the peculiarities of the legal profession (and other professions), in effect
prohibit the limited liability concept from being advanced by profes-
sional persons as their principal purpose in forming a corporation or
association. Although in the long run Section 269 will probably be one
of" the minor hurdles (or no hurdle at all) for the professional to over-
come, at the present time it is another weapon in the hands of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service as a means of discouraging the professional associa-
tion or corporation. If the government wants to preclude the professional
person from corporate pension and profit-sharing plan benefits, it should
do so by direct legislation to that effect.
The operation of a law practice in corporate form might mean the loss
of certain tax benefits available exclusively to non-corporate taxpayers.
For example, Section 1301 is a special averaging device which provides
that where 80% or more of the compensation or fees pertaining to one
particular project or case are collected in one taxable year the amount
received may be spread back ratably over the period that the services
were rendered, provided such period exceeds thirty-six months. This
section was apparently passed for members of the legal profession who
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have, for example, many contingent fee cases and the like which with
docket delays, etc., may extend beyond three years. Since the benefits
of this section are expressly available only to individuals or partnerships,
the professional corporation or association will lose this averaging device
even if the Subchapter S election were in force.
Any intelligent comparison of the partnership and corporate tax pro-
visions and their effect on the professional person should include the tax
consequences of one partner or associate doing business with a partner-
ship or association. Will he be deemed to be transacting business with
himself, with an aggregate of individuals including himself, or with a
completely separate entity?117 Will the corporate treatment of capital
gains and losses differ materially from that of the partnership structure?
Some of the fringe benefits such as the sick-pay exclusion,"" group life
insurance (often limited to organizations with 10 or more employees),
medical and health benefits," 9 split-dollar insurance, deferred compen-
sation plans,120 and the $5000 death benefit,' 2 ' etc., which are now
available to corporate taxpayers may provide more actual tax saving than
the pension and profit-sharing plan. Before the professional puts too
much emphasis on any one or more of these fringe benefits he should
remember that the current Tax Reform Bill proposes to repeal such
things as the sick-pay exclusion and certain group medical benefits.
There is also a strong possibility for the enactment of new averaging
devices for those who render personal services. Such provisions may not
be applicable to income earned by or through an association or corpora-
tion. Furthermore, any changes in the corporate and individual rate
structure will undoubtedly have an effect on whether or not to incor-
porate, especially with regard to those firms that will not be able to
distribute all of their current income and thereby become subject to both
the corporate and individual tax. Finally, it is to be observed that some
states have taxes on corporate profits but not on non-corporate profits.
How will associations be treated for state tax purposes?
E. Some Comments on the Termination of the Professional Association
or Corporation
If the government allows professionals to enter the indelible corporate
tax cage, will these professionals later look out with envy at their less
17 IRC § 707.
118 IRC § 105(d).
"19 IRC §§ 105, 106.
120 However, the deferred compensation arrangement may be unattractive for a law
firm where the future solvency and stability of the firm may be uncertain.
121 IRC § 101(b).
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greedy (perhaps more conservative is a better term) kinfolk who re-
mained in the partnership tax arena? The transition from a partnership
to a corporation is not a taxable event assuming compliance with Section
351. However, if the corporate environment proves to be disagreeable,
a change back to partnership form will in most cases be an expensive
proposition. A complete liquidation of a corporation is generally a tax-
able event even though the stockholders plan to continue the business in
partnership form. In the case of law firms that are taxed as corporations,
the items that will cause the most concern on liquidation are the previ-
ously untaxed accounts receivable (perhaps defined to include the value
of retainers and work in process) and possible good will. The other
assets, such as the law library, office equipment, and other property which
have values higher than the adjusted bases will also produce taxable gain.
Unlike the partnership, the corporation is a separate taxable entity,
and therefore the complete liquidation of the law association or corpora-
tion could produce double-tax problems. Those law corporations that
liquidate within a short time after their formation also run the risk of
being classified as "collapsible corporations."'"m Although a Subchap-
ter S election solely for liquidation purposes might remove the double-tax
burden, the lack of coordination between the collapsible corporation
provision and the use of Subchapter S makes this a very dangerous area
around which to plan.
When the corporation distributes the unrealized receivables to its mem-
bers in return for all of their stock or all of their interests in the corpora-
tion, is there a tax to the corporation? Section 336 states that "no gain
or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the distribution of property
in partial or complete liquidation" (emphasis added) .123 But here again
what is meant by "property"? Does it include receivables? A Second
Circuit case'2 4 and Court of Claims case 125 say "no," while the Sixth
and Ninth Circuits 26 say "yes." The theory used for taxing the corpora-
tion is that it is an anticipatory assignment of income to its shareholders.
However, some cases which have applied the assignment of income doc-
trine seem to limit it to the income that has been "earned" as distinguished
from future rights to income where the actual services have not yet been
rendered. 12 7 Applying this reasoning to the law firm, it is possible that
122 IRC § 341.
123 The only express exception to this rule relates to the disposition of installment obliga-
tions. IRC § 453(d).
124 J. Ungar, Inc. v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1957).
125 Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 524 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
126 Cold Metal Process Co. v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1957), United States
v. Horschel, 205 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1953).
127 E.g., see Williamson v. United States, supra note 125. Cf. J. Ungar, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, supra note 124.
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only that portion of the receivables attributable to services already ren-
dered would be taxed as ordinary income to the corporation. The re-
mainder (work in process and value of the retainer contracts) would be
taxed to the distributees when the services were rendered and the fees
collected. That portion of the receivables that is taxed to the corporation
would of course become part of the corporation's ordinary income for the
final taxable year; and if all of the corporate profits in the final year
could be withdrawn in the form of reasonable salaries and other deduct-
ible expenses, there would be no double-tax problems. On the other hand,
where the corporate profit cannot be completely wiped out by salary and
expense deductions the excess will be deemed to be capital gain to the
distributee shareholders or associates unless the collapsible corporation
provision converts to ordinary income that portion of the receivables which
was not taxed to the corporation.'28 In most instances, however, the ex-
ceptions to the collapsible corporation rules will apply to law firms. In
the final analysis it might be possible for at least a portion of the accounts
receivable to be taxed only once at capital gain rates to the individual
shareholders or associates, and the basis for these receivables in the hands
of the partnership will be their fair market value at the time of liquida-
tion of the corporation or association.
The next item that will cause problems on the termination of a law
association or corporation is good will. It is certainly questionable
whether good will should be a factor in a personal service organization,
especially small or medium-size law firms where reputation and future
income are so closely connected with the individual members of the firm.
In fact, the Internal Revenue Service has itself questioned the existence
of good will where, for example, an accountant sold his accounting busi-
ness and sought to allocate a portion of the price to good will, a capital
asset.2 9 But the Tax Court has held that where a going professional
practice is sold, part of the price is for good will. 3° Where a corporation
distributes all of its assets in a complete liquidation, now that the shoe
is on the other foot, the Internal Revenue Service will most likely argue
that even though no money is being paid for good will, the distributees
ought to be considered as having received all of the corporation's good
will even though a good part of it was built up prior to the incorporation.
128 IRC §§ 331, 341.
129 Wyler v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1251 (1950); Horton v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.
143 (1949). Also see Cullen v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 368 (1950). Rev. Rul. 480,
1957-2 Cum. Bull. 49 states that an interest in good will in a professional partnership can
be sold only when an interest in the firm name is sold, and the seller agrees to the
continued use of his name in the partnership. See Tenen, supra note 92, at 154. See also
notes 273-84 infra and accompanying text.
130 See cases cited note 129 supra.
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Where the professional persons do not continue the practice of law in
partnership or individual form after the corporate liquidation, there
should be no tax on good will. Where the distributees are taxed on an
amount (which will be difficult to ascertain) as good will, they should of
course be allowed to add this to their basis for their partnership interests.
If the professional association or corporation proves to be a fruitful
experience, there are further problems to consider on the death, retire-
ment or withdrawal of a member of such an organization, as compared
with the tax implications involved when the partnership form is used.
A withdrawing or retiring member of a law firm can terminate his interest'
by various means. He can have the partnership or corporation pay him
for his interest; he can sell his interest to the remaining partners or stock-
holders; or he can sell his interest to an outsider (provided that the part-
nership or corporation agreements allow). In the case of a partnership
there are further problems such as premature closing of the partnership
and partners' tax years, and bunching of income. A transfer of a part-
nership interest either by sale to a partner or to an outsider, or by re-
demption by the partnership itself will generally produce ordinary income
to the withdrawing or retiring partner on his share of the partnership
income as of the effective date of the termination of his interest.131 In
each of these cases the partnership year closes with respect to the
selling partner; 1 - and where there has been a sale (by withdrawing, re-
tirement, or direct sale) of at least a 50% interest in the profits and
capital of the partnership, the partnership year will close with respect to
all the partners.'33 In addition to his share of partnership income up to
the date of termination of his interest the selling partner will be taxed
at ordinary income rates on that portion of the selling price which equals
the value of his interest in the unrealized receivables (broadly de-
fined).' The balance of his gain, if any, will be taxed at capital gain
rates. 35 Where the retiring partner in effect sells his interest to the
partnership itself the rules may vary somewhat, depending upon the part-
nership agreement. As we have previously indicated, the incidents of
taxation can be shifted among the partners by means of an express pro-
vision in the agreement regarding the payment of good will.136 Therefore
some of the ordinary income can be converted into capital gain to the
131 See Jackson, Johnson, Surrey, Tenen & Warren, supra note 87.
132 IRC § 706(c) (2).
133 IRC §§ 706(c), 708(b) (1) (B).
134 IRC § 751.
135 IRC § 741.
136 IRC § 736(b); notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text; see also notes 273, 278,
281, 285 infra.
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selling partner, but the remaining partners will be taxed on a higher
share of the partnership income.
The tax consequences on the withdrawal or retirement of an associate
or stockholder from a professional association or corporation will be
quite different from the results which obtain in the partnership. In the
first place, the taxable years of the association or corporation and the
associates or stockholders will not close on termination of the member's
interest in the firm. As with the partnership, there are various ways for
a member to "sell out." Subject to the terms of any buy-out agreements,
the retiring member can sell his stock or beneficial interest to an out-
sider, to a member or members of the firm, or to the firm itself by way
of a redemption. Unlike the partnership situation, however, the sale or
redemption will normally be a capital asset transaction 37 In most cases
the selling member's share of unrealized receivables will therefore be
taxed at capital gain rather than at ordinary income rates. The regular
problems applicable to all corporate stock redemptions, such as the pos-
sibility of constructive dividends to the continuing shareholders, the stock
attribution rules138 (particularly acute in family organizations) will have
their place in the professional association or corporation, but proper tax
planning can go a long way in eliminating most of these problems.
The death of a partner does not ordinarily close the taxable year of
the partner or partnership. The tax consequences are in most respects
the same as those with regard to the withdrawal or retirement of a part-
ner. The most significant problems that arise on the death of a partner
are with regard to the estate tax, the income tax basis provision,'3 9 and
the provision relating to "'income in respect of a decedent."'40 Here again
the partnership agreement will largely govern the tax results. The value
of the partnership interest of the deceased partner will be includible in
his gross estate for Federal Estate Tax purposes.'4 ' Included in this
interest will be the deceased partner's share of unrealized receivables and
his portion of undistributed partnership income up until the date of
death. For Federal Income Tax purposes, however, all of the decedent's
share of the partnership income for his final year is not reported on his
final income tax return, but instead it is reportable by the estate or the
beneficiaries of the estate as "income in respect of a decedent." In addi-
tion, any payment to the estate for the decedent's interest in unrealized
137 But see discussion at note 82 supra and accompanying text.
138 IRC § 302.
139 IRC § 1014(c).
140 IRC § 691.
141 IRC § 691(c) permits deduction for estate taxes on that portion of the estate tax
attributable to income in respect of a decedent.
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receivables and good will (in the absence of a specific provision in the
agreement calling for the payment of good will) will be taxed in full as
ordinary income in the hands of the estate or beneficiaries of the estate
as income in respect of a decedent."4 In other words, for basis purposes
the only items that will receive a stepped-up basis in the hands of the
estate will be capital and not income items.
The most significant difference, therefore, between the corporation and
partnership form on the death of a member of a law firm is in the classi-
fication of assets such as unrealized receivables and good will. In the
case of a corporation if the entire beneficial interest of the decedent is
deemed to be a capital asset, then the decedent's share of the unrealized
receivables and good will (if any) will not be income in respect of a
decedent, and thus in the usual case not taxed at all to the decedent's
estate because of a stepped-up basis of the property in the hands of the
estate. 4 3 In the case of a corporation, even if the amount allocable to
good will is not spelled out in any agreement, it is treated as a capital
item and not as an income item. Although the partnership provisions
have a great deal of flexibility it seems that as long as sales and redemp-
tions of corporate interests steer clear of the constructive dividend pro-
visions of Section 302, the incidents of taxation can be more beneficial
to the estate of a deceased member of a corporation than they are to an
estate of a deceased member of a partnership.
Before the professional person can make any decision as to whether
or not to form an entity which will be taxed as a corporation he must
have more definite assurance that the Internal Revenue Service will not
classify this as a tax-avoidance scheme. Other problems that need to be
fully explored in each individual case are the need for the issuance of
shares of stock and the tax treatment of the transfer of accounts re-
ceivable-whether this item will be deemed "property" or "income."
Above all, each professional group before it can chart its course must
map out all of the relative tax gains as against all of the costs of being
taxed as a corporation. The pension and profit-sharing plans should be
qualified by the Internal Revenue Service before any change in entity is
actually made. Lawyers should be aware that each type of law firm has
its own quagmire of problems.
Assuming that the rewards of practice in corporate form make it
worthwhile to encounter the tax problems involved, further questions still
142 IRC §§ 736(a), 753, 1014(c). But see notes 273-84 infra and accompanying text
regarding the ethical restrictions on the transfer of good will by an attorney.
143 IRC § 1014. In this connection it should be observed that the 1963 "Tax Bill" recom-
mends a capital gains tax on transfers of appreciated property (i.e., basis lower than value)
at death.
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remain. Can such practice be sanctioned under the standards of ethics
of the particular profession? Will the adoption of an ethically acceptable
corporation or association satisfy the Kintner regulations and permit the
organization to be taxed as a corporation?
II
THE KINTNER REGULATIONS AND THE NEW LocAL LAWS
On November 15, 1960, the Treasury Department adopted new regu-
lations defining "association" for the purpose of the federal income tax
laws.144 An organization's classification, according to the regulations, de-
pends solely on a corporate resemblance test: If it has more corporate
characteristics than non-corporate characteristics, it will be determined
to be an association and thus taxed as a corporation. The regulations
declare that the major characteristics of a corporation are (1) associates,
(2) an objective to carry on a business and divide the profits therefrom,
(3) continuity of life, (4) centralization of management, (5) liability
for corporate debts limited to corporate assets, and (6) free transfer-
ability of interests. The first two characteristics are considered essential,
but since they are common to both corporations and partnerships, an
organization to be classed as a corporation rather than a partnership must
have more of the other four corporate attributes than it lacks. In addi-
tion, other less significant characteristics of a corporation or non-cor-
porate entity may be given some weight in the determination.
These regulations were passed in response to United States v. Kint-
ner,'45 and have become known as the Kintner regulations, but it is dan-
gerous to assume that these regulations constitute administrative recog-
nition of the principles of that case. As in Kintner, an organization's
144 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960). The case and Treasury Department history leading
up to the new regulations has been adequately covered elsewhere. See e.g., articles cited
at note 96 supra. The leading case on the subject is Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S.
344 (1935). The essence of this case is that to be an "association," an organization must
have (1) associates engaged in a joint business enterprise, and (2) characteristics which
make it resemble a corporation. Such characteristics are: (a) legal title to the property of
the enterprise in a corporate-like entity; (b) centralized management; (c) continuity of
life; (d) limited liability; (e) free transferability of interests. The Morrissey case involved
a trust which had at one time 920 beneficiaries and only two trustees, thus resembling the
traditional separation of ownership and management in a large business corporation.
Subsequent to Morrissey, the government successfully argued that several Illinois doctors
who entered into a trust arrangement were taxable as an "association." Pelton v. Com-
missioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936). Then in 1954, a doctor-taxpayer was able to con-
vince the courts, over the government's strong objections, that an unincorporated association
of doctors should be classed as an "association" and thus taxed as a corporation. United
States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), aff'g, 107 F. Supp. 976 (D. Mont. 1952).
A similar conclusion was reached independently of the Kintner case, but in agreement with
it, in Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N-). Tex. 1959). See also notes 306-09 infra
and accompanying text.
145 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). See notes 11, 144 supra.
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classification is made to depend on a corporate resemblance test; but the
regulations differ from Kintner in the weight assigned to the various cor-
porate characteristics."4 6 Federal tax law is said to control, as it did in
the Kintner case, the classification of an organization for tax purposes;
but the regulations also differ from Kintner by looking to state law to
determine whether or not the required corporate characteristics are in fact
possessed-and can be legally possessed-by the organization. 14 7 Thus,
even though the articles of association provide that the association shall
continue to exist notwithstanding the death of a member, if, under the
applicable state law, such death would nevertheless cause the technical
dissolution of the organization, the characteristic of continuity of life
would not be possessed by the organization.
Several states have responded to the new regulations by authorizing
professionals to form corporations or associations which will possess some
or all of the major corporate characteristics specified by the regula-
tions.146  Four of these states have limited the corporate authorization
to physicians (and in one case physicians and dentists).1o Perhaps these
medical corporation statutes reflect an awareness of a stricter policy
against the corporate practice of law and other professions than against
the practice of medicine in corporate form. More likely, they are evi-
dence of the active and effective medical lobbying in the various states.
In any event, the states of Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, Michigan, New
Jersey, Oklahoma and Wisconsin have authorized lawyers as well as
doctors and other professionals to form corporations for the practice of
their respective professions, 150 and the Colorado Supreme Court has
146 See notes 144 supra, 308-09 infra and accompanying text.
147 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960); see notes 306-07 infra and accompanying
text.
148 See notes 149-54 infra. Comment, 16 Sw. LJ. 462, 470-79 (1962) contains a helpful
chart and discussion of the extent to which the state statutes have met the regulations.
Prior to the, enactment of the new statutes, professionals, with but a few exceptions, were
generally prohibited from practicing their professions in corporate form. See I Fletcher,
Cyclopedia Private Corporations § 97 (1931); Maier & Wild, "Taxation of Professional
Firms as Corporations," 44 Marq. L. Rev. 127 (1960); Note, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 844 (1961);
note 149 infra. The prohibitions against a corporation practicing law are discussed in notes
158-208 infra and accompanying text.
149 Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 64-1701 to -1717 (physicians), 64-1801 to -1817 (dentists) (Supp.
1961); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-180 (1958) (medical clinics; adopted prior to the
Kintner regulations) ; (Connecticut also has an association statute covering all professions, see
note 154 infra); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 319.01-.23 (Supp. 1962) (worded as if it applies to all
professions but § 319.02(2) limits its coverage to physicians); S.D. Code 1961, ch. 29
(physicians). Missouri may also allow incorporation by doctors. Sager v. Lewin, 128 Mo.
App. 149, 106 S.W. 581 (1907) (corporation supplied medical treatment through a qualified
physician) ; Op. Att'y Gen. No. 8 (March 15, 1962) ; see also State Electro-Medical Institute
v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078 (1905); State Electro-Medical Institute v. Platner, 74
Neb. 23, 103 N.W. 1079 (1905) (out of state corporation employed doctors for the practice
of medicine in Nebraska); Doumitt v. Diemer, 144 Ore. 36, 23 P.2d 918 (1933) (corporation
engaged in taking X-ray pictures and giving X-ray treatments) ; note 154 infra.
150 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 10-901 to -909 (Supp. 1962); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 621.01-.14
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adopted a court rule which permits incorporation by attorneys.1 1 Ohio
has provided for incorporated associations of professionals, 52 and Ten-
nessee has created a professional association which "shall be deemed
and treated at law as a corporation and not a partnership."' 53 Lawyers and
other professionals also have been authorized to practice in the "associa-
tion" form by statutes in Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia. 5 In addition, proposals
(Supp. 1962); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 274.005-.990 (1962); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.315 (1962),
7 CCH 1962 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ff 6420; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:19-1 to -17 (1963), 7 CCH
1963 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. fl 6284; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 801-19 (Supp. 1962)
(excludes dentists); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.99 (Supp. 1963). See Bittker, "Professional
Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions and Comments," 17 Tax L. Rev.
1, 25-28 (1961); Buchmann & Bearden, "The Professional Service Corporation-A New
Business Entity," 16 U. Miami L. Rev. 1 (1961); Kahn, "The Wisconsin Service Corpora-
tion Law of 1961," 1962 Wis. L. Rev. 65.
The Michigan and New Jersey acts are quite similar to the Florida one, and only the
significant differences will be noted herein. The Oklahoma statute will be used as an example
herein since the Oklahoma Supreme Court has approved its usage by lawyers without an
amendment of the state's Canons of Ethics. See note 165 infra.
151 Colo. R. Civ. P., Rule 265 (Supp. 1961), as reported in New Professional Corp. Laws,
CCH 1962 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ff 521; Bye & Young, "Law Firm Incorporation in
Colorado," 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 427 (1962). The adoption of a court rule of this nature
seems advisable in all states desiring to permit lawyers to practice in the form of associa-
tions or corporations, a legislative act in addition to the court rule is probably necessary
in most states. See Note, 37 Notre Dame Law. 545, 551-53 (1962). Because of the
uniqueness of the Colorado approach, its rule will be referred to as an example herein.
152 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 99 1785.01-.08 (Page 1962). The provisions of this act
generally parallel those of the professional corporation acts and it will be referred to
herein as a corporation act. Vesely, "The Ohio Professional Association Law," 13 W. Res.
L. Rev. 195, 197 (1962); see also Dunkel, "Professional Corporations," 22 Ohio St. L.J.
703 (1961); Note, 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 71 (1962). But see 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 341, 343-44
(1962). Under a recent decision of the Ohio Supreme Court, lawyers will be unable to
organize associations under this act unless the court changes its rules to admit corporations
to the practice of law. Ohio ex rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157
(1962), 48 Iowa L. Rev. 490 (1963); 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 104 (1962); 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev.
341 (1962). The Ohio attorney general has also ruled that an out of state corporation cannot
practice engineering in Ohio since it was neither authorized to practice under the Ohio act
nor under legislation in its own state. Op. Att'y Gen. 2495 (1961), as reported in New
Professional Corporation Laws Explained, CCH 1962 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. fI 584 (here-
inafter cited as CCH Pamphlet).
IN Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-105 (Supp. 1962) (amendment to the Uniform Partnership
Act). The provisions of this statute generally are more similar to the association acts than
the corporation acts, and it will be referred to herein as an association act. See Comment,
29 Tenn. L. Rev. 437 (1962). Since this statute does not expressly repeal inconsistent laws
and Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-303 (1956) prohibits the practice of law by corporations or
associations, the question has been raised as to whether attorneys may practice as associa-
tions under the new statute. Comment, 29 Tenn. L. Rev. 437, 446 (1962). See also note 154
infra.
154 Ala. Laws 1961, act 865; Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 34-82 (1962) (amend-
ment to the Uniform Partnership Act adopted concurrently); Ga. Code Ann. 99 84-4301
to -4318 (Supp. 1961); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 1061/, §§ 101-09 (Smith-Hurd 1962); Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 14, §§ 197-1 to -19 (Supp. 1962); S.C. Code §§ 56-1601 to -1617 (Supp. 1962), 7
CCH 1962 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 11 6354; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132(b) § (6)(3) (1962)
(amendment to the Uniform Partnership Act adopted concurrently); Va. Code Ann.
§§ 54-873 to -893 (Supp. 1962) ; see also Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 59, §§ 341-461 (1930) (an 1874
Partnership Association Act which provides for more corporate characteristics than the
1961 association act). The Attorney General has rendered an opinion that doctors may
organize and practice medicine under the old act. See CCH Phamphlet ft 602. But because
of its provision for limited liability and a corporate trade name its application for lawyers
is doubtful. See discussion, infra. The Connecticut and Tennessee (see note 153 supra)
acts do not endow their associations with the corporate characteristics but merely authorize
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have been made in several other states for the adoption of professional
incorporation or association laws, and a model act has been prepared for
Massachusetts by the Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau. 15
The determination of whether or not a group of lawyers can qualify for
tax treatment as a corporation will depend on whether the new statutes
have authorized sufficient corporate characteristics within the definitions
stated in the Kintner regulations, 5 ' and whether the traditional taboos
professionals to adopt them and be excluded from the Uniform Partnership Act. See Bittker,
supra note 150, at 22; Comment, 16 Sw. L.J. 462, 481 (1962). However, if the opportunity
is presented, the state courts, in view of the tax purpose of the legislation and to clarify the
business associations law, will probably construe the corporate attributes as having been
bestowed on associations organized under the acts.
See Alabama Bar Ass'n Special Comm. Rep., "A Study of the Practical Ethical Considera-
tions as to the Alabama Professional Association Act," 14 Ala. L. Rev. 79 (1961); Bittker,
supra note 150, at 6-25; Specter, 'Pension and Profit Sharing Plans: Coverage and Opera-
tion for Closely Held Corporations and Professional Associations," 7 Vill. L. Rev. 335, 343
(1962); Waisel, "Attorneys' Federal Income Taxes," 66 Dick. L. Rev. 75 (1961); Comment,
12 Mercer L. Rev. 388 (1961); Notes, 14 Ala. L. Rev. 258 (1961); 36 Conn. B.J. 271
(1962).
The Alabama and Virginia acts will be referred to herein as examples of the association-
type statutes since the latter is the most comprehensive of the acts and the Alabama act
is almost identical to the Georgia and South Carolina acts (the material differences will be
indicated).
155 See Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau, "Incorporation of Professional
Groups: A Model Act," 47 Mass. L.Q. 405 (1962). At the time of this writing bills
authorizing professional corporations or associations were pending in at least fifteen states,
including New York. See 7 CCH 1963 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ff 8573; N.Y. Times, August
5, 1962, § 3, p. F9, col. 2. See also Committee on Incorporation of Professional Groups
Interim Rep., 5 Boston B.J. No. 11 p. 3 (1961); Lyon, "Action in Indiana on Kintner-
Type Organizations," 39 Taxes 266 (1961). (The proposed bill in Indiana was not adopted.)
Although Texas has authorized professionals to form associations, note 154 supra, the
statute did not expressly provide for any corporate characteristics. While such associations
will not be subject to the Uniform Partnership Act, it has not been determined what the
law is that does govern them. See Bromberg, "Texas Uniform Partnership Act-The
Enacted Version," 15 Sw. L.J. 386, 387-89 (1961). Consequently, new legislation may
be proposed concerning the establishment of professional associations or corporations. See
"Legislative Program Studied by Tax Section," 25 Texas B.J. 137 (1962).
156 It is debatable whether the Kintner regulations should apply to entities organized
under professional corporation-as distinguished from association-statutes. Since the
regulations define "association" as used in IRC § 7701(a)(3), it can be asserted that
they do not apply to the question of whether or not entities come directly within the scope
of "corporation" as used in that section. However the new regulations have been applied
to a medical clinic organized under a Connecticut "non-stock corporation" act. Colony
Medical Group, Special Ruling, 5 CCH 1962 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ff 4939.23 (1961). This
approach appears to be inconsistent with the treatment of business corporations which
generally are not challenged unless the corporate form is clearly being used as a subterfuge.
See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); 1 O'Neal, Close Cor-
porations § 1.09, at 19 (1958). Id. at § 8.17. See also Buchmann & Bearden, "The Professional
Service Corporation-A New Business Entity," 16 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 2, 22-23 (1961); Bye
& Young, "Law Firm Incorporation In Colorado," 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 427, 438-39
(1962) ; Eber, "Professional Service Corporations," 100 Trusts & Estates 758 (1961); Kahn,
"The Wisconsin Service Corporation Law of 1961," 1962 Wis. L. Rev. 65, 90; Maier, "Don't
Confuse Kintner-type Associations with New Professional Corporations," 15 J. Taxation
248 (1961). The validity of the corporate designation is further supported by the pro-
visions in all the professional corporation statutes making the entities subject to the
state's business corporation act except where it may conflict with the professional corpora-
tion act. See note 220 infra. Notwithstanding these contentions, one should be prepared
to demonstrate that the professional corporations do possess the requisite corporate char-
acteristics since it is not unlikely that the IRS will attempt to apply the Kintner regulations
to entities organized under both types of statutes. See Alexander, "Some Tax Problems of
a Professional Association," 13 W. Res. L. Rev. 212, 224-25, 232-33 (1962); Bittker, supra
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against the practice of law in corporate form can- be overcome. Included in
the general inquiry is the more pertinent question of whether ethical con-
siderations will require that the articles of association or incorporation
contain restrictions which in turn may prevent the organization from qual-
ifying under the tax regulations. 5 ' We will first consider some general
prohibitions and objections to the practice of law by a corporation and
then will discuss each corporate characteristic in light of its explanation
in the regulations, its attempted authorization by the states, and any ethi-
cal limitations on its adoption by a law firm.
A. The Practice of Law by Corporations and Associations
1. General Considerations. It has been said that there is "no judicial
dissent from the proposition that a corporation cannot lawfully engage in
the practice of law.1158 Witness a recent decision of the highest court of
Connecticut: "Artificial creations such as corporations and associations
cannot meet these prerequisites [for the practice of law] and therefore can-
not engage in the practice of law."' 5 9 Similarly, a 1961 opinion of the ABA
Committee on Unauthorized Practice notes the prevailing dogma that:
"corporations, laymen, and lay agencies are prohibited from practicing
law directly and from practicing law indirectly by hiring lawyers to
practice for them." 60
Consequently, in all of the states authorizing the new professional or-
ganizations, deviations from the regular business corporation acts have
been provided in an attempt to avoid infringing upon the traditional ethi-
note 150, at 26-27; Vesely, supra note 152, at 207-08; Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 776,
784-85 (1962).
157 It may be supposed that an association of professionals would encounter fewer
ethical problems than a professional corporation. However, in order to qualify for tax
treatment as a corporation, an association must possess many of the characteristics of a
corporation. Thus there remains little practical difference between the two entities except
for the more distasteful emotional reaction stirred by the vision of a corporation practicing
law. See Ohio ex rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157 (1962). See
also "The Day Law Firms Went Public," 5 NJ.S.BJ. 865 (1962) for an example of the
"wedge" approach (wedge the door open a little bit and the flood will follow) carrying the
concept of the incorporation of law firms to absurdity.
158 5 Am. Jur. Attorneys at Law § 25 (1936). See also Annot., 73 A.L.R. 1327
(1931), supplemented in 157 A.L.R. 282 (1945); 105 A.L.R. 1364 (1936); ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Opinions 122 (1934), 8 (1925) ; note 160 infra.
159 State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 234, 140 A.2d
863, 870, 69 A.L.R.2d 394, 402 (1958).
160 "Informative Opinion A of 1961," 47 A.B.A.J. 1133 (1961). Accord, State Bar Ass'n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., supra note 159, at 234, 140 A.2d at 870-71, 69 A.L.R.2d
at 402; Matter of Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 257, 232 N.W. 318, 319, 73 A.L.R. 1319, 1322
(1930); Matter of Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 483, 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910);
Bender v. Lewis, 73 Ohio St. 101, 76 N.E. 564 (1905); Hexter Title & Abstract
Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 515, 179 S.W.2d 946, 953-54, 157 A.L.R. 268, 279
(1944); Nelson v. Smith, 107 Utah 382, 394, 154 P.2d 634, 640-41, 157 A.L.R. 512, 519
(1944) ; State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 17, 177 Pac.
694, 696 (1919); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 8 (1925). See also note
158 supra.
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cal responsibilities of the professional practitioner. However, while a legis-
lature can determine who may be permitted to incorporate, its has been
established in many jurisdictions that the courts and not the legislatures
have the last word on who is qualified to practice law.161
As of this writing, three state courts and the Committee on Professional
Ethics of the American Bar Association have given qualified approval
for lawyers to carry on their practice in the form of a professional asso-
ciation or corporation. 1 2 The Supreme Court of Colorado has adopted a
rule of court permitting lawyers to practice as service corporations under
the Colorado Corporation Code provided that the corporation is operated
in accordance with the provisions of the rule.163 The Florida supreme
court has approved amendments to its Canons of Ethics and rules govern-
ing integration of the bar in order to permit Florida lawyers to organize
under that state's professional corporation act,164 and the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court has held that lawyers may practice in the form of an Okla-
homa Professional Corporation without infringing the Canons of Ethics.'65
161 E.g., Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 169 A.2d 652 (1961); People ex rel. Chicago
Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941, 111 A.L.R. 1 (1937); Matter of Day,
181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899) ; Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N.E. 725 (1932) ;
State ex rel. Ralston v. Turner, 141 Neb. 556, 4 N.W.2d 302, 144 A.L.R. 138 (1942);
Matter of Beldsoe, 186 Okla. 264, 97 P.2d 556 (1939); Olmstead's case,, 292 Pa. 96, 140
Atl. 634 (1928); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179
Ati. 139, 100 A.L.R. 226 (1935); Matter of Levy, 23 Wash. 2d 607, 161 P.2d 651, 162
A.L.R. 805 (1945); Matter of Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N.W. 441 (1932); 5 Am. Jur.
Attorneys at Law § 15 (1936). See Notes 48 Iowa L. Rev. 490, 493-99 (1963); 37 Notre
Dame Law. 545, 550-53 (1962). Cf. Vesely, supra note 152, at 204-05.
Notes, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 104, 105-06 (1962); 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 341, 342, 347 (1962);
31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 71, 79-80 (1962). See also Harvard Student Legislative Research
Bureau, supra note 155, at 419 providing that the professional corporation act shall not
apply to attorneys except to the extent and under the terms and conditions determined by
the state's highest court.
162 See notes 163-67 infra. Despite state approval to practice in corporate form, a
significant problem still remains for those lawyers who practice before federal administrative
agencies. If an agency does not permit an association or corporation to enter an appearance
before it, the individual members of such an organization will be faced with many problems.
Can the income from agency practice be included as income of the organization? If not,
it may not be worthwhile for many lawyers to be members of a professional association
or corporation since without the income from his agency practice, the lawyer could not
set aside a sufficient sum to provide a realistic retirement fund. Can the expenses of operating
the association practice be segregated from those attributable to an attorney's agency
practice? These and other accounting problems may be difficult to resolve, and may make
it unfeasible for such an attorney to seek corporate status unless the agencies he usually
practices before grant recognition to the new professional entities. Perhaps the best approach
for the agencies to take is to follow the lead of the amendments to the Treasury Depart-
ment rules of practice which admit any attorney (or C.P.A.) in good standing in a state,
and removes its restrictions regarding practice by employees of corporations or other such
organizations. 27 Fed. Reg. 9918 (Oct. 9, 1962), amending, 31 C.F.R. Part 10; see
proposed amendment, 27 Fed. Reg. 3611 (Apr. 14, 1962).
163 Colo. R. Civ. P., Rule 265 (Supp. 1961). See Bye & Young, supra note 156. Employees
of such corporations are also authorized to appear in the Federal District Court for Colorado
and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit. Id. at 453 n.159.
164 Matter of The Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961). See also note 167 infra.
165 Matter of the Oklahoma Professional Corporation Act, 7 CCH Stand. Fed. Tax Rep.
11 8522 (1962). The court noted that the corporation would not engage in the practice of
law, rather the corporate form would be used by individuals engaging in law practice.
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The ABA opinion distinguishes a previous opinion which considered it
improper for lawyers to practice in the form of a Massachusetts Trust,
6 6
and concludes that a professional corporation or association can avoid
violating the Canons of Ethics if appropriate safeguards are observed. 67
The Ohio supreme court, however, has refused to issue a writ of manda-
mus requiring the Secretary of State to accept articles of incorporation of
lawyers for filing under the Ohio incorporated association act. 6 8 The court
did not reach the ethical questions but instead relied on its rules which
limited admission to practice to natural persons. The validity of the
reasoning underlying these recent actions, as well as the older decisions
forbidding the corporate practice of law should greatly influence the
approach to be taken in the remaining states. 69
166 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 283 (1950).
167 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 303 (1961), 48 A.BA.J. 159 (1962). See
ABA Special Comm. to Cooperate with the ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics Re Ass'ns
of Attorneys Taxable as Corporations Rep., ABA Section of Taxation Bull. 41 (Oct. 1961);
American Bar Foundation Research Memo No. 28, "Ethical Problems Raised by the
Association and Incorporation of Lawyers" (Greenwood, Research Attorney Nov., 1961)
(contains a bibliography of articles on professional associations and the problems of ethics
involved). See also Alabama Bar Ass'n Special Comm. Rep., "A Study of the Practical
Ethical Considerations as to the Alabama Professional Association Act," 14 Ala. L. Rev.
79 (1961) which concludes that "thoughtful attention to ethical considerations should prevent
their becoming an obstacle." Id. at 87. Further official action by the Alabama Bar Associa-
tion was suspended pending the issuance of the ABA opinion. Note, 14 Ala. L. Rev. 258, 260
(1961). The Committee on Professional Ethics of the Connecticut State Bar Association
has informally indicated its concurrence with the ABA opinion. "Report of the Committee
on Professional Ethics," 36 Conn. B.J. 310, 311 (1962). The Philadelphia Bar Association
has ruled that practice in the form of a professional association is not of itself a violation
of the Canons of Ethics. See Spector, supra note 154, at 343 n.43.
The medical profession has endorsed practice in association or corporate form while the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has opposed the use of the new statutes
by C.P.A. However, some states have permitted their accountants to take advantage of their
state's statute. See State Board of Accountancy v. Eber, 7 CCH 1963 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep.
J 9207 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963) (Notwithstanding a Board rule prohibiting the practice of
accountancy in corporate form, the court held that accountants may incorporate under the
Professional Service Corporation Act. The Board's rules cannot override legislative policy
since the Board gets its rule-making powers from the legislature, and the professional
relationship and standards are preserved by the Act.); Ky. Att'y Gen. Op. OAG 63-13,
January 8, 1963, cited at 7 CCH Rep., supra at f 9207 (Accountants can incorporate
under the Kentucky statute); Buchmann & Bearden, supra note 156, at 12-13; Kahn,
supra note 156, at 91; Notes, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 776, 789-90 n.79 (1962); 35 Temp. L.Q.
312, 316 n.29 (1962); 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 71, 84-85 (1962). The opposition of the accountants
is based on avoiding anything which might make people think that accountants are limiting
their liability or taking advantage of what some might consider to be a "tax gimmick," and
for the practical reason that full time employees of a corporation were prohibited from
practicing before the Tax Court. Editorial, 112 J. Accountancy 39 (Nov. 1961). Now that
the latter reason is no longer valid (see note 162 supra) the accountants may reconsider their
position.
168 Ohio ex rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157 (1962), 48 Iowa L. Rev.
490 (1963), 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 104 (1962), 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 341 (1962). The Ohio
State Bar Association has petitioned the Ohio Supreme Court to consider changing its
rules to permit practice by lawyers organized under the Ohio Act. But see the case notes
cited, supra, suggesting that no rule change was necessary since it is the lawyers not the
association which will be practicing.
169 See Jones, "The Professional Corporation," 27 Fordham L. Rev. 353, 354-60, (1958);
Lewis, "Corporate Capacity to Practice Law-A Study in Legal Hocus Pocus," 2 Md. L. Rev.
342 (1938); Oh, "Corporate Practice of Law in New York," 40 Taxes 263 (1962);
CORNTELL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 48
2. Requirements for Admission to Practice and Control over Conduct.
Lawyers, being vested with a public franchise and responsibility, must
meet certain licensing requirements pertaining especially to character and
education. Once admitted to practice, an attorney is subject to rules and
standards for the breach of which he may suffer disbarment or other dis-
cipline. A corporation obviously cannot obtain a law degree or possess
personal character traits,17° but its owners and employees can. 17  Conse-
quently, all of the professional association and corporation acts have pro-
vided that only qualified professionals may own interests in, and perform
professional services for, the association or corporation. 7 Thus, the
Wormser, "Corporations and the Practice of Law," 5 Fordham L. Rev. 207 (1936);
Comment, 16 Sw. LJ. 462, 495-504 (1962); Note, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 844, 849-55 (1961),
notes 158-160, 167 supra.
170 See e.g., People ex rel. Lawyers Institute v. Merchants Protective Corp., 189 Cal.
531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922); State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,
140 A.2d 863, 870 (1958); Matter of Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15
(1910); State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 17, 177 Pac.
694, 696 (1919).
171 See Comment, 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 119, 129 (1934) pointing out that corporations as
such are also incapable of signing contracts or performing any other acts, but they can
and do perform such acts through qualified individuals.
172 E.g., Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 2: "Any two ormore persons duly licensed to practice
a profession under the laws of this State may form a professional association ..
Ala. Laws 1961, act 869, § 5:
A professional association may render professional services only through officers, em-
ployees, and agents who are themselves duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized
to render professional service within this State. The term "employee" as used in this
section does not include clerks, bookkeepers, technicians, nurses, or other individuals
who are not usually or ordinarily considered by custom and practice to be rendering
professional services for which a license or other legal authorization is required in
connection with the profession practiced by a particular professional association, nor
does the term "employee" include any other person who performs all his employment
under the direct supervision and control of an officer, agent, or employee who is himself
rendering professional service to the public on behalf of the professional association;
provided, that no person shall under the guise of employment practice a profession
unless duly licensed to practice that profession under the Laws of this State.
Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 9, set forth at note 267 infra. Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265
§ I(B) (Supp. 1961): "The corporation shall be organized solely for the purpose of con-
ducting the practice of law only through persons qualified to practice law in the State of
Colorado." Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § I(D) (Supp. 1961), set forth at note 267 infra.
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 804 (Supp. 1962): "One or more individuals each of whom is
licensed to render a professional service may incorporate a professional corporation....
Such Articles of Incorporation shall ... contain the following: ... (c) a certificate
by the regulating board of the profession involved that each of the incorporators, directors,
and shareholders are duly licensed to practice such profession." Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18,
§ 811 (Supp. 1962):
A professional corporation may render professional services only through its officers,
employees, and agents who are duly licensed to render such professional services; pro-
vided, however, this provision shall not be interpreted to include in the term "employee,"
as used herein, clerks, secretaries, bookkeepers, technicians, and other assistants who are
not usually and ordinarily considered by custom and practice to be rendering profes-
sional services to the public for which the license is required.
Okla. Stat. Ann. title 18, § 809 (Supp. 1962), set forth at note 267 infra. Va. Code Ann.
§ 54-875 (Supp. 1962): "Any three or more individuals, each of whom holds a valid, un-
revoked certificate or license to practice the same profession within this State, may organize
a professional association for the purpose of rendering professional services of the kind its
associates are authorized to render and dividing the gains therefrom . . . ." Va. Code Ann.
§ 54-876 (Supp. 1962): "A professional association may render professional services only
through officers, employees and agents, who are themselves duly licensed or otherwise legally
authorized to render professional services within this State . . . ." Va. Code Ann. § 54-885
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licensing agency controls the activities of the organization through its
authority over the individual practitioners, and, in some states, over the
organization itself.173 In addition, under a few of the statutes the fran-
chise of an association or corporation may be suspended if the organ-
ization does not require prompt withdrawal of a disqualified member1 74
(Supp. 1962): "The board of directors may engage whatever employees it deems necessary
for the carrying on of the business of the association. No employee shall render professional
services unless he is duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized to render such professional
services within the State of Virginia." Va. Code Ann. § 54-888 (Supp. 1962), set forth at
note 267 infra. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 10-902.4, 10-907 (Supp. 1962); Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 34-82 (1962); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 621.03(2), .07, .09 (Supp. 1962); Ga. Code
Ann. §§ 84-4303, -4306, -4310 (Supp. 1961); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 1063/2, § 101 (Smith-Hurd
1962); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 274.045, -055 (1962); Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 21.315(5), (8) (1962);
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:19-7, -10 (1963); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1785.02 -.03 (Anderson
Supp. 1962) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, §§ 197-3, -8 (Supp. 1962) ; S.C. Code §§ 56-1603, 1606,
1610 (1962); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 186.99(2), (6) (Supp. 1963). Tennessee does not specify
such requirements but they may be reasonably implied from the provisions that the associa-
tion shall be subject to the laws regulating the practice of the profession and that shares
can only be transferred to qualified nonmembers. Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-105(3) (d) (1955);
see 29 Tenn. L. Rev. 437, 446 (1962).
173 The following states retain the application over the members and professional em-
ployees of the laws and/or agency governing the particular profession. Ala. Laws 1961,
act 865, § 6; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 10-905, 909B (Supp. 1962); Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule
265 § HI(C) (Supp. 1961); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 621.07 (Supp. 1962); Ga. Code Ann. § 84-4307
(Supp. 1961); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 1061/, §§ 105, 106 (Smith-Hurd 1962); Ky. Rev. Stat.
§§ 274.065, 075 (1962); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21,315(6) (1962); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:19-8
(1963); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1785.04 (Supp. 1962); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 812', 813
(Supp. 1962); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 197-4 (Supp. 1962); S.C. Code § 56-1603 (1962);
Va. Code Ann. § 54-886 (Supp. 1962); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 186.99(8), (9) (Supp. 1963). The
following states make the organization itself subject to the laws and/or agency governing
the particular profession. Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § II(B) (Supp. 1961); Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 34-82 (1962); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 197-4 (Supp. 1962); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 61-105(3) (Supp. 1962); Matter of The Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 1961).
Arizona, Colorado, and Oklahoma provide that their corporations may not do any act
which an individual professional is prohibited from doing. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-904A
(Supp. 1962); Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § II(B) (Supp. 1961); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18,
§ 814 (Supp. 1962), and in Colorado, if a corporation violates the rule of court permitting
it to practice, it shall be grounds for the supreme court to terminate or suspend its right to
practice law. Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § 11(B) (Supp. 1961). See also Bye &
Young, supra note 156, at 438; Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau, supra note 155,
at 418-19; Comment, 16 Sw. L.J. 462, 503-04 (1962). In addition to the inherent power of
the courts to control the conduct of attorneys, and presumably lawyer-corporations, the courts
also have power to curtail the unlawful practice of law by corporations, through
quo warranto, injunction or contempt proceedings. People ex rel. Los Angeles Bar Ass'n v.
California Protective Corp., 76 Cal. App. 354, 244 Pac. 1089 (2d Dist. Ct. 1926) (quo
warranto) ; People ex rel. State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176
N.E. 901 (1931) (contempt); People ex rel. Courtney v. Ass'n of Real Estate Tax-payers,
354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933) (contempt); Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken,
129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934) (quo warranto, injunction) ; State Bar v. Retail Credit
Ass'n, 170 Okla. 246, 37 P.2d 954 (1934) (injunction); State v. Retail Credit Merchant's
Ass'n, 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S.W.2d 918 (1931) (quo warranto, injunction); Hexter Title &
Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946, 157 A.L.R. 268 (1944)
(injunction); See Wormser supra note 169, at 217-18. This power should not affect the
attribute of continuity of life. See note 225 infra. Individuals aiding the authorized practice
of law by corporations can, of course, also be disciplined. See Matter of Otterness, 181
Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 318, 73 A.L.R. 1319 (1930); Matter of Pace, 170 App. Div. 818, 156
N.Y. Supp. 641 (1st Dep't 1915); Canon 47; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion
122 (1934).
174 E.g., Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 10; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 621.10 (Supp. 1962), N.J. Stat.
Ann. §§ 14:19-11, -13c (1963); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 186.99(6) (Supp. 1963). Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 10-909(c) (Supp. 1962), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 197-18 (Supp. 1962), and Va. Code
Ann. § 54-890 (Supp. 1962) require a disqualified employee or associate to forthwith dis-
associate himself from the organization. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 274.095 (1962) requires the
1963]
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3. The Corporate Entity as an Intermediary. The relationship be-
tween a lawyer and his client is a personal one requiring the utmost con-
fidence. It has been asserted that a corporation could not establish such
a relationship, and that the entity would interfere with the confidential
relation between its lawyer employees and their clients.171 Canon 35 of
the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics reads in part:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited
by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client
and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual.
He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by
or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client
should be personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client.
The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics stated in its Opinion 283
that the practice of law in the form of a Massachusetts trust would violate
Canon 35 because the "trust" would be an intermediary between lawyer
and client. In the recent Opinion 303, however, the committee retreated
from this mechanical approach and recognized that Canon 35 would not
be violated merely because "there is legal entity distinct from the mem-
bers of the organization.. .176 Indeed, a partnership has been recognized
by many jurisdictions as a legal entity.177 It is apparent that the principal
evil which Canon 35 seeks to guard against is that of a lay agency or its
redemption of the shares of a disqualified member within one year of his disqualification.
The charter will become void if this is not done. It seems likely in the other states that if
a lawyer, member or employee of a professional organization was disbarred or suspended,
and he continued to participate in the activities or profits of the organization, such corpora-
tion or association would be in jeopardy of losing its franchise or being subject to other
punitive measures. See also note 173 supra.
175 People ex rel. Lawyers' Institute v. Merchants' Protective Corp., supra note 170;
State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., supra note 170; People ex rel. Courtney
v. Ass'n of Real Estate Tax-payers, supra note 173; Matter of Maclub, 295 Mass. 45, 3
N.E.2d 272 (1936); State ex rel. McKittrick v. C. S. Dudley & Co., 340 Mo. 852, 102 S.W.2d
895 (1937); Matter of Co-operative Law Co., supra note 170; People v. Peoples Trust Co.,
180 App. Div. 494, 167 N.Y. Supp. 767 (2d Dep't 1917); Land Title Abstract & Trust Co.
v. Dworken, supra note 173; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 122 (1934),
10 (1926), 8 (1925). But see Azzarello v. Legal Aid Society of Cleveland (Ohio Ct. C.P.,
Jan. 4, 1962), 48 A.B.A.J. 382 (1962) holding that the legal aid society was not unlawfully
practicing law and that it did not intervene in the attorney-client relationship nor control
or advise the attorneys. See also Canon 35; ABA Comm. On Professional Ethics, Opinion
No. 259 (1943); Comments, 3 U. Chi. L. Rev. 296 (1936), 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 119, 126-29
(1934) ; note 193 infra.
176 48 A.BA.J. 159, 161 (1962). It may be desirable to amend Canon 35 to provide that
authorized professional associations or corporations shall not be deemed lay agencies or
intermediaries. See note 179 infra.
177 See Caswell v. Maplewood Garage, 84 N.H. 241, 246, 149 A. 746, 751-52, 73 A.L.R.
433, 439 (1930) ; Crane, Partnership § 3 (2d ed. 1952) ; Stevens, Private Corporations 32-36
(2d ed. 1949); Note, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 698 (1941); cf., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Opinions 220 (1941), 181 (1938). It is interesting to note that working partners have been
considered as employees of the partnership entity for purposes of workmen's compensation
(Scott v. Alsar Co., 336 Mich. 532, 58 N.W.2d 910 (1953); Chisholm v. Chisholm Const.
Co., 298 Mich. 25, 298 N.W. 390 (1941)) and unemployment compensation (Finston v.
Unemployment Compensation Comm'r, 132 N.J.L. 276, 39 A.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd
sub nom. Naidech v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'r, 134 N.J.L. 232, 46 A.2d 734
(Ct. Err. & App. 1946)). This is the status that members of a law firm want to achieve
under the Internal Revenue Code.
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
stockholders exploiting or dominating the professional services of an
attorney.1 7 1 Such evil is not present with the associations and corporations
created by the new statutes which all require that the members be licensed
to practice the profession and that ownership may not be transferred to a
non-professional.179
Among the reasons which have been said to justify the requirement of
direct contact between attorney and client are the right of the client to
select his own attorney, 80 and the need to have the lawyer base his advice
on the particular facts of the client's case after the attorney has personally
examined all the documents and asked all the questions which he deems
relevant.' In the professional corporation or association these activities
will continue to be carried on by the individual lawyer-employees directly
with the clients.
Implied in the direct and personal responsibility to his client, is the duty
of the attorney to avoid employment which involves a conflict of loyalties
or interests."s It is thus feared that the attorney would owe some alle-
giance to his corporate employer which might conflict with that owed to
his client."8 3 Conflict of interest problems should be no more present in the
178 See ABA Comm. on Unauthorized Practice, Informative Opinion A of 1962, 28 U.P.
News 36 (#1, 1962): ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 303 (1961), 294 (1958),
98 (1933), 35 (1931), 32 (1931); Drinker, Legal Ethics 163-64 (1953); Vesely, supra note
152, at 206. See also People ex rel. Los Angeles Bar Ass'n v. California Protective Corp.,
supra note 173, holding the practice of law by a corporation unlawful even if all directors
and officers are attorneys since they may be succeeded by laymen through inheritance or
transfer; Matter of Co-operative Law Co., supra note 173, although the legal services were
conducted by lawyers, laymen owned and controlled the corporation, and it was held to be
unlawfully practicing law. Compare Azzarello v. Legal Aid Society of Cleveland, supra note
175.
179 See notes 172 supra, 267 infra. Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § II (Supp. 1961) pro-
vides that its professional corporations "shall not be deemed lay agencies within the meaning
of the Canons of Professional Ethics." The Florida opinion approved an amendment to
Canon 35 declaring that its professional corporations "shall not be deemed lay agencies or
such intermediaries." Matter of The Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 559 (Sup. Ct. 1961). N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 14:19-7 (1963) provides: "Notwithstanding any other or contrary provisions of
the laws of this State, a professional corporation organized under this act may charge for
the services of its officers, employees, and agents, may collect such charges, and may com-
pensate those who render such personal service." See also the discussion of centralized
management, notes 231-44 infra.
180 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 266 (1945), 237 (1941), 10 (1926);
Drinker, supra note 178, at 198-200. See also State v. James Sanford Agency, 167 Tenn. 339,
69 S.W.2d 899 (1934); ABA Comm. on Unauthorized Practice, Informative Opinion A of
1962, 28 U.P. News 36 (No. 2, 1962).
181 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 98 (1933); see also Opinion 270 (1945),
237 (1941), Informal Decision 508 (1962).
182 See Drinker, supra note 178, at 103-07 (1953); Canon 6; ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Opinions 275 (1947), 103 (1933), 10 (1926). See also State Bar Ass'n v. Connecti-
cut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 69 A.L.R.2d 394 (1958).
183 People ex rel. Lawyers Institute v. Merchants Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209
Pac. 363 (1922); State ex rel. McKittrick v. C. S. Dudley & Co., 340 Mo. 852, 102 S.W.2d
895 (1937); Matter of Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910); People v.
Peoples Trust Co., 180 App. Div. 494, 167 N.Y. Supp. 767, 768 (2d Dep't 1917); Hexter
Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946, 157 A.L.R. 268
(1944); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 10 (1926). But see Lewis, supra
note 169, at 345.
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all-lawyer association or corporation than they would be in a partnership.
It would be unrealistic to assert that a partner or lawyer-employee of a
partnership owes no allegiance to the partnership or other partners. Not
all potential conflicts of interest are unethical,18 4 and it would be impracti-
cal and undesirable to maintain that the general loyalties of an attorney
to his partnership or corporation would interfere with the professional
responsibilities to his client. Of course, a member or employee of a cor-
poration or association, like one of a partnership, may not represent
interests which would conflict with the interests of other clients of the
organization.1' 5
The personal relationship of attorney and client also encompasses the
confidential nature of that relationship.' While all of the new statutes
disclaim any intention to modify the rules governing the profession or the
law applicable to the relationship between the professional and his client 8 7
a few of the acts go further and expressly provide that the confidential
relationships now or hereinafter enjoyed shall remain inviolate. 88 This
provision appears desirable since the question of privileged communica-
tion is one of law as well as ethics. 9 It should also be noted in this regard
184 Canon 6 forbids representation of conflicting interests "except by express consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." Even with such disclosure it may
be improper to represent conflicting interests, but there are many occasions when disclosure
or other practical considerations will justify representation despite a conflict of interests.
See Cheatham, Legal Profession 155 (2d ed. 1955) (noting that there is an inescapable con-
flict of interest between a lawyer and his client in the matter of fees); Drinker, supra note
178, at 107-11, 120-22 (1953); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 271 (1946). Cf.,
Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 93 Fed. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1899); Eise-
mann v. Hazard, 218 N.Y. 155, 112 N.E. 722 (1916).
185 Drinker, supra note 178, at 106; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 103
(1933), 72 (1932), 50 (1931), 49 (1931), 33 (1931), Informal Decision No. C-437. See
note 288 infra.
186 See People v. People's Trust Co., supra note 183; Drinker, supra note 178, at 104, 132-
37; Canons 6, 37.
187 E.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 812 (1962). "This act does not alter any law applicable
to the relationship between a person rendering professional services and a person receiving
such services .... " Ky. Rev. Stat. § 274.075 (1962). "This Act shall not alter any law
applicable to, or otherwise affect the fiducial, confidential, or ethical relationship between a
person rendering professional services and a person receiving such services." Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 62-7 (Supp. 1962). See notes 188, 238 infra. See also Minn. Stat. Ann. § 319.20 (Supp.
1962) (limited to medical corporations) permitting investigations by the licensing board but
making the records and information relating to services rendered to a patient immune from
such inquiry and providing that all other information furnished shall be confidential between
the board and the corporation concerned.
188 Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 6:
This act does not modify any law applicable to the relationship between a person
furnishing professional services and a person receiving such service ...including the
confidential relationship ...if any, and all confidential relationships previously enjoyed
under the Laws of this State or hereinafter enacted shall remain inviolate.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:19-8 (1963) and Va. Code Ann. § 54-886 (Supp. 1962) are to the
same effect. See Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § II(D) (Supp. 1961): "Nothing in this Rule
shall be deemed to modify the attorney-client privilege specified in 1953 C.R.S. 158-1-7(2)
and any comparable common law privilege."
189 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 247 (1942), 150 (1936); 8 Wigmore,
Evidence §§ 2290-92 (McNaughton Rev. 1961). See Simon, "The Attorney-Client Privilege
As.Applied to Corporations," 65 Yale L.J. 953 (1956); 76 Harv. L. Rev. 655 (1963).
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
that a corporation is not entitled to invoke the privilege against self-in-
crimination and that corporate papers in the hands of its officers have
been held not to be entitled to the protection of the privilege 90 However,
partners may not be in any better position to invoke the self-incrimina-
tion privilege to protect partnership papers held by them.'91
4. Solicitation, Fee-Splitting and Related Evils. Fear of unrestricted
advertising and solicitation is another apparent justification for the rule
that a corporation may not engage in the practice of law.12 Attorneys
who perform legal services for a corporation which is unlawfully practic-
ing would be breaching their ethical responsibilities by receiving legal
business through the corporation's solicitations, by sharing their profes-
sional fees with the lay corporation, and by aiding the unauthorized prac-
tice of law.1
Such evils will not exist in the professional corporation. Since only
lawyers may own and perform professional services for the corpora-
tion,194 there will be no sharing of fees with laymen, and the Canons of
Ethics will operate on the members and employees, and in some states on
the organization itself,195 to prevent improper solicitation. Moreover,
since the lawyers will be practicing in corporate form under legislative or
judicial authority, they will not be engaged in, or aiding, the unauth-
190 McCormick, Evidence § 125 (1954). See also note 189 supra on the applicability of
the attorney-client privilege to corporations.
191 See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2259a (McNaughton Rev. 1961); 1 Davis, Administrative
Law 198-200 (1958).
192 See State ex rel. McKittrick v. C. S. Dudley & Co., 340 Mo. 852, 102 S.W.2d 895,
901-02 (1937); Matter of Tuthill, 256 App. Div. 539, 10 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1st Dep't 1939);
Note, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 746, 751 (1960); cf., People ex rel. State Board of Medical Examiners
v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal. 2d 156, 82 P.2d 429 (1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633
(1939); Matter of Rothman, 12 NJ. 528, 97 A.2d 621 (1953); State ex rel. Lundin v.
Merchants Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919); ABA Comm. on Profes-
sional Ethics, Opinion 31 (1931); N.Y. Co. Lawyers' Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Opinion 47 (1914).
193 Canons 27, 34, 47. See Matter of Maclub, 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272, 105
A.L.R. 1360 (1936) ; Matter of Schwartz, 175 App. Div. 335, 161 N.Y. Supp. 1079 (1st Dep't
1916); Matter of Newman, 172 App. Div. 173, 158 N.Y. Supp. 375 (1st Dep't 1916); Cases
cited, notes 50, 85 supra; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 294 (1958), 198
(1939), 122 (1934), 35 (1931), 31 (1931), 10 (1926), 8 (1925); ABA Comm. on Unauthor-
ized Practice, Informative Opinion A of 1962, 28 U.P. News 36 (No. 2, 1962); N.Y. City
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 733 (1949); Conn. State Bar Ass'n Comm.
on Professional Ethics, Opinion 5, 31 Conn. BJ. 144 (1957); N.Y. Co. Lawyers' Ass'n
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 220 (1924), 136 (1917), 47 (1914); see also Matter
of Schwartz, 195 App. Div. 194, 186 N.Y. Supp. 535 (1st Dep't 1921), aff'd, 231 N.Y. 642,
132 N.E. 921 (1921). Although a legal aid or lawyer reference service conducted by a bar
association advertises its legal services, the usual evils of advertising and solicitation to aid
individual lawyers and commercialize the profession are not present, and the society is not
considered to be unlawfully practicing law. See Jacksonville Bar Ass'n v. Wilson, 102 So. 2d
292 (Fla. 1958); Azzarello v. Legal Aid Society of Cleveland (Ohio Ct. C.P., Jan. 4, 1962),
48 A.BAJ. 382 (1962); ABA Comm. supra, Opinions 207 (1941), 205 (1940), 148 (1935);
see also Opinions 291 (1956), 191 (1939).
194 See note 172 supra.
195 See notes 173-74 supra. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 274.085 (1962) expressly prohibits advertis-
ing contrary to the ethics of the profession.
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orized practice of law. As a further guard against indirect solicitation, all
of the states restrict the business of the organization to the rendering of
the professional service for which it was created, thus preventing the or-
ganization from operating a business which could be used to feed its law
practice." 6 Most of the acts, however, do permit the entity to invest its
funds and own real and personal property used for the rendering of pro-
fessional services. 19 7 The ownership of such property is, of course, a
necessary incident to the practice of law, and the investments would be
subject to the same limitations regarding conflicts of interest and solici-
tation that apply to individual practitioners or members of partner-
ships.198
19' E.g., Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 4; Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § I(B) (Supp. 1961);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 806, 810 (Supp. 1962) also prohibit a person from being an officer,
director, or shareholder of more than one professional corporation at the same time, and Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 621-13 (Supp. 1962) and Ky. Rev. Star. § 274.095 (1962) prohibit mergers and
consolidations except with domestic corporations rendering the same type of professional
services. See Kahn, supra note 156, at 74, interpreting the Wisconsin act as prohibiting
investments by one professional corporation in another, but apparently not prohibiting one
person from being a stockholder in more than one corporation as long as he was licensed
to perform the services rendered by each. See also note 198 infra.
197 E.g., Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 4: "However, it may invest its funds in real estate,
mortgages, stocks, bonds, or any other type of investment, and may own real or personal
property necessary or appropriate for rendering professional service." Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 18, § 806 (Supp. 1962) is to the same effect. Va. Code Ann. § 54-881 (Supp. 1962):
Each professional association organized under the provisions of this chapter shall have
power:
(d) To purchase, take by gift, devise or bequest, receive, lease, or otherwise acquire,
own, hold, improve, use and otherwise deal in and with real or personal property, or
any interest therein, wherever situated, in its own name.
(e) To sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, transfer and otherwise dispose
of all or any part of its property and assets.
(f) To make contracts and incur liabilities, borrow money at such rates of interest
as its board of directors may determine, issue its notes, bonds and other obligations,
and secure any of its obligations by mortgage or pledge of all or any of its property
and income.
(i) To pay pensions and establish pension plans, pension trusts, profit sharing plans,
and other incentive plans for its associates, directors, officers and employees.
Compare Fla. Stat. Ann. § 621-8 (Supp. 1962) with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:19-9 (1963). All
of the statutes except those of Connecticut, Ohio and Tennessee and the Colorado rule have
provisions similar to the Alabama one. Even in the states lacking express provisions, the
authority to own property and invest funds should be implied. This is especially true under
acts granting general corporate powers or making the business corporation law applicable
except when there is a conflict with the professional corporation act. See e.g., Colo. R. Civ.
Proc., Rule 265 § I(C) (Supp. 1961); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1785.08 (Anderson Supp. 1962).
The "Model Act" permits the rendering of the professional service and "services reasonably
related thereto" and provides that present practices should be used as a guide in determining
what is reasonably related. Thus attorneys could continue to act as trustees. In addition, the
corporation is permitted to "own" its business property and "invest" (not to the extent of
a controlling interest) in any other property. Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau,
supra note 155, at 410.
198 See Matter of Rothman, 12 N.J. 528, 97 A.2d 621 (1953); Matter of L.R., 7 N.J.
390, 81 A.2d 725 (1951); Matter of Schwartz, 175 App. Div. 335, 161 N.Y. Supp. 1079 (1st
Dep't 1916); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 305 (1962), 297 (1961), 255
(1943, as modified, 1948), 225 (1941), 57 (1932), Informal Decisions 520, C-442, C-431,
C-424, 37-46; Conn. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 5 (1957), 31
Conn. B.J. 144 (1957); N.Y. Co. Lawyers Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 322
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The professional corporations and associations will no doubt want to
take advantage of the tax benefits available by establishing a qualified
pension or profit-sharing plan. An investment of this nature should not
raise ethical problems, 19  but the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics
in its Opinion 303 stated that it would violate Canon 34 prohibiting fee-
splitting with a layman if non-lawyer employees were permitted to par-
ticipate in a profit-sharing plan. Since this restriction may prevent an
organization from qualifying its profit-sharing plan under the Internal
Revenue Code, the major benefit of adopting the corporate or associa-
tion form, and perhaps some of the minimal benefits which the ABA
fought for under the Keogh Bill, may be lost to lawyers. 200 Despite the
ABA Committee's acknowledgement in its recent opinion that "the sub-
stance of an arrangement is controlling, not the form," it is submitted
that in this particular regard the Committee applied Canon 34 formalis-
tically and mechanically. It is recognized by the opinion that the pay-
ment of regular compensation to lay employees out of fees derived from
legal services does not violate Canon 34Y01 Even though this type of
arrangement permits a non-lawyer to collect a portion of the lawyer's
fees, to hold otherwise would prevent a legal secretary or clerk from ever
being compensated for his or her lawful services. Canon 34 forbids the
payment of legal fees to one who performs legal services without a
license, solicits legal business or otherwise exploits the practice of law,202
(1934), 260 (1928), 220 (1924), 179 (1919), 114 (1917), 47 I, III (1914); Drinker, supra
note 178, at 221-28 (1953). See also ABA Special Comm. to Cooperate With the ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics Re Ass'ns Taxable As Corporations, ABA Section of Taxation
Bull. 41, 53 (Oct. 1961); Buchmann & Bearden, supra note 156, at 9, 16. But cf., Matter of
Thibodeau, 295 Mass. 374, 3 N.E.2d 749, 106 A.L.R. 1360 (1936), 31 Ill. L. Rev. 813 (1937).
199 See notes 197 supra, 254 infra.
200 See ABA Special Comm., supra note 198, at 53. Apparently the ABA opinion does not
condemn a pension plan based on a fixed yearly contribution, but even such a contribution
must be keyed to estimated earnings and if the estimate proves wrong, the tax laws allow
for some adjustment. It may be that a profit-sharing plan can be devised which will have
standards of participation that exclude nonlawyer employees but is still not discriminatory.
See Spector, supra note 154. See also notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text; note 204
infra.
201 This modifies a statement in Opinion 283 (1950) but is consistent with other opinions
which of necessity, permit a lawyer to compensate out of his fees persons who perform
nonlegal activities which constitute a part of the total services of the lawyer. See Opinions
297 (1961), 272 (1946) (accountant), 294 (1958), 48 A.B.A.J. 383 (1962), 180 (1938)
(collection agency); 48 (1931) (patent attorney); Informal Decisions Nos. 344, 341, 326.
See also N.Y. Co. Lawyers Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 220 (1924), 142
(1918). Apparently it makes a difference to some committees whether the compensation for
a layman's nonlegal services is paid direct to the layman or included in the lawyer's fee and
then paid to the layman by the lawyer. Compare N.Y. City Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Profes-
sional Ethics, Opinion 473 (1939) with Opinion 446 (1938). The latter situation comes
within the literal wording of the Canon 34 prohibition but is no more within its intent than
is the payment of a legal secretary's salary out of legal fees.
202 See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 272 (1946), 237 (1941), 56 (1931),
35 (1931), 32 (1931), 31 (1931), 8 (1925); N.Y. Co. Lawyers' Ass'n, Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Opinions 562 (1941), 475 (1939), 47 II(a) (1914); Drinker, supra note 178, 179-80,
181-86 (1953) ; see also Matter of Maclub, 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936); Canons 12,
27, 28, 35, 47.
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but it does not prohibit a lay employee from receiving a fair compensa-
tion based upon the value of the legitimate non-legal services performed
and not on the size of the legal fees.203 According to the New York
County Lawyer's Association Committee on Professional Ethics, a bonus
to employees based on net profits is not improper as long as there is no
advance agreement to make the distribution.20 4 Such an agreement, in
the opinion of the Committee, is "inconsistent with the essential dignity
of the profession, and is liable to be made the cloak for promoting the
solicitation of employment for the office." The first reason assigned is
difficult to understand and thus difficult to meet;205 the second reason is
understandable but answerable. Since an increase in the business of a
law office is likely to result in higher wages or a year-end bonus for the
employees, any encouragement to solicit would be present even without
an agreement to share in the increased earnings. Would an employee
need an advance agreement in order to act in anticipation of the usual
consequences? In any event, the evil of solicitation can be guarded
against through the disciplinary authority over an attorney who en-
courages or acquiesces in such conduct on the part of his employees. 20 6
If there are effective safeguards against aiding the unauthorized practice
of law, solicitation, and exploitation of a lawyer's service, it would seem
that reasonable contributions to a profit-sharing plan should not be con-
demned even though they are based on the net profits of the law firm.
The evils which Canon 34 seeks to guard against are not present, and
the determination of contributions on the basis of earnings is merely a
method of keeping the expense of a plan within the bounds of what the
firm can afford. Such plans are legitimate methods of compensation with
the laudable objectives of increasing employee stability, efficiency and
loyalty, and with the aid of a tax saving, helping to provide for the re-
tirement needs of both professional and non-professional employees. 0
203 See note 201 supra.
204 Opinion 122 (1917). See Opinion 80 (1915) holding that it would be improper to pay
a clerk bonuses from time to time based on the business which he attracts to the law office.
Cf., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 18 (1930). It has been suggested that a
law firm could make voluntary payments to a profit-sharing fund without any agreement
to do so. Bye & Young, supra note 156, at 456. But such an arrangement might fail to
qualify as an approved plan under the tax laws, and would lack some of the nontax benefits
of an agreed to plan.
205 One cannot argue with the proposition that a loss in the dignity of the lawyer would
injure the status and effectiveness of the profession, nor can it be denied that it would be
undignified for a lawyer to enter into a contract to share legal fees with a layman who has
unlawfully performed legal services, not performed any legitimate services, or merely solicited
business. The essential dignity of the profession, however, would not seem to be injured by
providing a fringe benefit to a law firm's employees in accordance with what the firm can
afford on the basis of each year's earnings.
206 See notes 172-74 supra.
207 See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Decision 347: "An assignment by
a partner of his interest in the partnership to himself and his wife by the entireties merely
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In summary, the newly created professional entities appear to have
avoided the usual objections to the practice of law by a corporation.28
Although uncertainty exists as to some procedures which might be used
by lawyers practicing in this form, it can not be said that an all-lawyer
professional corporation or association is incapable of being used as a
structure in which to practice law. It remains to be determined whether
or not ethical considerations may nevertheless prevent the acquisition of
the corporate characteristics required under the Kintner regulations.
B. The Corporate Characteristics Required By the Kintner Regulations
1. Associates and a Joint-Profit Objective. °9 Although these char-
acteristics may not be counted in judging the corporate resemblance of an
organization, the absence of either of them will prevent the organization
from being classed as an association. All but two of the association
statutes require a minimum of two or three professional persons to form
an association," ° while most of the corporation statutes permit a profes-
sional organization to be formed by only one person." Although the
to save inheritance taxes, the wife being in no way involved in law practice or in any
relationship with the clients, does not violate Canon 34." See also N.Y. City Bar Ass'n,
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 591 (1941); note 99 supra. Some state courts
may decline to follow the prohibition on lay-employee profit-sharing plans in the ABA
Opinion 303. See Bye & Young, "Law Firm Incorporation in Colorado," 34 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 427, 456 n.177a (1962). This portion of the ABA opinion came as a shock to many
lawyers especially members of some large firms which for several years had had profit-sharing
plans for their nonpartner or nonlawyer employees.
208 Other objections such as the fear that professionals would try to limit their liability
for their conduct will be discussed in conjunction with the characteristics required by the
Kintner regulations, infra. The refusal to permit corporations to practice law has also been
rationalized on the ground that it is against public policy. See Comment, 2 U. Chi. L. Rev.
119, 129 (1934); Note, 37 Notre Dame Law. 545, 551 (1962). This was no doubt true, but
it should no longer be a valid objection if the reasons for such practice being against public
policy have been removed and if the state legislature and/or judiciary has authorized such
practice.
209 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a)(2), (3) (1960). See Smith, "Associations Classified As
Corporations Under the Internal Revenue Code," 34 Cal. L. Rev. 461, 469-509, 529-30 (1946).
210 Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 34-82 (1) (1962)) and Tennessee (Tenn.
Code Ann. § 61-105(3) (Supp. 1962)) and Virginia (Va. Code Ann. § 54-875 (Supp.
1962)) require three or more persons. Alabama (Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 2), Georgia (Ga.
Code Ann. § 84-4303 (1961)) and Illinois (Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 1061/2, § 101 (Smith-Hurd
1962)) require at least two associates. S.C. Code § 56-1603 (1962) and Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14,
§ 197-13 (Supp. 1962) permit only one professional to form an association.
211 Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-908.1 (Supp. 1962)) requires two or more persons,
while the following states require one or more: Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 621.1, .5 (Supp. 1962);
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 274.015(1) (1962) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.315(4) (Supp. 1962) ; N.J. Stat.
Ann. §§ 14:19-1, -5 (1963); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1785.02 (Anderson Supp. 1962); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 804 (Supp. 1962); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(2) (Supp. 1963). The Colo-
rado court rule 265 does not explicitly provide for any minimum number of lawyers to form
a corporation, but states that "Lawyers may form professional service corporations for the
practice of law under the Colorado Corporation Code . . . ." Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265
§ I(A) (Supp. 1961). The use of the plural "lawyers" may imply more than one and the
Corporation Code requires three or more persons to establish a corporation, Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 31-1-2 (1953). But see Bye & Young, supra note 207, at 436-37 stating that the
Colorado rule permits less than three shareholders. See Note, 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 71, 82-83
(1962) posing the possibility that a one-man Ohio association might qualify under the
regulations. The note apparently overlooks the essentialness of the "associates" attribute to
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"associates" requirement would not be met by a one-man organization,
this would not preclude organizations of two or more persons in such
states from qualifying under the regulations. If, however, a professional
corporation was recognized under the tax laws as a corporation and not
an association, it would be unnecessary to satisfy the requirement of hav-
ing associates, and a sole practitioner could incorporate and seek tax
benefits as an employee of his own corporation. 212
All of the states concerned provide for the conduct of a professional
business, 213 the gains therefrom to be divided among the members. A
group of individual practitioners who continue to maintain their separate
practices but form a loose-knit organization in the hopes of satisfying all
but the centralized management requirements of the regulations, prob-
ably would still be prevented from qualifying as an association because
they would not be engaged in a joint enterprise. 14
2. Continuity of Life? 5 This characteristic will be present if the
association is not dissolved by the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retire-
ment, resignation or expulsion of any member. Local law-not the agree-
ment of the members-determines whether or not dissolution occurs upon
the happening of such an event. Consequently, a partnership organized
under the Uniform Partnership Act or Uniform Limited Partnership
Act lacks continuity of life because a partner may terminate the agency
relationship in contravention of an agreement among the members2 16
Thus the regulations are concerned with the technical dissolution of the
entity and not the more practical consideration that the enterprise may
continue to exist uninterrupted by changes in membership 17
classification as an association. The "Model Act" permits a one-man corporation so that
he can get the same benefits nonprofessional incorporators could get by using "dummies" as
additional incorporators. Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau, "Incorporation of
Professional Groups: A Model Act," 47 Mass. L.Q. 405, 406-07 (1962); see also note 234
infra.
212 See National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Bittker, Federal
Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders § 2.07 (1959) ; 1 O'Neal, Close Corpora-
tions 19 (1958); 2 Id. at § 8.17; Bye & Young, supra note 207, at 429; Kahn, "The
Wisconsin Service Corporation Law of 1961," 1962 Wis. L. Rev. 65, 90. See also note 156
supra.
213 For purposes of tax law classification, a profession is not distinguished from other
types of businesses. See e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(g) (1), (2), (3) (1960).
214 See Vesely, "The Ohio Professional Association Law," 13 W. Res. L. Rev. 195, 208 n.74
(1962) ; Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 776, 787 (1962).
215 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1960). See Smith, supra note 209, at 518-22; Ray,
"Corporate Tax Treatment of Medical Clinics Organized As Associations," 39 Taxes 73, 79
(1961). A provision that the association will continue only for a stated period will not
defeat continuity of life.
216 See 7 Unif. Laws Ann. § 31, Commissioners' Note.
217 See Uniform Partnership Act §§ 17, 27, 31, 41(1). This section of the regulation has
been challenged as not being in accord with state interpretations of the Uniform Partner-
ship Act, Maier & Wild, "Taxation of Professional Firms as Corporations," 44 Marq. L. Rev.
127, 138-39 (1960), and is inconsistent with some tax cases. See United States v. Stierwalt,
287 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1961) (continuity of life present because of improbability of dis-
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All of the association statutes provide that the life of the association
shall not be affected by such events as would have caused the dissolu-
tion of a partnership.218 New Jersey and Wisconsin are the only corpora-
tion states which expressly provide that professional corporations shall
have perpetual existence, 19 but the continuity of life of the other states'
professional corporations can be implied from the nature of the corporate
entity and from the applicability of the business corporation acts of the
respective states.220
solution although members have right to dissolve); Bye & Young, supra note 207, at 432-33;
Sneed, "More About Associations in the Oil and Gas Industry," 33 Texas L. Rev. 168,
188-89 (1954). Certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code do not consider a partner-
ship terminated where the enterprise continues unless there has been a sale or exchange of
at least half of the total interest in the partnership. IRC §§ 706(c), 708. See Carrington &
Sutherland, Articles of Partnership for Law Firms 34-35; ABA Economics of Law Practice
Series, Pamphlet No. 6 (1961); Comment, 16 Sw. LJ. 462, 469, 480 (1962).
Realistically viewed a partnership may have as much continuity of life as does a corpora-
tion, since a corporation can often be dissolved by shareholders holding a sufficient per-
centage of the stock, and a partner is not likely to dissolve a partnership in contravention
of his agreement because of the deterrent effect of damage suits. See Bittker, supra note 212,
at 30 (1959); Note, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 746, 760 (1960). The continuity of life of a close
corporation is especially shaky. And see 2 O'Neal, supra note 212, at §§ 9.06, 9.18, 9.26-.29.
218 Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 8:
Unless the articles of association expressly provide otherwise, a professional association
shall continue as a separate entity independent of its members or shareholders, for all
purposes for such period of time as provided in the articles, or until dissolved by a
vote of two-thirds of the members, and shall continue notwithstanding the death,
insanity, incompetency, conviction for felony, resignation, withdrawal, transfer of
membership or ownership of shares, retirement, or expulsion of any one or more of the
members or shareholders, the admission of or transfer of membership or shares to any
new member or members or shareholder or shareholders, or the happening of any other
event, which under the law of this State and under like circumstances, would work a
dissolution of the partnership, it being the aim and intention of this section that such
professional association shall have continuity of life independent of the life or status of
its members or shareholders. No member or shareholder of a professional association
shall have the power to dissolve the association by his independent act of any kind.
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 106Y2, § 107 (Smith-Hurd 1962); Va. Code Ann. § 54-887 (Supp. 1962)
are to the same effect. See also Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 34-82(1) (a) (1962); Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 197-14 (Supp. 1962); Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-105(3) (a) (Supp. 1962).
Pennsylvania (Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 197-19 (Supp. 1962)) permits dissolution by a majority
(or greater percentage provided for in the by-laws) vote of the outstanding ownership shares.
219 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:19-13(a) (1963); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(10) (a) (Supp. 1963).
Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-908.2 (Supp. 1962)) requires a stated term of existence of
not more than twenty-five years which term may be renewed. This requirement will not
defeat continuity of life. See note 215 supra.
220 Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § I (Supp. 1961): "Lawyers may form professional
service corporations for the practice of law under the Colorado Corporation Code, providing
that such corporations are organized and operated in accordance with the provisions of this
Rule." Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § I(C) (Supp. 1961): "The corporation may exercise
the powers and privileges conferred upon corporations by the laws of Colorado only in
furtherance of and subject to its corporate purpose." Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 805 (Supp.
1962): "The Business Corporation Act shall be applicable to Professional Corporations and
they shall enjoy the powers and privileges and be subject to the duties, restrictions and
liabilities of other corporations, except where inconsistent with the letter and purpose of
this Act. This Act shall take precedence in the event of any conflict with provisions of the
Business Corporation Act or other laws." See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 10-904, -908.3(b)
(Supp. 1962); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 261.13 (Supp. 1962); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 274.015(2) (1962);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1785.08 (Anderson Supp. 1962); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(3) (Supp.
1963). (E.g., perpetual existence is granted corporations in Ohio by Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 1701.10 (Page 1954)). The Kentucky statute also provides for the termination of the corpo-
ration if the outstanding shares of a deceased, disqualified or otherwise withdrawing member
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The continuity of life of an organization may be endangered by the
uniform requirement in all states that all members or shareholders be
qualified to practice the profession. In order to prevent an interest from
passing to an unqualified person, which in turn could cause dissolution
of the organization,22' the articles of association or incorporation, or the
statute itself (as has been partially provided in some states), should re-
quire the organization to purchase the interest of a deceased, disqualified,
resigned, expelled or inactive member whenever the interest has not been
transferred to a qualified professional within a stated reasonable period
of time.22 To avoid dissolution upon the death or disqualification of the
are not transferred to a qualified person or redeemed by the corporation (Ky. Rev. Stat.
§§ 274.095(1), (5) (1962)) or if such redemption renders the corporation insolvent (Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 274.095(6) (1962)). See note 174 supra.
221 See note 174 supra; Bittker, "Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation:
Some Questions and Comments," 17 Tax L. Rev. 1, 15 (1962). In some states, however,
dissolution of the corporation may not be required because a shareholder becomes dis-
qualified. See Bye & Young, supra note 209, at 441; Vesely, supra note 214, at 208-09;
note 224 infra. See also note 225 infra.
222 See e.g., Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 9:
Subject to the provisions of the articles of association, the estate of a member or share-
holder who was a person duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized to render the
same professional service as that for which the professional association was organized
may continue to hold stock or membership pursuant to the articles of association for
a reasonable period of administration of the estate, but shall not be authorized to
participate in any decisions concerning the rendering of professional service.
Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 11 provides a method for setting the price at which shares of a
deceased, retired, expelled or disqualified member may be purchased by the association or
its members. Other acts contain provisions of a similar nature. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-
909(D) (Supp. 1962); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 274.095(1) (1962); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:19-10,
13(c) (1963); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 815 (Supp. 1962); Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(10c)
(Supp. 1963); see Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau, supra note 211, at 414-16.
Florida (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 621.11 (Supp. 1962)) permits purchase or redemption of its shares
by the corporation as long as its capital will not be impaired. Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265
§ I(E) (Supp. 1961) requires that provision be made for a disqualified shareholder to dispose
of his shares to the corporation or to any qualified person. See Note, 37 Notre Dame Law.
545, 548 (1962) stating that a deceased or otherwise withdrawing member's interest must be
redeemed but that such a requirement would prevent free transferability of interests. But see
discussion at notes 268-73 infra. Bittker, supra note 221, at 15-17 maintains that a repurchase
agreement would be inadequate to save the continuity of the entity because the organization
might lack funds to repurchase, be prohibited from doing so, or otherwise not act within the
required time. However, restrictions on the purchase of a corporation's own stock should
not apply since they would be in conflict with the provisions of the professional corporation
acts which authorize such purchase and which usually provide that the business corporation
acts will not be applicable where they conflict with the professional corporation act. See
Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau, supra at 409. In addition Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 18, § 815 (Supp. 1962) expressly provides that restrictions on the repurchase of a corpora-
tion's shares shall not apply to professional corporations, and Pennsylvania (Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 14, § 197-13 (Supp. 1962)) and Virginia (Va. Code Ann. §§ 54-889, -891 (Supp. 1962))
give their associations the power to redeem the interests of associates while Arizona (Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-908(6) (Supp. 1962)) permits transfer of shares to the corporation. But
see Vesely, supra note 214, at 200 suggesting that while an Ohio association can redeem
and retire its own shares it may not be able to purchase them. The organization
should of course maintain sufficient funds with which shares can be repurchased. It
might be wise to require some paid-in capital or reserve for this purpose. See Harvard
Student Legislative Research Bureau, supra at 408. If an organization fails to repurchase
shares as required, it would seem that it could be compelled to do so at the instance of a
shareholder's court action, or it could be dissolved. But the latter remedy would not neces-
sarily destroy continuity of life under the Kintner regulations. See note 221 supra; note 225
infra.
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last surviving member,2 23 the statute could permit a disqualified member
or the estate of a deceased member to transfer ownership to a qualified
person, or permit the estate of the last member to convert the organiza-
tion into a general purpose corporation. 4 In any event it would seem
that continuity of life does not require that the organization not be dis-
solvable under any circumstances but only that it not be dissolved by
those events which would normally terminate a partnership. This much
the state statutes clearly provide. 2 5
Continuity of the life of the entity may also involve continuity of
its name. The use of a deceased member's name may be in violation of
Cannon 33 unless such use is permitted by local custom and is not mis-
leading.22 Furthermore, the use of designations such as "Company" or
"Associates" and other trade names has been considered improper.2 7
223 A few acts expressly provide that the entity shall be dissolved upon the death of the
last surviving member. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-908(3) (Supp. 1962); Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 274.095(3) (1962). As a practical matter this would only be a problem, in those states
permitting a sole practitioner to form'an association or corporation. See Note, 31 U. Cinc. L.
Rev. 71, 82-83 (1962). By analogy, a closely held corporation is classified as a corporation
for tax purposes even though its existence may" terminate upon the death of its owner-
manager. See notes 212, 217 supra.
224 The right of a disqualified member or the estate of a deceased member to transfer
interests held in the organization exists expressly or impliedly in the provisions of the acts
permitting redemption of such interests. See note 222 supra. In addition, Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 14, §§ 197-12, -18 (Supp. 1962) expressly allows a disqualified associate who has been
expelled or a personal representative of an associate's estate to transfer his interest. NJ.
Stat. Ann. § 14:19-13(b) (1963) and Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(10) (b) (Supp. 1962) auto-
matically convert a professional corporation into a business corporation when no qualified
stockholder remains, and the Attorney General of Florida is of the opinion that it would
not be improper to permit the inheriting shareholders of a sole owner of a professional
corporation to amend the articles 'of incorporation to convert the entity into a general cor-
poration. Op. Atty. Gen. of Fla. 061-139, Sept. 12, 1961, reported in New Professional
Corporation Laws Explained, CCH 1962 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. No. 8, Pt. I, ff 549.
Pending transfer or redemption of an interest, or conversion of the purpose of the corpora-
tion, it is of course necessary to provide that the estate of a deceased member, or a dis-
qualified member, shall not participate in any decisions concerning the rendering of profes-
sional services, or share in the future professional earnings of the organization. See notes
271-74 infra and accompanying text.
225 A business corporation can also be dissolved for abuse of its powers or unauthorized
acts. See Stevens, Private Corporations 951-54 (2d ed. 1949) ; Grayck, "Professional Associa-
tions and the Kintner Regulations: Some Answers, More Questions, and Further Comments,"
17 Tax L. Rev. 469, 481-82 (1962) ; note 173 supra. Moreover, the dissolution of a corpora-
tion or of a professional association is brought about by independent action such as quo
warranto proceedings, not by the unauthorized act itself. See Bye & Young, supra note 207,
at 440-41; Comment, 16 Sw. LJ. 462, 482 (1962).
226 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 267 (1945), 258 (1943), 208 (1940);
Informal Dec. Nos. 598 (1962), 541 (1962); see Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.,
178 Misc. 152, 33 N.Y.S.2d 733 (App. Term 2d Dep't 1942); ABA Comm., supra, Opinion 97
(1933) stating that where the custom is that the firm name does not necessarily identify the
firm members, a former partner's name may continue to be used. The Wisconsin statute
(Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(4) (Supp. 1963)) permits the use of a former member's name.
The Arkansas (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-1704 (1961)) and South Dakota (S.D. Laws 1961,
ch. 29, § 4) medical corporation acts provide that the name of a deceased member may be
carried for no more than a year after his death. Florida has made Canon 33 expressly
applicable to the professional corporation, but permits it to adopt a fictitious name when
authorized by the professional incorporation act. Matter of The Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554,
559 (Fla. 1961).
227 ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion 219 (1941); Informal Opinions 373-
77; Drinker, supra note 178, at 206-07 (1953).
1963]
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On the other hand, it is also improper to use a partnership name when in
fact a partnership does not exist.22 Taken in total these prohibitions
would prevent a professional corporation from adopting a name since it
could not identify itself as a corporation for fear of using a trade name,
but it would be misleading if a partnership name were adopted. Since
these new state acts now permit lawyers to incorporate or form associa-
tions, it should no longer b6 improper to use designations which properly
identify the entities. Accordingly, provisions of the acts permit or require
the use of designations as "associated," "professional association," "char-
tered" or abbreviations thereof.229 The name should indicate the type of
firm a person is dealing with, especially if liability is limited in any
degree 3 0
3. Centralization of Management?3  To have this characteristic, the
regulations require that the authority to make management decisions be
vested continuously and exclusively in one or more persons but less than
all the members, that these persons must do more than perform minis-
228 ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinions 277 (1948), 126 (1935); 115 (1934),
106 (1934); N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 607 (1942);
Drinker, supra note 178, at 204-08. The acts of Florida (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 621.12 (Supp.
1962)) and Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 274.075 (1962)) permit their corporations to
practice under the names of one or more members without a designation of the corporation
status if such name is registered. Registration of a trade name by a law firm would appear
to be insufficient protection in view of the long tradition of firm names being used to desig-
nate full liability partnerships. See notes 251-53 infra and accompanying text.
229 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 10-906(A), (B) (Supp. 1962) (full or last name of one or
more shareholders or a fictitious name if not prohibited by the profession's canons of ethics,
plus "professional corporation," "P.C.," "Limited," "cLtd.," "Professional Association," "TPA.,"
"Chartered"); Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 3; Ga. Code Ann. § 84-4304 (1961) and S.C. Code
§ 56-1604 (1962) ("Professional Association," "PA.") ; (Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § I(A)
(Supp. 1961)) ("professional company," "professional corporation" or abbreviation thereof,
Canon 33 applies); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 621.12 (Supp. 1962); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.315(11)
(Supp. 1962) and NJ. Stat. Ann. § 14:19-14 (1963) (with minor differences) (last names
of some or all of the stockholders, plus "chartered," "professional association," "PA.," but
not "company," "corporation," "incorporated" or other similar word or abbreviation); Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 106Y, § 103 (Smith-Hurd 1962) (full or last name of one or more members,
plus "associated," "association," "and associates" or "assoc."); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 274.075
(1962) (last name *of two or more shareholders (except for single owner corporations), plus
"chartered," "professional service corporation," "P.S.C."); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 807
(Supp. 1962) ("corporation," "incorporated," "corp.," "inc." subject to further requirement
of regulating board of profession) ; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132b § 6(3a) (1962) ("associ-
ation," "associates") ; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(4) (Supp. 1963) (last name of one or more
present or former associates, or other name if recorded, plus "Chartered," "Limited," "Ltd.,"
"Service Corporation," "S.C.").
230 See notes 252-53 infra and accompanying text.
231 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1960). See Ray, supra note 215, at 80; note 244
infra; Smith, supra note 209, at 513-18. Under these provisions it would seem impossible for
a one-man association or corporation (if it were subject to the regulations) to possess this
characteristic. The regulations permit a limited partnership to qualify for this characteristic
if substantially all of the interests are owned by limited partners. This would not aid the
lawyer but may prove to be a help to the IRS in classifying as associations organizations
developing mineral interests. See notes 304-05 infra.
It has been suggested that even a corporation does not give "exclusive" authority to its
board of directors to make all the management decisions and other individuals frequently
make day-to-day operational decisions which are potentially binding. Note, 12 Stan. L. Rev.
746, 760 (1960). See note 243 infra.
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terial tasks such as presiding at meetings, and that their decisions should
not require the ratification of the other members. In addition, no individ-
ual member should be able to bind the association by his acts. The
regulations specify that a partnership governed by the Uniform Partner-
ship Act would not qualify because the acts of one partner could bind
all, notwithstanding a partnership agreement to the contrary since such
agreement would not be binding on persons dealing with the partnership
without notice of the restriction.
All of the association statutes provide for a governing group to man-
age the affairs of the association,2 32 and several of the states expressly
restrict the authority of individual members to bind the association 33
With the exception of Arizonaj the states authorizing professional cor-
porations do not expressly provide for centralization of management since
such characteristic would be possessed by reference to the applicable
business corporation acts. 3 '
Because an attorney may have a professional obligation to exercise his
own discretion in certain matters such as what clients he will represent
and what causes he will bring or contest,235 it has been questioned
232 E.g., Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 7:
A professional association organized pursuant to the provisions of this act shall be
governed by a board of governors elected by the members or shareholders, and repre-
sented by officers elected by the board of governors, so that centralization of manage-
ment will be assured, and no member shall have the power to bind the association
within the scope of the association's business or profession merely by virtue of his
being a member or shareholder of the association.
Va. Code Ann. § 54-882 (Supp. 1962):
A professional association organized pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be
governed by a board of directors, which shall be elected by the associates from their
own number and shall have the full management of the business and affairs of the
association and continuing exclusive authority to make management decisions on its
behalf, and no associate shall have the power to bind the association within the scope
of its business or profession merely by virtue of his being an associate . . . . [T]he
number of directors shall be three, except that if the total number of associates is less
than four, the number of directors shall be two.
(3 or more persons are required to form an association in Virginia, Va. Code Ann. § 54-875
(Supp. 1962) ). See also note 234 infra.
233 Note 232 supra; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 34-82(lb) (1962); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 106Y,
§ 108 (Smith-Hurd 1962).
234 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-908(4) (Supp. 1962) provides for a board of directors,
officers and an executive committee. In addition to making the business corporation laws
applicable (see note 220 supra), several of the statutes make reference to a board of directors
or other governing body. E.g., Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § I(D) (Supp. 1961), Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 621.11 (Supp. 1962), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.315(12) (1962), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:19-6
(1963), Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 810 (Supp. 1962). Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.63(A)
(Anderson Supp. 1962) provides that its business corporations shall be managed by a Board
of Directors of not less than three persons. The "Model Act' which provides for a one-man
corporation also permits a professional corporation of less than four members to have a
board of directors of less than three members notwithstanding the requirements of the
business corporation act. Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau, supra note 211, at
407-09. Michigan (Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.315(12) (Supp. 1962)) and New Jersey (N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 14:19-6 (1963)) permit one or more directors depending on the number of
shareholders.
235 Canon 31; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 10 (1926) ; N.Y. Co. Lawyer's
Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 251 (1927); ABA Special Comm., supra note
198, at 41, 50-52. Drinker, supra note 198, at 160-61.
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whether he can transfer this responsibility to a governing board.23 It is
clear that a lawyer may not delegate his confidence, responsibility or
functions to a layman,237 but there does not appear to be any ethical
objection to delegation to an attorney, who retains responsibility for his
acts, working under the supervision of another attorney whose conduct
is also subject to the same restrictions and who possesses the same profes-
sional obligations and privileges.238 Indeed, several existing law partner-
ships have management committees which supervise, in addition to ad-
ministrative matters, functions such as the acceptance of clients and the
character and quality of the legal service rendered 39 Difficulties may
be encountered, however, in those states which permit non-profes-
sionals to hold management positions.10 While a non-lawyer's func-
236 See ABA Special Comm., supra note 198; Bittker, supra note 221, at 13-15, 23.
2837 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 303 (1961), 85 (1932), 68 (1932), 8
(1925) ; Drinker, supra note 198.
288 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 363 (1961), 97 (1933), 68 (1932);
Alabama Bar Ass'n Special Comm. Rep., "A Study of the Practical Ethical Considerations
as to the Alabama Professional Association Act," 14 Ala. L. Rev. 79, 83-84; Bye & Young,
supra note 207, at 441-42; Grayck, supra note 225, at 479; cf., Canon 34; ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics, Opinion 204 (1940). The duty to preserve the client's confidences,
imposed by Canon 37 and the laws of the several states, would apply to all lawyers including
managers, entering into a professional relationship with the client. See ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Opinion 303 (1961); Alabama Bar Ass'n, supra; American Bar Founda-
tion Research Memo. No. 28, "Ethical Problems Raised by the Association and Incorporation
of Lawyers," 17 (Greenwood, Research Att'y 1961); Note, 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 341, 346
(1962).
239 See partnership agreement provisions based on national survey in Carrington &
Sutherland, supra note 217, at 20-21, 86-96; see also ABA Comm. on Professional Etthics,
Opinion 303 (1961); ABA Special Comm., note 198 supra; Comment, 16 Sw. L.J. 462, 484
(1962). The Texas Uniform Partnership Act contains provisions sanctioning existing classifi-
cations of partners such as senior, junior, and managing, and permits agreements to establish
various classes of nonpartner employees. (This latter provision was intended to permit
certain persons who share in the profits to be treated as employees rather than partners in
order to seek tax benefits.) Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132b §§ 18(2), 18(3) (1962) ; Brom-
berg, "Texas Uniform Partnership Act-The Enacted Version," 15 Sw. L.J. 386, 390-91
(1961).
240 See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 303 (1961); Alabama Bar Ass'n,
supra note 238, at 83; Comment, 16 Sw. L.J. 462, 483, 501-02 (1962). Such states include:
Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 7:
Members of the board of governors need not be members or shareholders of the pro-
fessional association and officers need not be members of the board of governors except
that the president shall be a member of the board of governors, provided that no officer
or member of the board of governors who is not duly licensed to practice the profes-
sion for which the professional association was organized shall participate in any deci-
sions constituting the practice of said profession.
Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § I(F) (Supp. 1961): "The president shall be a shareholder and
a director, and to the extent possible all other directors and officers shall be persons having the
qualifications described in paragraph D above [Colorado lawyers]. Lay directors and officers
shall not exercise any authority whatsoever over professional matters." See Bye & Young,
supra note 207, at 436-37. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:19-6 (1963) and Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(7)
(Supp. 1963) (for one-man corporations only). Compare Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 810
(Supp. 1962): "No person may be an officer, director, or shareholder of a professional
corporation who is not an individual duly licensed to render the same specific professional
services as those for which the corporation was organized." The Florida Supreme Court has
required directors to be lawyers and executive officers to be shareholders. Matter of The
Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 557-58 (1961). See Note, 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 341, 345-46 (1962)
contending that a requirement that directors be lawyers is implied from the Ohio act provi-
sion that professional services only be rendered by licensed officers, employees and agents.
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tions might be limited to housekeeping matters, this would appear to
be insufficient to satisfy the regulations which require that authority
to make the "business decisions" be vested in the central managers." 1
Since such decisions may well include ones of a professional nature,
it would be advisable to employ only professionally qualified persons
as managers. Furthermore, to avoid a charge of unauthorized prac-
tice of law or fee-splitting, or that the central managers constitute an
intermediary exploiting or controlling the services of the lawyer em-
ployees, the members of the management committee should also be mem-
bers or shareholders in the organization.2  The restrictions of Canon 33
which prohibit partnerships with non-attorneys should also serve to
prohibit a layman from becoming a member or a manager in a profes-
sional association or corporation.
Practical and ethical objections to the relinquishment of decision-
making authority could also be minimized by vesting the management in
a rotating committee of members who would then delegate authority to
the lawyer employees to exercise their own discretion in accordance with
general policies adopted by the managers. The lawyer employee could
make decisions which would bind the organization, but only because he
had been delegated the authority to do so, not because he was a member
of the organization. Business corporations frequently delegate broad
decision-making authority to certain of their employees, and a profes-
sional employee of a business corporation would normally enjoy suffi-
cient freedom to exercise his professional prerogatives.242
Many states fail expressly to permit or prohibit lay directors, e.g., Connecticut and
Tennessee, while Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 197-6 (Supp. 1962) provides that members of the
board of governors need not be associates. This provision seems unwise since a non-assodate
manager (although prohibited from rendering professional services if he is a layman) might
exploit legal services in violation of Canon 35 or share in professional fees in violation of
Canon 34. See Note, 35 Temp. L.Q. 312, 317 (1962). By contrast, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 106Y2,
§ 108 (Smith-Hurd 1962) provides that: "Officers and members of the Board of Directors
or Executive Committee shall be members of the professional association." And Va. Code
Ann. § 54-882 (Supp. 1962) requires members of the board of directors to be associates,
and (§ 54-883) requires all associates to be employees. Since all states require associates
and shareholders to be qualified professionals, requiring the board members to be associates
or shareholders prevents laymen from holding such positions. It also seems advisable to
require all associates to be employees in order to avoid a division of fees not based upon a
division of service or responsibility. Canon 34; ABA Special Comm. supra note 198, at
52-53; N.Y. Co. Lawyer's Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 170 (1919) (im-
proper for partnership to continue with dormant partner who shares in fees and formal
responsibility only) ; see note 257 infra.
241 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (3) ; ABA Special Comm. supra note 235 at 50-51; Bittker,
supra note 236 at 13-15.
242 Canons 34, 35, 47; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 303 (1961), 272
(1946), 237 (1941), 32 (1931), 10 (1926), 8 (1925) ; ABA Report, supra note 235; Alabama
Bar Ass'n, supra note 238; note 240 supra. See also note 165 supra.
243 See Grayck, supra note 225, at 479-80; see note 61 supra. The daily operation of a
corporation necessarily requires persons other than the board of directors to make binding
business decisions. See Vesely, supra note 214, at 209-10; Note, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 746, 760-61
(1960). But cf. Bye & Young, supra note 207, at 442-43 questioning the effect of a board of
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While a large law firm would have little problem in adopting or main-
taining centralized management, a small firm which was unable or unwill-
ing to employ "junior members" might find that none of its present part-
ners will consent to give up, even temporarily, any of their authority over
the affairs of the organization. 44 Thus the greatest road block to attain-
ing this attribute may not be law or ethics but human nature.
4. LimitedLiabilitv.25 The Kintner regulations provides that limited
liability will exist when no member of the organization is personally liable
under local law for the debts of or claims against the organization, that is,
when a creditor cannot seek personal satisfaction from a member of the
organization if its assets prove insufficient to satisfy-his claim. Limited
liability does not exist in a partnership governed by the Uniform Part-
nership Act.
In order to eliminate the possibility that professionals may use the
corporate form to avoid personal responsibility for their acts, a few
states have clearly sacrificed this corporate characteristic and have pre-
served joint and several liability as in a partnership.24 Most-states, how-
ever, have attempted both to satisfy the Kintner regulations and retain
sufficient personal liability to meet professional standards. While these
two objectives may at first appear inconsistent, they can be rationalized.
Although it is true that a shareholder in a business corporation is ordi-
narily liable only to the extent of his capital contribution,247 when the
directors which delegates powers to employees but never exercises its retained ultimate
authority. See note 244 infra.
244 See Bye & Young, supra note 207, at 451-52; Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 776, 781-82,
786-87 (1962). It may be the actual contemplation of the members not the formal arrange-
meq which controls. See United States v. Stierwalt, 287 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1961).
2 4 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1960). See Ray, supra note 215, at 80-81; Smith,
supra note 209, at 525-27. Limited liability may exist in a limited partnership under cir-
cumstances not applicable to the practice of law.
246 Pennsylvania makes all the associates jointly and severally liable for (1) the torts of
any agent or employee committed while acting in the ordinary course of the operations of
the association, (2) the misapplication by an associate of the money or property of a third
person which was received by the association in the ordinary course of its operation, and
(3) the debts and obligations of the association which remain unsatisfied upon dissolution;
and the associates are jointly liable for all other debts and legal obligations of the associa-
tion. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, §§ 197-17, -19(b) (Supp. 1962); see Note, 35 Temp. L.Q. 312,
315, 318-19 (1962). Arizona provides that the liability arising from the rendering of profes-
sional services shall not be altered, and that the shareholders shall be jointly and severally
responsible for such liability, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-905 (Supp. 1962). But the
private property of the shareholders shall otherwise be exempt from liability for the debts
of the corporation. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-908(5) (Supp. 1962).
247 There are several business corporations in which the shareholders do not enjoy com-
plete limited liability. See e.g., 13A Fletcher, Cyclopedia Private Corporations §§ 6219, 6224
(1961). The concept of limited liability is neither essential to the existence of a state corpora-
tion nor to a corporation for tax purposes. Stevens, supra note 225, § 4, at 18-19; Conway,
"The New York Fiduciary Concept in Incorporated Partnerships and Joint Ventures," 30
Fordham L. Rev. 297, 298-99 (1961); Smith, supra note 209, at 533; Sneed, supra note 217,
at 191. The latter article reported the results of a survey of 84 cases holding organizations
taxable as corporations. Only 45 of the organizations in question possessed limited liability
as compared with 100% having associates, a joint profit objective, continuity of life and
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shareholder is also an employee of the corporation, he may be personally
liable for his own negligence and misconduct. Accordingly, several states
have stated their intention not to modify any law applicable to the rela-
tionship between a professional and his client or patient including the
liability arising out of the rendering of professional services, but have
also expressly or impliedly denied personal liability of the members for
the debts or claims against the association.248 These provisions probably
do not retain partnership-type liability, but on the other hand, if con-
strued to retain more than just a member's personal liability for his
tortious conduct, neither will they satisfy the regulations.249 Those states
centralization of management. See e.g., Cooper v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 530 (10th Cir.1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 944 (1959).
248 The provisions vary somewhat from state to state and will likely be construed by
the state courts as preserving different degrees of personal liability. E.g., Ala. Laws 1961,
act 865, § 6:
This act does not modify any law applicable to the relationship between a person
furnishing professional services and a person receiving such service, including liability
for tort arising out of such professional service. . . Subject to the foregoing provisions
of this section, the members or shareholders of any professional association organized
pursuant to the provisions of this act shall not be individually liable for the debts of,
or claims against, the professional association unless such member or shareholder has
personally participated in the transaction for which the debt or claim is made or out
of which it arises.
See also Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 14: "The assets of a professional association shall not be
liable to attachment for the individual debts of its members of shareholders." This latter
provision should not be interpreted as negating liability of the association as the principal
of its agents and employees. NJ. Stat. Ann. § 14:19-8 (1963). See note 253 infra. The
Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. § 84-4307 (1961)) and South Carolina (S.C. Code § 56-1607 (1962))
acts are identical except that they preserve "liability arising out of such professional service"
not merely the tort liability arising therefrom. The acts of Illinois (Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 106/2,
§ 106 (Smith-Hurd 1962)), Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1785.04 (Supp. 1962)),
and Oklahoma (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 812 (Supp. 1962)) also preserve the liability arising
out of the professional relationship, but do not make any express provision for limiting
liability. However, it may be inferred in Ohio and Oklahoma from the applicability of their
business corporation laws. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1785.08 (Anderson Supp. 1962),
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.32 (Page Supp. 1962); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 805 (Supp.
1962). See Note, 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 341, 344-45 (1962) noting that the Ohio constitution
requires shareholders in a corporation to have limited liability, but that the Ohio "associa-
tion" members while not subject to partnership liability do not enjoy limited liability.
Vesely, supra note 214, at 203 suggests that the preservation of professional liability applies
only to the members as employees not as shareholders, so that limited liability is provided.
See Comment, 16 Sw. LJ. 462, 487 n.91 (1962).
The Tennessee statute (Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-105(3c) (1962)) simply provides that "The
members of the association shall not be personally liable for debts of, or claims against the
association." While this enacts limited liability it may nevertheless be modified by the
provision (Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-105(3c) (1962)) making the association "subject to the
laws ...regulating the practice of the profession." If this latter provsion is construed
to include ethics as well as well as laws regulating the professions, the Tennessee statute
would not be unlike those state statutes expressly preserving the liability arising out of
the professional relationship. See Comment, 29 Tenn. L. Rev. 437, 446 (1962). See also
notes 249, 250, 258, 259 infra.
249 Professor Bittker contends that a member's liability is retained to the same extent
as if he were still a partner, in particular, he is liable for his breaches of contacts as well
as for his torts, and for the torts or misconduct of the other association members and of
persons working under his supervision. This construction is strengthened by the clause
appearing in some state statutes like that of Alabama which denies limited liability to a
member who has personally participated in the transaction giving rise to the debt or claim.
Bittker, supra note 221, at 8-13. See Comments, 12 Mercer L. Rev. 388, 397 (1961);
16 Sw. LJ. 462, 486-87 (1962). It seems, however, that state courts will more likely construe
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which apparently have only relieved the members of personal liability
for contractual debts of the organization have probably preserved the
ethical responsibilities of the lawyers involved but have not met the re-
quirements of the regulations in that freedom from personal liability for
"claims against the organization" would seem to include freedom from
tort as well as contractual claims.250
The question still remains of what is the minimum liability that must
be preserved in order to satisfy ethical standards. Since these profes-
sional organizations are joint enterprises, it may be argued that nothing
short of partnership-type liability preserves the existing professional
relationship. This seems to be the theory of a 1950 opinion of the ABA
Committee on Professional Ethics,251 but the recent Opinion 303 makes
no mention of such a requirement and observes that lawyers may prac-
tice under a form of organization that imposes limited liability as long
as the lawyer or lawyers rendering the services are personally respon-
sible to the client, and the restrictions on the liability of the other lawyers
in the organization are made apparent to the client.25 2 The latter re-
quirement can be met by an identifying designation such as "Professional
Association," "P.A.," "Professional Service Corporation," or "Chart-
ered" which should no longer be condemned as trade names.2 53 The
former requirement raises questions under Canon 34 which prohibits a
division of fees for legal services, except with another lawyer, based on a
division of service or responsibility. Since the income of the professional
association or corporation will be derived from the services of its lawyer
employees, the salaries of such employees and any distributions to the
owners must be based upon a contribution of services or a sharing of
the preservation of the professional relationship as retaining the liability of a member for
torts committed by him (and possibly by those under his direct supervision) and for
breaches of his contractual or fiduciary obligations arising out of transactions in which he
participated in his professional, as distinct from administrative, capacity. The mutual
liability of partners is a matter of partnership law and does not inhere in the professional
relationship, and thus would not apply to the members of a professional corporation
or association unless the statute creating the entity provided for it. See Grayck, supra note
225, at 474-78; Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 776, 781 (1962) ; notes 237, 241, 242, infra. See also
Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau, supra note 211, at 417-18 suggesting alterna-
tive provisions, one retaining partnership liability and another limiting, personal liability
to the person rendering the service and other shareholders participating therein. The authors
express the hope that the latter provision will satisfy the Kintner regulations.
250 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 34-82(lc) (1960); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 274.055 (1962); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 180.99(8) (Supp. 1963) ; cf., Arizona statutes, supra note 246. See Bittker, supra
note 236, at 23; Kahn, supra note 212, at 77. But see Note, 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 71, 76, 82
(1962) making the questionable suggestion that an Ohio association could qualify under the
regulations with personal liability limited only as to contractual obligations.
251 Opinion 283 (1950) holding practice in the form of a Massachusetts Trust improper
because, among other reasons, the trustees would not be liable for the acts of the bene-
ficiaries and the beneficiaries would not be personally liable for the acts of the trustees.
252 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 303 (1961). See 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 341,
345 (1962).
253 See notes 227-30 supra and accompanying text.
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responsibility.254 In a partnership, if a partner did not contribute his
services to a particular client on a particular matter, he could neverthe-
less share in the fee because his personal liability as a partner placed him
under responsibility to all the clients of the partnership. Even with this
legal liability removed, the members of an association will still bear a
professional responsibility for the legal services of the organization. Re-
sponsibility can be moral as well as legal, and can include supervision or
control of the lawyer rendering the services 55 Thus, the managers and
officers of a professional organization, and perhaps all the members, may
share in the responsibility to the clients of the organization. Further-
more, since the income from all sources is pooled, and total expenses
deducted, it may be impossible to determine whose salary represents
what legal fees.2 56 As long as all the shareholders are also active em-
ployees, it would seem that the Canons of Ethics do not require that they
be personally liable to the same extent as members of a partnership."
254 The question has been raised as to whether Canon 34 will be violated by a distribu-
tion of earnings from a profit-sharing or pension plan at a time when the distribution is
not in proportion to the services being rendered. (It is not anticipated that there will be
any other distribution of earnings.) See ABA Special Comm. to Cooperate with the ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics Re Ass'ns of Attorneys Taxable as Corporations, ABA
Section of Taxation Bull. 41, 52-53 (Oct. 1961); Waisel, "Attorneys' Federal Income Taxes,"
66 Dick. L. Rev. 75, 81-82 n.52 (1961). However, it would seem that the allocation of
services and responsibility to earnings should be made (if indeed it ever can be accurately
made) at the time of contributions to such plans and not at the time of distribution. See
note 256 infra. The earnings of the accumulated funds are interest on an investment which
any attorney is free to make and which several states give the association or corporation
express authority to make. See note 183 supra; Alabama Bar Ass'n, supra note 238, at 86.
See also Carrington & Sutherland, supra note 217, at 75-76 suggesting that law partnerships
reduce taxes by paying younger partners more at a time when they are in a lower tax
bracket, with the expectation that the older men, who presently cut their income, will be
paid more in their less productive or retirement years. See note 258 infra, regarding pay-
ments to the estate of a deceased member.
255 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 303 (1961), 204 (1940).
255 See N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 684 (1946) holding
that where a partnership with an out of state attorney is legal, it is not improper to pool the
income, deduct the expenses, and then divide the net profit among the partners. See also
Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 776, 789 (1962) suggesting that since it may be too difficult, especially
for a client, to determine who has contributed services to a client's project or who was
negligent in his contribution, it may be better to hold the entire firm liable especially where
the client looks to the organization as a whole to serve his legal needs. This result would,
of course, eliminate the fee-splitting problem. Partnership income is not always based upon
services being rendered at the time the income is received. See Carrington & Sutherland,
supra note 219; American Bar Foundation Research Memo No. 28, supra note 238, at 16. See
also New Jersey (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:19-7 (1963)), permitting the corporation to
charge and collect fees and compensate, the officers, employees and agents.
257 See N.Y. Co. Lawyer's Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 170 (1919) stating
that a partnership should not continue with a dormant partner who shares in the fees but
contributes no services and only bears formal responsibility and lends the use of his name.
Such an arrangement begets increased commercialism and decreased professional responsi-
bility. However, a temporary absence or one due to ill health or old age was not considered
cause to terminate the partnership arrangement. Va. Code Ann. § 54-885 (Supp. 1962)
requires its associates to be employees of their association, and Colorado (Colo. R. Civ. Proc.,
Rule 265 § I(D) (Supp. 1961)) requires the shareholders in its corporations to be actively
engaged in the practice of law for their corporation except during periods of illness, accident,
armed service, vacations, and leaves of absence not to exceed one year. The ABA Special
Comm., supra note 254, at 52-53 notes that unless supplying capital is itself a responsibility
1963]
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This result is consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Florida approving that state's provision that a shareholder shall remain
personally liable for any negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct com-
mitted by him, or by any person under his direct supervision and control,
while rendering professional services on behalf of the corporation."' 8
However, a provision like the Florida one may not meet the Kintner
regulations' requirement of limited liability since it probably makes the
supervising attorney liable for more than his own negligence. 59
The Colorado Rule uniquely provides that the shareholders of its
professional corporations will be jointly and severally liable for the acts
and omissions of the employees of the corporation unless adequate liabil-
.ity insurance is provided.2 60 The effect of this provision could be ques-
tionable in light of a statement in the regulations that if a member re-
mains personally liable under local law notwithstanding an indemnifica-
tion agreement, limited liability will not be attained.26 1 But considering
the recognized tax purpose of the professional corporation, it is likely
that the Colorado Court will construe their own rule as completely re-
lieving the shareholders of personal liability during periods when the
required liability insurance is carried. Court rules of this nature are
desirable since they assure ethical acceptance and favorable construction
while also encouraging malpractice insurance to protect an attorney's
clients.
(an unlikely conclusion), the ownership must be restricted to employees of the organization.
See also Bye & Young, supra note 217, at 436; Comment, 16 Sw. L.J. 462, 489 (1962) ; Note,
31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 341, 346-47. But see Note, 39 Temp. L.Q. 312, 317-18 (1962). It has also
been suggested that the joint and several liability of law partners is a matter of partnership
law and not legal ethics. Alabama Bar Ass'n, supra note 238, at 84. Except as modified by
Canon 34 this proposition is probably valid.
258 Matter of The Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 1961) noting that the Florida
act makes an additional remedy available against the corporation to the extent of its assets.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 621.07 (Supp. 1962). This remedy (which should be available through
the doctrine of respondeat superior even in the absence of a statutory provision) may
provide an extent of protection to the client beyond the individual practitioner's liability
but falling short of partnership liability. See United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 424
(9th Cir. 1954). The provisions of the Michigan (Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.315(6) (1962)),
New Jersey (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:19-8 (1963)), and Virginia (Va. Code Ann. §§ 54-886, -892
(Supp. 1962)) are similar to the Florida ones but the Virginia statute expressly disclaims
partnership liability stating that an associate shall not be liable for any debts or claims
against the association or another associate or employee other than one under his direct
supervision and control. See also Alabama Bar Ass'n, supra note 238, at 84 concluding that
the Alabama act meets ethical standards.
259 It has been asserted that the regulations do not permit any vicarious liability on the
part of a member. Comment, 16 Sw. L.J. 462, 486-87 (1962). If so, and the proposition
is not free from doubt, then the Florida provision will not meet the regulations unless it
can be said that the supervising shareholder will be negligent in his supervision or selection
of underlings in every instance in which the underling commits a negligent or wrongful
act. Compare Bittker, supra note 236, at 10 with Grayck, supra note 225, at 477-78.
260 Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § I(G) (Supp. 1961). See Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 776,
789 (1962). The required amounts of liability insurance will exceed the asset value of the
average partnership. Bye & Young, "Law Firm Incorporation in Colorado," 34 Rocky Mt.
L. Rev. 427, 437 (1962).
261 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1960)
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Although many of the states do not achieve limited liability under the
regulations, the provisions may still be entitled to some weight in de-
termining how closely a professional organization resembles a business
corporation.22  Furthermore, since an association is required to have
only three out of four of the principal corporate characteristics, and since
there is no need to encourage investment in a professional corporation,
it may be desirable from a public relations standpoint for an organiza-
tion of lawyers to retain full personal liability.263
5. Free Transferability of Interests.2  This is the power of each
member, without the consent of the other members, to substitute an-
other person for himself as a member of the organization, thereby trans-
ferring all the attributes of membership-not merely a right to share in
profits without participating in management. This characteristic will not
be present if the transfer, under local law, results in a dissolution of the
old organization and the formation of a new one (as is likely the case
with a partnership).265 For the transfer to be completely free it must be
capable of being made without the consent of the other members, but a
modified form of free transferability exists when a member is required
to offer his interest to the other members at its fair market value before
he may transfer it to a non-member. The modified form of free trans-
ferability is acceptable under the regulations but will be given less sig-
nificance in determining the classification of the organization for tax
purposes.
For the same reasons that only lawyers may form a professional organ-
ization to practice law, transfers of membership or ownership must like-
262 See notes 284, 285 infra and accompanying text.
263 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a), (g)(1), (g)(5) (1960). See Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
776, 789-90 (1962); Comment, 16 Sw. L.J. 462, 499-500 (1962). The American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants has not approved the practice of accountancy in association
or corporation form because among other reasons, of the unfavorable impression that might
be created by people thinking liability is being limited and that the accountants are taking
advantage of a tax "gimmick." Compare the attitude of the Supreme Court of Florida in
approving that state's act for use by attorneys. In re The Florida Bar Association, supra
note 258. See notes 319, 344 infra and accompanying text. See also note 153 supra_
264 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (1960). See Ray, supra note 215, at 81. The regulations
have been criticized as requiring more freedom of transfer than many business corporations
presently provide for. See Maier & Wild, supra note 217, at 139-40; Note, 12 Stan. L. Rev.
746, 758 (1960); Cf. Smith, "Associations Classified as Corporations Under the Internal
Revenue Code," 34 Cal. L. Rev. 461, 522-25 (1946). Restrictions on the alienability of a
business corporation's stock are generally held to be valid as long as transferability is not
totally prohibited. 12 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Private Corporations §§ 5452-5458 (1957);
Stevens, Private Corporations § 129 (2d ed. 1949). Restrictions are especially common in
dose corporations. 2 O'Neal, Close Corporations ch. 7 (1958) ; Harvard Student Legislative
Research Bureau, "Incorporation of Professional Groups: A Model Act," 47 Mass. L.Q. 405,
415-16 (1962).
265 See Crane, Partnership 415-16 (2d ed. 1962). The Uniform Partnership Act provides
that an assignment of a partner's interest merely transfers a right to share in profits not
management, and while the assignment does not automatically dissolve the partnership,
it gives the remaining partners the option to do so without violating their agreement.§§ 27, 31(1) (c). See Comment, 16 Sw. LJ. 462, 488 (1962).
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wise be limited to lawyers. To permit a non-lawyer to become a member
of such an organization would involve violations of Canon 33 (forbidding
partnerships with non-lawyers), Canon 34 (fee splitting with non-
lawyers), Canon 35 (lay intermediary controlling or exploiting legal
services), Canon 47 (aiding the unauthorized practice of law), and would
probably also violate Canon 31 (lay interference in professional deci-
sions) and Canon 37 (interference with confidential relationship)?68
Consequently, all of the states restrict transfers of membership or owner-
ship to qualified professional persons.267 Such a restriction does not, ac-
cording to an example furnished with the regulations, negate the attribute
of free transferability.26
Ethical problems may nevertheless arise when a member dies, becomes
insolvent, incompetent, disqualified or wishes to resign and cannot find
a qualified person to purchase his interest. Such a member or his per-
sonal representative should possess the authority to make a transfer to a
266 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 303 (1961); Note, 37 Notre Dame
Law. 545, 547 (1962).
267 E.g., Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 9: "A professional association may issue its capital if
it is a stock-type association or accept as members of the professional association, if a non-
stock association, only persons who are duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized to render
the same professional service as that for which the professional association was organized."
Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § I(D) (Supp. 1961): "All shareholders of the corporation
shall be persons duly licensed by the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado to practice law
in the state of Colorado, and who at all times own their shares in their own right." Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 809 (Supp. 1962):
A professional corporation may issue the shares of its capital stock only to persons who
are duly licensed to render the same specific professional services as those for which
the corporation was organized. A shareholder may voluntarily transfer his shares in a
professional corporation only to a person who is duly licensed to render the same
specific professional services as those for which the corporation was organized. Any
shares issued in violation of this section are null and void. The voluntary transfer of
any shares transferred in violation of this section is null and void. No shares may be
transferred upon the books of the professional corporation or issued by the professional
corporation until there is presented to and filed with the corporation a certificate by the
regulating board stating that the person to whom the transfer is to be made or the
shares issued is duly licensed to render the same specific professional services as those
for which the corporation was organized.
Va. Code Ann. § 54-888 (Supp. 1962):
Except to the extent provided in the articles of association or the by-laws, certificates of
ownership shall be freely transferable by any associate to another associate, or to other
associates, or to any person who is not an associate provided such person is duly
licensed or qualified under the laws of this State to render the same kind of profes-
sional service which the association was organized to render, and such transferee shall
thereupon become an associate in the organization and be entitled to participate in
its management and affairs with all the rights of the transferor of such interest.
See note 158 supra.
.268 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (1) (1960). See ABA Special Comm., supra note 254, at
52 observing that the regulations only require transferability to "a person" not to "any
person," thus limiting transfers to lawyers comes within the literal requirement. But see
Bittker, supra note 221, at 17-20, 21 n.38. Grayck, supra note 238, at 483 notes that Bittker
bases his conclusion on policy not the requirements of the regulations. It is less certain,
however, that transfers restricted to qualified professionals who will be active employees of
the organization (as is probably necessary, see note 259 supra) will still be free enough
under the regulations. See Comment, 16 Sw. L.J. 462, 489 (1962); Note, 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev;
341, 347 n.33 (1962).
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qualified person,26 9 and in the event no such transfer is consummated
within a reasonable time, the organization should be required to pur-
chase the interest.270 The recent ABA Opinion 303 stated that the tem-
porary holding of the interest by a non-lawyer personal representative
does not violate the Canons of Ethics as long as the layman has no say in
management and does not have access to the confidences of any client." 1
While the ABA opinion places a great emphasis on a temporary versus a
permanent holding of an interest,272 it would seem that all true ownership
by a layman is forbidden. Thus, an executor, administrator or other
representative of a former member may "own" the interest in name only,
and must not be permitted to exercise any of the attributes of ownership
except the right to transfer. Accordingly, neither the personal represen-
tative nor the heirs of a deceased member may share in the income of the
organization which is earned after the death of the member. This does
not, however, prevent such persons from receiving future payments
based upon the member's prior services for which compensation had not
yet been received2 7
3
269 See e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-909(D) (Supp. 1962); Pa. Code Ann. tit. 184,
§§ 197-12, -18 (Supp. 1962). See also note 224 supra.
270 See e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-909(D) (Supp. 1962); Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule
265 § I(E) (Supp. 1961) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 274.095 (1962) ; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:19-10, -13c
(1963); Okla. Stat. Ann. fit. 18, § 815 (Supp. 1962). See Harvard Student Legislative
Research Bureau, supra note 264, at 414-16. It has been contended that a requirement of this
nature will prevent the free transferability of the shares. Note, 37 Notre Dame Law. 545, 548
(1962). But the provisions for redemption will operate only if no valid transfer has been
made, and a transfer to a member of the association or corporation is consistent with the
concept of free transferability as practiced in business corporations. See notes 264, 268 supra,
282, 286 infra. Restrictions on a corporation purchasing its own stock should not apply
to these professional organizations. See note 222 supra.
271 See note 266 supra. See also Alabama Bar Ass'n, supra note 238, at 85; notes 237,
238 supra. The provisions cited in notes 222, 270 supra, generally contain restrictions
to the effect that the personal representative shall not be permitted to vote the interests
being held or otherwise participate in the management of the organization or rendering
of professional services. See Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau, supra note 264,
at 411-12.
272 See note 265 supra. The opinion states at least eight times that it would be unethical
to transfer "permanent beneficial and voting interests" to a layman. The late Dean Sturges
used to comment that many judges seem to think that if they state a proposition three times
within the course of an opinion, it becomes the law. Perhaps this was the theory of the
ABA ethics committee, but it is submitted that a layman cannot hold even a temporary
voting interest in a professional association engaged in the practice of law. However, the
ABA's ultimate conclusion that a personal representative may hold a nonparticipating
interest for a limited time and purpose seems sound.
273 The widow or other beneficiaries of a deceased lawyer are entitled to the lawyer's
share in his former practice as of the date of his death. This may include his interest in the
library, furniture, unexpired lease and future fees accruing from services performed prior
to his death, but nothing may be paid for any goodwill which the deceased may have
acquired or contributed to his firm. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 266 (1945),
Informal Decision Nos. 507, 628 (1962) (may pay a disbarred attorney a share of a
contingent fee for services rendered in a matter unrelated to his disbarment and prior
thereto) ; N.Y. Co. Lawyer's Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 352 (1939), 161
(1918); N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 771 (1952), 755
(1950), 706 (1947), 618 (1942), 100 (1928-29). See note 279 infra. However, the former
associate may make an additional gift to the widow as long as they do not enter into
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Similar considerations prohibit a lawyer from selling his interest in
the organization's future earnings or good will.274 It is sometimes said
that a lawyer cannot acquire any good will because his success depends
upon his personal ability and efforts, and his personal reputation cannot
be assigned to others 2 5 It is true that an attorney has no property in-
terests in his clients; they are free at any time to choose another at-
torney." Nevertheless some clients are inclined to continue to consult
the same firm, especially when it operates under the same name, even
though old members leave and new ones are added. The value of this
probability of recurring clientele is properly labeled as the good will of
the firm.277 Moreover, it seems apparent that the privilege of becoming
a fee sharing contract. N.Y. Co. Comm., supra, Opinion 161 (1918); N.Y. City Comm.,
supra, Opinion 591 (1941). And in order to avoid difficult questions of accounting, the
articles of partnership could provide for a percentage of earnings to be paid to the estate
of a deceased partner for a limited number of years in lieu of his share of fees earned but
not billed at the time of his death. The payment must be a reasonable approximation of
the fees due the deceased. N.Y. City Comm., supra, Opinion 706 (1947). While another
lawyer may not solicit a deceased lawyer's clients, it is proper for an associate to contact
the clients and inform them of the death and state that any pending matters will be
handled by the associate unless and until the client names another counsel. ABA Comm.,
supra, Opinion 266 (1945), Informal Decision No. 507 (1962); N.Y. City Comm., supra,
Opinion 618 (1942); Alabama Bar Ass'n, supra note 238, at 82. But see N.Y. City Comm.,
supra, Opinion 329 (1935) where the Committee stated that an associate of a deceased
lawyer may make payments to the widow "for the files and tangible assets; and the general
good will." Apparently many law partnerships now provide for payments to a deceased
partner's estate as a gratuity or in lieu of good will. See Carrington & Sutherland, Articles
of Partnership for Law Firms, ABA Economics of the Law Practice Series, Pamphlet No.
6, 51-54, 67 (1961).
274 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 266 (1945); N.Y. Co. Lawyer's
Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 352 (1939); N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Opinions 646 (1943), 633 (1943), 588 (1941), 272 (1933). A transferring
lawyer, like the estate of a deceased lawyer, can continue to share in fees from his prior
services. N.Y. City Bar Ass'n, supra, Opinions 679 (1945), 100 (1928-29). See also
note 258 supra.
275 See e.g., Siddall v. Keating, 8 App. Div. 2d 44, 185 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1st Dep't 1959);
Arundell v. Bell, 52 L.J. Ch. 537, 19 Eng. Rul. Cas. 657 (1883) ; ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Opinion 6 (1925); N.Y. City Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion
679 (1945); cf. Masters v. Brooks, 132 App. Div. 874, 878-80, 117 N.Y. Supp. 585, 588-90
(1st Dep't 1909).
276 See Trenbath v. Platt, 20 N.Y.S.2d 244, 249 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1940), aff'd
264 App. Div. 708, 34 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 288 N.Y. 741, 42 N.E.2d
751 (1942); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 266 (1945)t 10 (1926); N.Y.
City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 633 (1943), 618 (1942); 588
(1941); Drinker, Legal Ethics 94, 198-200 (1953). The ABA Committee has recently held
that it would not be proper for a law firm and a lawyer-employee to agree to a restrictive
covenant in an employment contract. Opinion 300 (1961), 47 A.B.AJ. 977 (1961);
Informal Decision No. 521 (1962). But see the following cases which enforced reasonable
covenants not to compete entered into by attorneys: Smalley v. Greene, 52 Iowa 241,
3 N.W. 78 (1879); Bunn v. Guy, 4 East 190, 102 Eng. Rep. 803 (K.B. 1803). Some
partnership agreements now contain covenants not to compete and they are not considered
unethical. See Carrington & Sutherland, supra note 273, at 59-60; ABA Comm., supra,
Informal Decision No. 521 (1962).
277 Good will was long ago described, by Lord Chancellor Eldon, as "the probability
that the old customers will resort to the old place." Cruttwell v. Lye, 17 Ves. Jun. 335,
346, 34 Eng. Rep. 129, 134 (Ch. 1810). Cardozo stated that the chief elements of value
upon the sale of good will are continuity of place and continuity of name, and in a
complex business, continuity of organization. Matter of Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 5, 150 N.E.
581, $83 (1926). A professional organization enjoying continuity of life and of name will
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a member of a successful law firm and sharing in the income therefrom
is worth more than an interest in an unsuccessful or unknown law firm,
and this difference in value is a difference in good will. Notwithstanding
the existence of good will as an economic fact,2 7 permitting an attorney
to sell his interest in good will would allow him to share in fees from
legal services without a division of services or responsibility, would allow
the buyer to purchase clients, frequently would obligate the seller to
solicit his former clients to employ his successor, and, if the seller's files
were relinquished to the buyer, might result in revealing the confidences
of clients without their consent. 7 9 Whether the ABA Committee in its
have a greater opportunity to acquire good will. The ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics has stated that "the continued use of a firm name by one or more surviving partners
after the death of a member of the firm whose name is in the firm title is expressly
permitted by the Canons of Ethics. The reason for this is that all of the partners by their
joint and several efforts over a period of years contributed to the good will attached to the
firm name." Opinion 267 (1945). This opinion was rendered the same day as Opinion 266
(1945) stating: "The good will of the practice of a lawyer is not, however, of itself an
asset, which either he or his estate can sell." See also note 278 infra.
278 It is recognized by many law firms that good will can become a significant asset, but
upon withdrawal of a partner his interest in the good will is usually forfeited to the remaining
partners. Indeed the protection of this interest has been urged as a reason for permitting
surviving partners to continue to use the name of their former partner. ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Opinion 267 (1945), set forth at supra note 277. Occasionally, firms will
provide for payments of a fee to former partners or their estates for the use of the former
partner's name or a gratuity in recognition of his services. See Carrington & Sutherland,
supra note 273, at 33, 51-62, 67-68. See notes 258, 262 supra; cf., ABA Comm., supra, Opinion
6 (1925). Several cases, especially older ones, have recognized that professionals may
acquire good will and that it may be transferred, or that at least a consideratlon may be
paid for a covenant not to compete and an agreement by the transferor to recommend his
clients to the transferee. Lawyers and solicitors: Smalley v. Greene, 52 Iowa 241, 3 N.W.
78 (1879); Austen v. Boys, 2 De G. & J. 626, 44 Eng. Rep. 1133 (1858); Bunn v. Guy, 4
East 190, 102 Eng. Rep. 803 (Ch. 1803). Contra, Siddall v. Keating, 8 App. Div. 2d 44, 185
N.Y.S.2d 630 (1st Dep't 1959); Arundell v. Bell, 52 L.J. Ch. 537, 19 Eng. Rui. Cas. 657(1883). Physicians: Hoyt v. Holly, 39 Conn. 326, 12 Am. Rep. 390 (1872); Harshbarger v.
Eby, 28 Idaho 753, 156 Pac. 619 (1916); Tichenor v. Newman, 186 Ill. 275, 57 N.E. 826
(1900); French v. Parker, 16 R.I. 219, 14 Atl. 870 (1888); Randolph v. Graham, 254 S.W.
402 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). Dentists: H. M. LaRue, 37 T. C. 39 (1961); Cook v. Johnson,
47 Conn. 175, 36 Am. Rep. 64 (1879); Slack v. Suddoth, 102 Tenn. 375, 52 S.W. 180 (1899).
Accountants: Evans v. Gunnip, 135 A.2d 128, 65 A.L.R.2d 513 (Del. 1957). Contra, Cook
v. Lauten, 1 In. App. 2d 255, 117 N.E.2d 414 (1954); cf. Lynch v. Bailey, 275 App. Div. 527,
90 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1st Dep't 1949). It has been suggested that a professional person's good
will may not be assigned but a transferee's chances of success may be enhanced by the
transferor withdrawing as a competitor. Cowan v. Fairbrother, 118 N.C. 406, 24 S.E. 212(1896). See Bye & Young, supra note 260, at 450 suggesting that good will exists to the
extent the value as an organization exceeds the value of each member practicing separately.
See also notes 82-85, 122 supra and accompanying text. The following "general rules" are
stated in American Jurisprudence:
The good will that an attorney at law has built up in the practice of his profession may
be made the subject of sale, like that of any other business. [Citing to section on Good
wil.]
5 Am. Jur. Attorneys at Law § 9 (1936).
Frequently, it has been said that salable good will can exist only in commercial or
trade enterprises and that it cannot arise in a professsional business depending upon
the personal skill and confidence in a particular person... The better doctrine, however,
appears to be that good will also exists in a professional practice or in a business which
is founded upon personal skill or reputation. [Citing cases, none of which involves
lawyers.]
24 Am. Jur. Good Will § 11 (1939).
279 Canons 27, 28, 34, & 37; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 266 (1945),
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Opinion 303 failed to discuss this matter because of an unexplained
oversight of the ethical problems or an unexpressed insight into reality,
it still seems that a transfer of an interest in an organization engaged in
the practice of law should be restricted to the extent that the considera-
tion paid for it may not include an allowance for good will.280 Contrary
to the opinion of some writers,2 ' such a restriction should not destroy
the free transferability of the interest. The regulations do not require
that an interest always be transferred at its fair market value,282 and
Informal Decision No. 507 (1962); See N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Opinions 771 (1952), 735 (1949), 633 (1943) ; see also note 259 supra.
280 See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Decision No. 507 (1962) rendered
after Opinion 303 (1961) and reaffirming the principles of Opinion 266 (1945), notes 274,
279 supra. Studies on this matter were apparently available to the ABA Committee at the
time it rendered Opinion 303. See American Bar Foundation, supra note 238, at 22-
23 and authorities cited therein. See also Drinker, Legal Ethics 189 (1953); Alabama
Bar Ass'n, supra note 238, at 85-86; N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Opinion 633 (1943):
Clients are not merchandise. Lawyers are not tradesmen. They have nothing to sell
but personal service. An attempt, therefore, to barter in clients would appear to be
inconsistent with the best concepts of our professional status. This notwithstanding
the absence of any reference to the subject in the Canons. This does not prohibit any
attorney from advancing to the partnership the necessary funds to enable it to pay
out the agreed value of the retiring partner's interest without allowance for good will
or firm name, and thereupon becoming a member of the new firm.
But see, N.Y. City Comm., supra, Opinion 329 (1935).
It may be that the sale of an interest in a professional association can be distinguished
from a sale of an individual's practice. The confidential relationship required by Canon 37
could be preserved, and the solicitation objection, while applicable in theory, would appear
to be unrealistic since the existing members would no doubt veto undeserving potential
members seeking to buy clients, and without any solicitation the clients would probably
continue to consult the organization regardless of membership changes (unless they were
lured away by the withdrawing member). The fee-splitting objection, however, is harder
to overcome unless Canon 34 is amended or reinterpreted. There is no sharing of responsibility
by the withdrawing attorney since the selection of a new attorney is not considered a
sufficient responsibility under Canon 34. ABA Comm., supra, Opinions 204 (1940), 153
(1936). And even though the purchase price of the interest be paid in advance, it cannot
be persuasively argued that the money does not come from legal services since the impli-
cation is clear that the buyer expects to recover his investment from future legal fees.
See O'Rear v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1935) where the taxpayer, a former
chief justice of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, sold interests in his law practice to two
attorneys in order to form a three-man partnership with each holding an equal interest.
The IRS and the court rejected his contention that he had conveyed good will, a capital
asset, and held that the payments represented the present worth of the future legal fees
which the taxpayer would have been entitled to because of his greater experience and reputa-
tion. But see notes 82-85, 122 supra and accompanying text. This is, incidentally, another
example of the tax code's failure to recognize that the value of almost all "capital assets"
is based upon their future earning capacity. See Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax 65 (1955);
Miller, "The Capital Asset Concept," 59 Yale L.J. 837,. 878, 885, 1078 (1950); Notes,
104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1088, 1096 (1956), 35 Texas L.'Rev. 861 (1957).281 E.g., Bittker, supra note 236, at 17-21 (1961); Vesely, "Ohio Professional Association
Law," 13 W. Res. L. Rev. 195, 210 (1962). See also American Bar Foundation Memo,
supra note 238, at 22-23; Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 776, 787 (1962).
282 The only reference to this standard of pricing is in the section of the regulations
permitting a modified form of free transferability to exist where the interest is first
required to be offered to the other members at its -"fair market value." Treas. Reg.§ 301.7701-2(e) (2) (1960). This provision is apparently designed to deny the attribute of
free transferability to those organizations which coerce a transferring member to sell his inter-
est to the other members at an unfair price, far below that which an outsider would be willing
to pay. See Bye & Young, supra note 260, at 443 n.106. Thus, as long as the same factors
were taken into account in determining the price to members as to outsiders, it would seem
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moreover, it may be contended that an interest's fair market value, un-
like its black market value, includes only those factors which may law-
fully be considered28
In lieu of a payment for good will, a successful professional corpora-
tion or association will probably require a proposed transferee to have
something exceptional by way of ability or reputation,28 and it may de-
velop that the most frequent source of new members in an association-
as it is in a partnership-will be the deserving lawyer-employees of the
organization. An appropriate measure of control over the admission of
new members can be obtained by requiring that a withdrawing member
first offer his interest to the other members or the organization before
being permitted to transfer it to an outsider.285 As already indicated, this
modified form of free transferability is recognized by the Kintner regu-
lations, and it is also permitted or required by almost all of the states.286
that the purpose of the regulations would be satisfied. See notes 283, 285 infra. Book value
and other standards of pricing which often do not include good will are used in stock
purchase agreements of business corporations. See 2 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 7.24 (1958).
283 The transferee of an interest in a law firm may pay for a share of the capital ssets
(library, furniture, fixtures, lease or building), accounts receivable and fees not yet paid
but earned by the transferor. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion 266 (1945); N.Y.
City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 755 (1950), 633 (1943), 329 (1935);
see notes 273, 274, 278 supra; note 285 infra.
284 This suggestion is merely a continuation of current practices. Two or more un-
established practitioners readily form partnerships, but an established attorney would
ordinarily only form a partnership with another established attorney or one who possesses,
a great potential to attract clients or render extraordinary services. For an example of the
ethical and other problems which may arise when these general practices are departed from,
see O'Rear v. Commissioner, supra note 280.
285 Such transfers must be made at the fair market value of the interest. See note 28Z
supra. It may be wise to provide for a method of determining fair market value in the
enabling statute which will apply in the absence of another method provided for in the
by-laws or articles of incorporation or association. See Kentucky. (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 274.010(4) (1962)) requiring the corporation to apply to the court to determhie the fair
market value in the absence of another agreement. The "Model Act" provides alternative
clauses, one setting book value as the standard, and the other, said to meet the Kintner
regulations, providing for the appointment of three appraisers from the profession, one
chosen by the corporation, one by the withdrawing member or his representative, and the
third by the other two appraisers. Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau, supra note
260, at 414-16; see Bye & Young, supra note 260, at 436. Several of the state statutes
provide that in the absence of an agreement otherwise the price at which an association
or corporation shall redeem the interests of a deceased, disqualified, or otherwise withdrawing
member shall be the book value of such interest at the end of the month preceding the
death or disqualification. E.g., Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 11; NJ. Stat. Ann. § 14:19-13
(1963); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 815 (Supp. 1962); Va. Code Ann. § 54-891 (Supp. 1962);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(10) (c) (Supp. 1962).
286 See notes 264, 268, 282 supra. Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-105(3) (d) (Supp. 1962) requires
a first offer to the other members. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 34-82(1)(d) (Supp. 1962)
authorizes a first offer to the other members or the association. A few states risk the
loss of this characteristic by requiring that a transfer be approved by at least a majority vote
of the outstanding shares. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 621-11 (Supp. 1962); Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 21.315(10) (Supp. -1963); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:19-10 (1963). See Harvard Student
Legislative Research Bureau, supra note 260, at 414-15. Several of the other states expressly
authorize restrictions to be made in the by-laws or articles on the transferability of the
ownership interests. E.g., Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 9; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-909 (D)
(Supp. 1962); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 197-12 (Supp. 1962); Va. Code Ann. § 54-889 (Supp.
1962); see Bye & Young, supra note 260, at 443-44. First offer and other restrictions on
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Another limitation which may be implied is that a membership should
not be transferred (in the absence of appropriate safeguards) to an
attorney who has clients whose interests may conffict with the interests
of the organization's clients.2"7 This limitation should not cause diffi-
culty under the regulations since it is analogous to prohibited transfers
of a business corporation's stock to competitors and others when anti-
trust or other laws would be violatedV 8
Finally, it is required in a few states, and may be desirable in all
states, to state on the face of the stock certificates or other evidences of
ownership any restrictions which are placed on their transferability28 9
transferability are common with many business corporations, especially those closely held,
and have not prevented such organizations and other noncorporate organizations from being
taxed as corporations. See Fidelity-Bankers Trust Co. v. Helvering, 113 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940); 2 O'Neal, supra note 282, at §§ 7.05, 7.06, 7.08, 7.09;
Stevens, Corporations § 129 (2d ed. 1949).
287 Canon 6; ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 103 (1933), 72 (1932), 50
(1931), 49 (1931), 33 (1931); Informal Decision No. C-437; see Opinion 181 (1938), over-
ruled by Opinion 271 (1946). The Committee on Professional Ethics of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York has held that a lawyer admitted in another state may be
a member of a firm in such state and also have an office in New York (Opinion 662(1944)), and that an attorney may be a partner in two firms located in different boroughs
as long as no conflicting interests will be represented and all parties consent (Opinion
561 (1941)). See Kahn, supra note 250, at 74; 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 341, 346-47 (1962).
Oklahoma (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 810 (Supp. 1962)) expressly prohibits a person
from being an officer, director or shareholder of more than one professional corporation
at the same time. Thus, not only can a lawyer not practice law with two corporations
but if he is also qualified to practice accounting or any other profession, he cannot do
both through a corporate form. See ABA Comm., supra, Opinions 305 (1962), 297 (1961)
prohibiting an attorney-accountant from holding himself out to practice both professions.
Several states provide that if an owner or employee of the professional association or
corporation accepts employment or public office which restricts the practice of his profession,
he must sever his connection with the professional organization. See e.g., Ala. Laws 1961,
act 865, § 10; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 621:10 (Supp. 1962) ; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(6) (Supp.
1962). See also Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § I(D)(Supp. 1961) requiring shareholders
to be active employees of the corporation except while ill, injured, in armed services, on
vacations, or on leaves of absence not to exceed one year. The ABA Comm., supra, has ruled
that a member of a firm may remain a member while holding a full time government job
if it is not illegal to do so, if the public is not misled, and if conflicting interests are not
represented. Opinion 192 (1939). See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Canon 36.288 See 6A Fletcher, supra note 247, at §§ 2825-26, 2834-35, 2841; 10 Fletcher, supra note
247, at §§ 5004-05 (1961). But see Bittker, supra note 281, at 18.
289 See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 197-12 (Supp. 1962); Va. Code Ann. § 54-889 (Supp.
1962). The Uniform Stock Transfer Act which applies to shares of a corporation (§ 22(1))
provides that a restriction cannot be effective unless it is stated upon the certificate (§ 15).
See Buchmann & Bearden, "The Professional Service Corporation-A New Business Entity,"
16 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 11 (1961) stating that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act would apply
to the professional corporation. It would not, however, apply to an association unless it
was treated as a corporation under state law. The Uniform Commercial Code, Article 8,
which has replaced the Stock Transfer Act in many states provides that a restriction must
be noted conspicuously on the certificate to be effective against anyone but a person with
actual knowledge of the restriction (§ 8-204). But that article applies only to securities
which are defined as instruments "of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges
or markets or commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium
of investment." (§ 8-102(1)(a)(ii)). It is unlikely that the interests in a professional
association or corporation will be dealt in upon exchanges or otherwise publically traded
or used as a medium of investment. However, comment 3 to § 8-204, indicates that the
section is applicable to cooperative associations and private clubs. See also 12 Fletcher,
supra note 247, at § 5458 (1957).
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This may prevent unqualified persons from purchasing the interests and
may help avoid the embarrassing situation of a person without notice of
the restrictions obtaining an interest in violation of them.2 90
6. Miscellaneous Corporate Characteristics. The Kintner regula-
tions provide that other characteristics of a corporation or a partnership
may be given some significance in determining whether or not a par-
ticular organization qualifies as an association.291 Consequently, a favor-
able ruling will be made more probable if the state law creates a legal en-
tity, independent of the members, which has the power to contract, hold
title to property, and can sue and be sued.92 To further attain a corpo±.
rate resemblance, the organization, among other things, could make
articles of association and by-laws, provide for a board of directors or
similar body, prepare a plan for managerial succession, hold directors'
and owners' meetings, adopt formal voting procedures, maintain a formal
record system, and enter into written employment contracts with its mem-
ber employees 93 If permitted by state law, the organization could also
issue stock or other certificates of ownership and adopt a trade name
and seal2 94
Several of the association statutes have provisions expressly stating
that the organization is to be an association and not a partnership or a
corporation, or that it is to have characteristics like a corporation and
not a partnership. 95 Since federal law determines the classification of
an organization, these statements are not binding for tax purposes, but
they may be helpful.in interpreting the intent of the state to authorize
the various corporate characteristics which will be considered in making
290 The "Model Act," Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau, supra note 260, at
412-13 makes a transfer to an unqualified person and certain other prohibited actions
ineffective, but protects an innocent person who is not a shareholder and who relied on
the effectiveness of such action. See also Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 809 (Supp. 1962), set
forth at note 267 supra.
291 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1) (1960).
292 See e.g., Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 14; Va. Code Ann. §§ 54-882, -894 (Supp. 1962).
These powers should be implied under the corporation statutes. See 1 Fletcher, supra note
247, at §§ 5-14 (1931); Stevens, supra note 286, at § 3.
293 The Virginia act (Va. Code Ann. §§ 54-882, -894 (Supp. 1962)) gives the most
complete authorization for such matters, but organizations in the other states should be
able to adopt the measures without express statutory authority. For examples of helpful
factors, see Bye & Young, supra note 260, at 444-45 (noting that the larger the number
of shareholders, the greater the probability that it will be taxed as a corporation) ; Edwards,
"Taxation-Unincorporated Associations and the Medical Profession," 30 Miss. L.J. 293, 298
(1959) ; 6 Fletcher, supra note 247, at §§ 2474-2535 (1950).
294 See e.g., Issue stock, Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 9; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 621.09 (Supp.
1962); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1785.06 (Anderson Supp. 1962); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18,
§ 809 (Supp. 1962) ; certificates of ownership, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 197-11 (Supp. 1962) ;
Va. Code Ann. § 54-889 (Supp. 1962); seal, Va. Code Ann. § 54-881(c) (Supp. 1962);
trade names, see notes 228-29 supra.
295 E.g., Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 16; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 106r/, § 101 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1962); Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-105(2) (1962); Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132(6) (b) (3)
(1962); Va. Code Ann. § 54-874(3) (Supp. 1962).
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the ultimate tax classification. Another helpful provision contained in
many of the states' acts makes the professional organization subject to
their business corporation law where not in conflict with the authorizing
grant.296 Such provisions will endow the new entities with additional
corporate attributes and will also avoid difficulties under state law by
providing a guide to follow in this unchartered area.2 97
C. Tentative Conclusions
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is quite conceivable that
groups of lawyers organized under the various state statutes, as supple-
mented by carefully drawn articles and by-laws, could qualify as asso-
ciations under the Kintner regulations without infringing ethical respon-
sibilities. Since the regulations require that an association have more
corporate than non-corporate characteristics, it would be sufficient if the
organization, in addition to having associates and a joint-profit objective,
possessed continuity of life, centralization of management, and a modi-
fied form of free transferability of interests 9 8 In the event that the
296 E.g., Ala. Laws 1961, act 865, § 16; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-904 (Supp. 1962); Colo. R.
Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § I(C) (Supp. 1961); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 621.5, .13 (Supp. 1962); Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 274.015(2) (1962); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1785.08 (Anderson Supp. 1962);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 805 (Supp. 1962); Tenn. Code Ann. § 61-105(3) (d) (Supp. 1962);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(3) (Supp. 1963). See note 220 supra.
297 The new statutes have been criticized because they have plunged blindly into new
areas of law in pursuit of tax advantages and in ignorance of state law consequences.
Bittker, "Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions and
Comments," 17 Tax L. Rev. 1, 2, 28-30, 32-34 (1961); see note 316 infra; Note, 75 Harv.
L. Rev. 776, 788 (1962). This criticism is more true of some statutes (e.g., Texas, see
Bromberg, "Texas Uniform Partnership Act-The Enacted Version," 15 Sw. L.J. 386
(1961)) than others. Virginia has detailed provisions'authorizing those corporate powers and
attributes deemed applicable to the professional association. Va. Code Ann. §§ 54-882, -897,
-898 (Supp. 1962). See also Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 21.315(12) to (15) (1962); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§§ 14:19-6, -13 to -17 (Supp. 1963). Other states provide that the organization shall have
the powers, authority, duties and liabilities of corporations except as modified by the grant-
ing statute. E.g., Colo. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 265 § I(C) (Supp. 1961) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 2 74.015
(2) (1962); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 805 (Supp. 1962); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(3) (Supp.
1963). A few of the problem areas are specifically covered by some statutes, e.g., mergers
and consolidations are permitted only with domestic corporations rendering the same pro-
fessional services. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 621.13 (Supp. 1962); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 274.085 (1962).
In general, problems should be avoided by following the pattern of the business corporation
acts where applicable. See note 296 supra; Buchmann & Bearden, supra note 289; Kahn,
supra note 250. The new entities will likely be quite similar to close corporations in their
operations, and can also be guided, where appropriate, by provisions now used in articles of
partnership of law firms. See 1 O'Neal, supra note 282, at §§ 1.02, 1.07, 1.12; Carrington &
Sutherland, supra note 273; note 348 infra. One commentator has suggested that the new
skeleton-type professional association statute may indicate that the business corporation
statutes are unnecessarily detailed, although he suspects that the corporation statutes will be
looked to as a guide in settling some of the many problems raised in the operation of the
new entities. Manning, "The 1961 Amendments to the Connecticut Corporation Acts," 35
Conn. B.J. 460, 475 (1961).
298 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (1) (1960) gives an example of an organization of doctors
classified as an association which does not have limited liability but does have associates,joint-profit objective, centralized management, continuity of life and a modified form of free
transferability. See also Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(g)(5), (6) (1960); Colony Medical
Group, Special Ruling, 7 CCH 1961 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ff 6375 holding the clinic to
be an association although it lacked free transferability of interests; see also note 300 infra.
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corporate resemblance test was construed to give some weight to partial
possession of the characteristics defined by the regulations, an organiza-
tion might qualify even if it lacked more than one characteristic. 99 For
example, some significance could be given to an attenuated limited lia-
bility, to continuity of the enterprise, but not the entity, to centralized
management of administrative but not professional affairs, to transfers
permitted only after approval of the members or a licensing agency, and
to the other miscellaneous corporate attributes previously discussed.300
The extent to which lawyers and other professionals may successfully
employ the new state statutes to gain entity status under the tax laws
depends in large measure on the attitude of the administrators in the
Internal Revenue Service. The barriers and delays which professionals
seeking tax rulings have thus far encountered may indicate a hostile or
at best a cautious attitude. 01 On the other hand, the recent amendments
The Connecticut statute is unique in that it authorizes the formation of a professional
association if the members provide for three out of four of the significant corporate char-
acteristics. Attorneys in Connecticut would be well advised to try to adopt all four as
authorized since this will increase their chances of qualification under the tax law, and will
avoid the problem of whether a third person without notice who deals with the association
would be bound by the association's nonadoption of one of the characteristics. But see
Bittker, supra note 297, at 22-23.
299 See Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 776, 783-84 (1962).
300 See the analysis of the various combinations of factors considered by the courts prior
to the adoption of the Kintner regulations. Smith, "Associations Classified as Corporations
Under the Internal Revenue Code," 34 Cal. L. Rev. 461, 530-35 (1946) concluding that an
organization should be classified as an association if, in addition to associates in a joint
enterprise with a business purpose, it has a reasonable degree of centralization of manage-
ment, continuity of life, and less than a total restriction on free transferability; Sneed,
"More About Associations in the Oil and Gas Industry," 33 Texas L. Rev. 168, 189-93(1954) suggesting that to be an association, an organization must have associates, a joint
profit objective, continuity of life, centralization of management, plus (1) limited liability
and (2) centralization of legal title in a common agent, trustee or entity, or, plus either
(1) or (2) and a substantial number of miscellaneous corporate characteristics.
301 See Rev. Proc. 11, 1961-1 Cum. Bull. 897; Alexander, "Some Tax Problems of a Pro-
fessional Association," 13 W. Res. L. Rev. 212, 231-35 (1962); Eber, "Professional Service
Corporations," 100 Trusts & Estates 758, 760 (1961); Note, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 746, 764-65(1960); 8 Amer. B. News 2, col. 2 (No. 2, Feb. 15, 1963). Cf., Maier, "Don't Confuse
Kintner-Type Associations With New Professional Corporations," 15 J. Taxation 248, 250(1961); Lyon, "Action in Indiana on Kintner-Type Organizations," 39 Taxes 266, 268(1961); Ray, "Corporate Tax Treatment of Medical Clinics Organized as Associations," 39
Taxes 73 (1961). When questioned about the status of professional corporations and asso-
ciations under the tax regulations, Internal Revenue Commissioner Caplin indicated there
were many problems and referred to the article by Professor Bittker (supra note 297), one
of the most outspoken critics of tax aid to professionals through the association approach.
N.Y. Times, August 5, 1962, § 3, p. F9, col. 2. See notes 316, 320, 335, 340, 341 infra. and
accompanying text. It may be that the passage of the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retire-
ment Act of 1962 which provides some tax relief for the professional will cause the IRS
to take an even stricter attitude towards permitting further relief through professional
associations or corporations. See Note, 48 B.U.L. Rev. 107, 117-18 (1963). But see Colony
Medical Group, Special Ruling, supra note 298, applying the Kintner regulations to a
medical clinic organized under a Connecticut Non-Stock Corporation Act, and concluding
that the Clinic could be treated as an association under the tax laws. This ruling is the oniy
one of its kind and is of doubtful precedent value because it is a special letter ruling, was
not issued under the present procedure, and was primarily concerned with the status of the
doctors for Federal Employment Tax purposes. One student note interprets the issuance
of the regulations as substantially approving the philosophy of the Kintner case and indi-
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to the Treasury Department regulations to allow otherwise qualified
employees of corporations or other organizations to practice before the
IRS indicate that the new statutes are being given effect for some pur-
poses. °2 However, the Treasury Department was careful to point out
that the amendments are not intended in any way to affect the deter-
mination of the nature of professional corporations or associations for
income tax purposes. 0 3
The Kintner regulations were designed both to prevent partnership-
like entities from being taxed as corporations and to enable the IRS to
tax corporate-like entities as corporations even though they resisted such
classification. 04 It is hoped that the service will not adopt a policy which
discriminates against the taxpayer in every instance by strictly con-
struing the corporate resemblance criteria when applied to professionals
and more loosely construing them when applied to oil and gas enter-
prises and others seeking to avoid association status. 30 5
Some commentators have maintained that a professional organization
might qualify as an association under the tax laws notwithstanding the
Kintner regulations. This contention rests on two debatable theories.
The first is that the regulations are invalid because of their reliance on
local law.306 It is true that income tax classifications are federal in na-
ture and should not depend upon local variations, but this principle is
not violated by the regulations. 30 7 Organizations which possess similar
characteristics, regardless of their classification under state law, will be
treated the same for tax purposes. Thus, an organization which is desig-
nated as an association under one state's law although it does not have
continuity of life or limited liability, is not the same as an association
cating that the IRS is favorably disposed to giving tax relief to professionals. On this basis,
he suggests that the regulations may be amended to make it easier for organizations under
the new statutes to meet the tax requirements. Note, 37 Notre Dame Law. 545, 549 (1962).
But see articles cited supra and notes 132, 133 supra and accompanying text.
302 27 Fed. Reg. 9918 (Oct. 9, 1962), amending 31 C.F.R. Part 10; see proposed amend-
ments, 27 Fed. Reg. 3611 (Apr. 14, 1962).
303 Ibid.
304 See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a)(2), (g)(2), (3), (5), (6) (1960); Ray, supra note
301, at 86-87; note 216 supra; cf., Smith, supra note 300; Sneed, supra note 300; Soter,
"Taxation of Oil and Gas Financing Arrangements," 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 1, 3-8 (1962).
805 See United States v. Stierwalt, 287 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1961), 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 129
(1961); John Provence #1 Well, 37 T.C. 376 (1961). But see Colony Medical Group,
Special Ruling, 7 CCH 1961 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ff 6375. See also Ray, supra note 301,
at 86-87. While the taxpayer has the burden of proof, he should have an opportunity to
try to sustain it before an unbiased tribunal. See Grayck, 'Trofessional Associations and
the Kintner Regulations: Some Answers, More Questions, and Further Comments," 17
Tax L. Rev. 469, 489 (1962).
806 See e.g., Lyon, supra note 301, at 267; Ray, supra note 301, at 82-87; Comment, 12
Mercer L. Rev. 388, 392, 395 (1961). Cf., Mackay, "Pension Plans and Associations Taxable
as Corporations for Professional Persons," 10 Sw. L.J. 281, 287-88, 291-92 (1956); Note, 37
Ind. L.J. 124, 134 (1961).
307 See Maier & Wild, "Taxation of Professional Firms as Corporations," 44 Marq. L.
Rev. 127, 137 (1960); Bittker, supra note 297, at 8 n.10. Cf., Note, 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 71,
73-74 (1962).
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under another state's laws which does possess those attributes, and the
two types of organizations can be rightfully distinguished for tax pur-
poses. The other theory asserts that the new regulations are invalid
because the definition of "association" in the regulations is inconsistent
with the interpretation given in Morrissey and other cases, 30 and with
the old regulations construing the statutory definition of "corporation"
in the 1939 Internal Revenue Code which was re-enacted without change
in the 1954 Code.30 9 The theory that an interpretation of a statute is
given the force of law by the re-enactment of the statute without altera-
tion of the interpretation, is, as the Morrissey case itself recognized, a
flexible doctrine which does not invalidate regulations issued after re-
enactment.310 Although Treasury regulations have been afforded vary-
ing weights by the courts,"' they are usually upheld unless unreasonable
or plainly inconsistent with a statute.312 However persuasively one might
308 Morissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935); United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d
418 (9th Cir. 1954); see Bye & Young, supra note 260, at 432-34; Comment, 12 Mercer L.
Rev. 388, 390-91, 395 (1961). The Morrissey case, unlike the new regulations, gave signifi-
cance to the characteristics of associates and a joint-profit objective, and to the fact that
an entity was created apart from the members of the organization. The Kintner regulations
afford weight to the former two characteristics when determining whether an entity is a
trust or an association but not a partnership or an association (since the characteristics are
essential to both types of enterprise). However, it may be that the application of the
Morrissey case (which involved a trust) was similarly limited and that the separate entity
factor was given little, if any, wright. See Smith, supra note 300, at 529-30, 533. But see
Sneed, supra note 300, at 189-90. See also note 144 supra.
309 Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.3797-2 (1943), readopted as, Treas. Reg. 118, § 39-3797-2 (1953).
See Maier & Wild, supra note 307, at 141. Under the old regulations, the most significant
characteristics were continuity of life (often interpreted as continuity of the enterprise)
and centralization of management. See Edwards, supra note 293; Smith, supra note 300, at
530; Note, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 746, 759-60 (1960). These characteristics would be easier for
a professional organization to attain than the now equally important characteristics of
limited liability and free transferability of interests.
810 As the statute merely provided that the term "corporation" should include "asso-
ciations," without further definition, the Treasury Department was authorized to supply
rules for the enforcement of the Act within the permissible bounds of administrative
construction. Nor can this authority be deemed to be so restricted that the regulations,
once issued, could not later be clarified or enlarged so as to meet administrative exi-
gencies or conform to judicial decision. . . . We find no ground for the contention that
by the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1924 the Department was limited to its previ-
ous regulations as to associations.
Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 354-55 (1935). See Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co.,
308 U.S. 90, 100-01 (1939); 1 Davis, Administrative Law §§ 5.07-.10 (1958). The
reenactment doctrine would only seem to be valid, if at all, where it could be shown that
Congress actually considered the existing regulations or court decisions and decided not to
make any changes in light of them. See 1 Davis, supra, at § 5.07; Brown, "Regulations, Re-
enactment and the Revenue Acts," 54 Harv. L. Rev. 377 (1941); Feller, "Addendum to the
Regulations Problem," 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1311 (1941) ; Griswold, "A Summary of the Regula-
tions Problem," 54 Harv. L. Rev. 398, 400-04 (1941); Griswold, "Postscriptum," 54 Harv.
L. Rev. 1323 (1941); Surrey, "The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the
Income, Estate and Gift Taxes," 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 556 (1940); cf., Commarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498, 510-11 (1959).
811 See 1 Davis, supra note 310, at 317-19, 321-24.
812 Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); see 1 Davis,
supra note 310, at 318-19, 321-24; Eisenstein, "Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Ad-
ministration," 58 Harv. L. Rev. 477, 528 (1945); cf., Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118,
127, 129 (1952); Griswold, supra note 310, at 404-11; see also Note, 31 U. Cinc. L. Rev.
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argue that the old cases and regulations employed more desirable criteria
than do the Kintner regulations, 18 it cannot be fairly said that they are
unreasonable or inconsistent with the undefined terms used in the statute.
Unless a particular court strongly opposes the policy of the regula-
tions,314 it seems likely that the Kintner regulations will be approved
as the tests to be used in determining whether or not the new profes-
sional organizations qualify as associations under the tax laws. Never-
theless, on the basis of the only court decisions thus far considering the
tax status of professional associations,315 we would expect the courts,
unlike the Internal Revenue Service, to construe the regulations favor-
ably to the taxpayer.
III
EvALUATION
The successful use of the professional corporation will undoubtedly
help the rich lawyer (a relatively rare breed) to get richer. It may even
increase the downward trickle of financial benefits. But clearly this is
insufficient reason to encourage its use and acceptance. What of
the effect on professional responsibilities? On the tax policy? On the
law of business associations? The problems and uncertainties in these
areas have prompted one tax authority, Professor Boris Bittker, to wave
the red flag and advise the Treasury Department and the federal courts
to resolve doubts against the new entities and deny corporation classifi-
cation or at least to abstain from decision until the states have developed
a corpus of private law. 1" Other writers, while more sympathetic to the
desire of professionals for tax relief, have suggested that it may be a
wise compromise to accept the lesser benefits under H.R.-10 than enter
the twilight zone of professional corporations.3 1 7 The present writers,
71, 74-75, 77 (1962) stating that the regulations are interpretive and could be attacked as
unreasonable but that they are not in fact unreasonable. Despite statuory auhorization to
issue regulations (IRC § 7805) on the basis of the legislative history of the Code, most tax
regulations are considered interpretative rather than legislative, and thus, not entitled to
"the force of law." See 1 Davis, supra note 310, at 310-11 and authorities cited at 313 nn.25-28.
313 See e.g., Ray, supra note 301; Note, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 746, 760-61, 764 (1960); cf.
Smith, supra note 300; Sneed, supra note 300.
314 See 1 Davis, supra note 310, at 317, 319 noting that the degree of the judge's agree-
ment or disagreement with the regulation is one of the most important factors determining
how much respect the judge will give the regulation. In view of the Kintner and Gait
decisions, infra note 315, it would not be shocking to find some courts disregarding the
Kintner regulations.
315 Gait v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959); Kintner v. United States,
107 F. Supp. 976 (D. Mont. 1952), aff'd, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954); see also Pelton v.
Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936) ; note 314 supra.
316 Bittker, supra note 297, at 25, 28-34. But see note 297 supra.
317 E.g., Comments, 12 Mercer L. Rev. 388, 400 (1961), 16 Sw. L.J. 462, 505-06 (1962);
14 Syracuse L. Rev. 104, 106 (1962). Cf., Editorials, 84 NJ.LJ. 512 (1961), 27 U.P. News
183 (No. 2, 1961).
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however, view the matter differently. We regard the advent of the pro-
fessional corporation as providing an opportunity to evaluate some
neglected or ignored policy considerations in the fields of professional
responsibility, taxation and business associations.
Thirty years ago it was stated that "the economic demand for the
incorporation of law firms as such is very slight."31 The income tax
laws have now provided the economic incentive, and this has given rise
to increased interest in evaluating the traditional prohibitions on the
practice of law in corporate form. On the basis of our analysis, it seems
that these prohibitions are based more on a restricted doctrinal approach
to legal ethics and the law of business associations than on realistic
considerations. The Supreme Court of Florida has aptly observed that:
Traditionally, prohibition against the practice of a profession through the
corporate entity has been grounded on the essentially personal relationship
existing between the lawyer and his client, or the doctor and his patient.
This necessary personal relationship imposes upon the lawyer a standard
of duty and responsibility which does not apply in the ordinary commercial
relationship. The non-corporate status of the lawyer was deemed necessary
in order to preserve to the client the benefits of a highly confidential rela-
tionship, based upon personal confidence, ability, and integrity. If a means
can be devised which preserves to the client and the public generally, all
of the traditional obligations and responsibilities of the lawyer and at the
same time enables the legal profession to obtain a benefit not otherwise
available to it, we can find no objection to the proposal. 319
The attempts of the states to devise this means are not perfect but
neither do they miss the mark entirely. It is apparent to us that the
all-lawyer corporation with express provisions insuring the preservation
of the full-measure of the attorney's professional relationship, respon-
sibility and liability would not be appreciably different from many
existing law partnerships.
Professor Bittker contends, however, that aside from the questionable
effect of the state laws on professional responsibilities, the states should
not be able to alter federal tax incidents merely by changing the label
on a form of doing business.32° While this position has merit, it is not
the state legislation that is to blame but the federal income tax laws
which permit such labels to determine tax liability. Moreover, the Kint-
ner regulations in defining the label, "association," invited the states to
318 Note, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1114 (1931).
319 Matter of The Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 1961). Compare the attitude
of other lawyers who fear a too hasty tinkering with professional relationships as a result
of an undue concern for tax benefits. E.g., Bittker, supra note 297, at 2-3, 28-30; "The Day
Law Firms Went Public," 5 N.J.S.B.J. 865 (1962); Editorials, 84 NJ.LJ. 512 (Sept. 28,
1961), 27 U.P. News 183 (No. 2, 1961) ; see also notes 167, 264 supra.
320 Bittker, supra note 297, at 28-30, 31-32, 34-35. See Note, 75 Rarv. L. Rev. 766, 792-
94 (1962).
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act by making the presence or absence of the essential corporate char-
acteristics dependent on local law.82' The approach of the regulations
and in general of the courts which have construed these labels has been
purely conceptual: Under the tax laws a corporation is treated in X man-
ner e.g., it may deduct contributions made to a qualified pension plan,
a typical business corporation-typical by common law standards, that
is-has certain characteristics, 22 the ABC Organization has more of
these characteristics than it lacks, therefore we will treat the ABC Or-
ganization as if it were a corporation and tax it in X manner.
This approach is inadequate in terms of modern business association
law and tax policy. It ignores why a corporation is taxed in X manner,
and ignores the policy behind the provision providing for taxation in
X manner and whether the taxation of all corporations in X manner is
within that policy. What is needed is a functional approach where a
corporation or other form of business organization is looked upon as a
"method" not as a "thing." 23 Under this approach the concern is over
what a corporation does and why, not the metaphysics of what a cor-
poration is. 24 Thus instead of classifying the "thing" and letting the
tax consequences be determined by the label, the appropriate tax policy
is first found and then the tax consequences are adjusted as to each
business method in a manner consistent with the tax policy.
To illustrate, let us analyze the taxation of corporations in the re-
ferred to X manner, i.e., the permitted deduction of contributions made
to a qualified pension plan. Why can a corporation take such deduc-
tions? Apparently because it is an employer of employees. What makes
321 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960).
322 E.g., Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935) ; Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1)
(1960). Professor Bittker recognizes the conceptual nature of this approach but, nevertheless,
feels constrained to employ it. Bittker, supra note 297, at 3 n.5. The extreme degree of con-
ceptualism in the )Kintner regulations is illustrated by their requirement of continuity of
the life of the entity rather than that of the enterprise. See note 218 supra. The concern
should be with the kind of organization that was in fact contemplated. See United States v.
Stierwalt, 287 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1961), 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 129 (1961); note 324 infra.
323 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 118-19, 222 N.Y.S. 532, 543-44
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1927); Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in Amer-
ican Constitutional Law 22, 166-68 (1918); Manning, "Corporate Power and Individual
Freedom: Some General Analysis and Particular Reservations," 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 38, 39
(1960); 2 Corp. Prac. Comm. (No. 4) 26, 28 (1961): "A 'corporation' is a way of filing
papers, attended by certain more or less predictable special legal consequences of an increas-
ingly narrow significance."
324 See Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, supra note 323, at 114-19, 222 N.Y. Supp.
at 538-44; Henderson, supra note 323, at 50, 165-68; Cohen, "Transcendental Nonsense and
the Functional Approach," 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809 (1935); Green, "Corporations As Persons,
Citizens and Possessors of Liberty," 94 U. Pa. L. Rev. 202, 202-04, 205-06, 209-10 (1946) ;
Harbrecht & McCallin, "The Corporation and the State in Anglo-American Law and
Politics," 10 J. Pub. L. 1, 44 (1961); Note, 23 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 172 (1961); see also United
States v. Goldberg, 206 F. Supp. 394, 405 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Tucker v. Binenstock, 310 Pa.
254, 263, 165 Atl. 247, 250 (1933); Dewey, "The Historic Background of Corporate Legal
Personality," 35 Yale L.J. 655, 660-63, 669-73.
[Vol. 48
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
it so? Continuity of life? Hardly. Limited liability? Wholly unlikely.
Free transferability? Very doubtful. Centralization of management?
Perhaps in part. Recognition as a separate legal entity? This is appar-
ently the most basic reason why a corporation can be an employer. Yet
the regulations ignore this characteristic. Should we therefore conclude
that any method of doing business, including a partnership, 325 which is
recognized as a legal entity should be taxed in the same manner as a
corporation? Clearly not for purposes other than the deductibility of
contributions made to a pension plan, and not even for that purpose
until we determine whether this result will carry out the policy behind
the tax code provisions. In making our determination we may even dis-
cover that not all corporations and their employees were intended to be
benefited by these provisions, that small closely held corporations should
be treated differently than large publicly held corporations, that the law
was passed for the advantage of minimum wage employees but not high
salaried executives or, on the other extreme, that all taxpayers who per-
formed personal services were within the benefited class regardless of
their form of business or whether they were employees in a legalistic
sense. In other words the inquiry has little or nothing to do with the
label, we are not concerned with what is or is not a corporation, but
with what is the reason certain tax consequences were provided for and
who should benefit from them, and how can the policy of the provisions
best be carried out.
It should come as a shock to no one that the federal tax laws have
many purposes other than that of producing revenue. Because of
their great fiscal impact, the tax laws provide the government with a
most effective means of economic and social control, and thus, their real
meaning and purpose can begin to appear only when they are viewed in
the context of the desired economic goals and related social objectives.
In examining a particular tax code provision we need not be restricted
by its historical justification, although that may provide a starting place
for an evaluation of the provision in light of today's desires and expec-
tions. The pension plan provisions of the Internal Revenue Code have
been part of our tax laws for many years and their original purpose could
not be expected to settle all problems of application to the continuously
325 A partnership has been recognized as a legal entity for many purposes including that
of an employer of the working partners. Scott v. Alsar Co., 336 Mich. 532, 58 N.W.2d 910
(1953); Chisholm v. Chisholm Construction Co., 298 Mich. 25, 298 N.W. 390 (1941);
Finston v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 132 N.J.L. 276, 39 A.2d 697 (Sup. Ct.
1944), aff'd sub nom. Naidech v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 134 N.J.L. 232, 46
A.2d 734 (Ct. of Err. & App. 1946); see Crane, Partnership § 3 (2d ed. 1952); Stevens,
Private Corporations § 7 (2d ed. 1949); Note, 41 Col. L. Rev. 698 (1941). See note 177 supra.
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changing conditions of our society. 2  Thus, the particular distribution
of values intended to be effected by the provisions is to some extent un-
known, but we believe that certain general policies are discernible.
The basic governmental purpose in giving favorable tax treatment to
amounts contributed or set aside for retirement purposes is not to lessen
the tax-bite for low or high bracket taxpayers. If tax relief were the
chief motivation, then a direct reduction of rates would be a simple
means to accomplish the result. Instead, we believe that the touchstone
of the retirement plan provisions will be found in the basic inequality
or tax differential in our federal tax structure between income earned by
personal services and income attributed to capital investment.127 Those
who derive their income substantially from capital wealth generally can
spread it relatively evenly over their lifetime. Age 65 is merely another
birthday for those who have no need to know what the word retirement
means. On the other hand, those who support themselves by performing
personal services are more likely to bunch their earnings in a significantly
shorter period of time. They will, thus, be more heavily hit by a grad-
uated tax structure than their coupon-clipping counterparts. There are
several ways in which our tax laws could attempt to equalize this differ-
ential. The double personal exemptions, the unlimited medical expense
deduction, and the retirement income credit are all available to the elderly
taxpayer, but curiously enough, whether he obtains his earnings from
capital wealth or personal services. The primary means, then of short-
ening this tax gap between those who depend on personal service income
and those who do not is the encouragement of the private, non-govern-
mental, pension or profit-sharing plan. The private plan is expected to
be a supplement to the basic or minimum public retirement systems. It is
intended, with the aid of the tax code, to serve as an averaging device
for those who can set aside or have set aside for them a portion of their
earnings in their younger and more productive years for enjoyment in
their older and retirement years.
A collateral yet important objective of the deferral of earnings to post-
retirement years would be to reduce the burden of the government in
providing a fuller economic life (through social security or other means)
326 For summaries of the history and reasons for the growth of private pension plans and
their encouragement through the tax laws, see e.g., Dyer, "Federal Tax Treatment of Pension
and Other Employee Benefit Plans," Tax Revision Compendium, Vol. 2, 1375; Holland,
"Some Characteristics of Private Pension Plans, House Comm. on Ways and Means," id. at
1301 (Comm. Print 1959); Specter, "Pension and Profit Sharing Plans: Coverage and Opera-
tion for Closely Held Corporations and Professional Associations," 7 Vill. L. Rev. 335, 338
(1962).
327 See Morrison, "Income Taxation of Savings for Retirement," Tax Revision Com-
pendium, supra note 326, at 1337; cf., Dyer, supra note 326, at 1375; Seligman, 'Tension
and Other Employee Benefit Plans," id. at 1353.
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to those who would come to seek aid from public funds. 28 This latter
objective was considered a most significant one in the face of criticism
of the "welfare state" movement, which gained great momentum in the
1930s. In order to make peace with industry and to encourage it to
provide and administer funds for the retirement needs of its working
force, the government developed a philosophy of helping those who help
others.329 Consequently, the affluent executive employee was permitted
to be included along with the more needy low or medium wage earner
in the group benefited by the retirement plan provisions of the tax code.
Although the executive or highly compensated person was not likely to
become a financial burden on the government in his retirement years,
the inclusion of this class of persons was consistent with the objective
of minimizing the income tax liabilities of personal service earnings as
compared with income derived from capital.
While these pension and profit-sharing plan tax benefits have been
part of our law for many years, it was not until the high tax rate struc-
ture was adopted in the World War II period that many taxpayers be-
came aware of the sizable relief available.3 0 Although the greater part
of the nation's working force fell within the magical label, "employee,"
and were thus eligible for the benefits, 331 self-employed persons (partners
and sole-proprietors) who were not technically employees within the
common-law tradition and who could not or would not change their
formal entity arrangements were unable to take advantage of the bene-
fits. These self-employed persons, however, were also within the class
that derived their earnings from personal services and were deserving of
some tax equalization with the capital wealth class. Nevertheless, the
Treasury Department opposed the entrance of the self-employed person
into the pension and profit-sharing plan arena. Their reasoning was
apparently two-fold. First, the self-employed person and especially the
professional was said not to be looking to provide for his retirement
needs, but rather to obtain a device to minimize his current tax liability.
However true this may be of some self-employed persons, it is not likely
to be true of the majority, of lawyers who upon reaching retirement age
328 See e.g., Lesser, "Pension and Other Employee Benefit Plans," id. at 1383-84; Seligman,
supra note 327, at 1353, 1354-58.
329 See McConnell, "Treatment of Pension Plans," id. at 1347-49.
330 World War II was also a period of wage controls and many employers turned to
pension plans as a means of giving additional compensation to their employees. For these
and other reasons asserted for the growth of private pension plans, see Holland, supra note
326, at 1301; Lesser, supra note 328, at 1383; McConnell, supra note 329, at 1347-48; see
also note 326 supra.
331 Despite this eligibility, the large majority of employees are not presently covered by
private pension plans. This is also a legitimate concern for the tax policy planner. See
Bittker, supra note 297, at 34; Holland, supra note 326, at 1301, 1306-09; McConnell, supra
note 329, at 1347-48. See also notes 350-52 infra.
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find that the canons of ethics prohibit them from selling the practice
which they have struggled to build-up,33 and likely face the prospect
of continuing to work in order to eat. Moreover, this same argument,
even if valid, could also apply with greater force to the bulk of corporate
executives and other highly compensated members of the protected
"employee" group."3 In addition, one reason for extending pension
plan tax benefits to highly paid manager-employees was to encourage
them to set up retirement programs for the run-of-the-mill employee.
This same reasoning ought to apply to employees of self-employed per-
sons (i.e., non-corporate employers) who, though technically capable of
being covered by employee pension plans, are often and realistically
denied such coverage because the employer lacks sufficient incentive to
set up a plan under which he can not be included.33
A second Treasury Department objection to the inclusion of the self-
employed within the pension plan tax shelter was the age-old cry of loss
of tax revenue. Obviously this argument is applicable to the entire em-
ployee retirement plan concept and lacks validity when applied only to
professionals or other self-employed persons or only to loss of revenue
through retirement plans and not through other special tax benefits.
Professor Bittker and others have criticised the attempts of the profes-
sional people to come under the pension plan benefits of the tax code
because they seek to obtain special benefits not available to other tax-
payers, and because this would open the door to other special interest
groups seeking similar preferential treatment.335 As previously observed,
the tax laws have been frequently used as a means of social and eco-
nomic control, and tax favoritism to foster certain welfare programs
such as pension plans or certain industries such as oil and natural re-
sources is not evil merely because it curtails the amount of collectible
tax revenue. It is bad only when the revenue losses are not outweighed
by the social and economic gains resulting from the tax benefit. The late
Senator Kerr recently defended so-called "loopholes" in our tax laws
which provide depletion allowances for oil recovery companies, stock
options for corporate managers, deductions for expenditures for good-
332 See notes 275-82 supra and accompanying text.
s33 Owner-employees of a one man or closely held corporation may take advantage of
the pension or profit-sharing plan provisions. See note 213 supra; Byron, "Profit-Sharing
Plans for the Closely Held Corporation," 40 Taxes 47 (1962) explaining that the provisions
intended to benefit the needy are also available to the greedy. The use of "retirement"
provisions as a tax deferral and savings device by those not in need of retirement funds,
whether by executive employees or self-employed persons, has been criticized. See e.g., Lesser,
supra note 326, at 1383, 1384-88. In addition, corporate executives often have opportunities
to increase their income through favorable capital investments. See Griswold, "The
Mysterious Stock Option," id. at 1327. See also note 351 infra.
334 See Dyer, supra note 326, at 1375, 1379; see also note 329 supra.
335 Bittker, supra note 297, at 34-35; cf., Lesser, supra note 328, at 1383, 1386-87.
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will, split-income provisions for married taxpayers, dividend credits for
investors, capital gain rates for property owners and investors, pension
plan and other benefits for the aged, and certain other special interest
tax legislation . 3 6 He stated:
I think each of the present provisions serves a worthy purpose. They en-
courage home ownership, stimulate investment, promote development of
our natural resources, remove inequities or benefit the aged or handi-
capped. 37
Thus, in determining whether a tax benefit should be bestowed on a
particular group, several factors should be weighed, including the an-
ticipated loss of tax revenue, the social or economic gain expected, the
existing tax benefits or burdens applied to the group seeking the bene-
fits and to other groups which might be considered to be in an analogous
category, the difficulty of administration, and, perhaps, the likely po-
litical acceptance. In terms of the pension plan benefits for professional
folk, the inquiry might well be: Are they seeking to open wider a tax
loophole which should be closed as to other persons now enjoying it, or,
upon a weighing of all the relevant factors, are the professional persons
deserving of the benefits just as persons in analogous positions are? 8'
While we recognize the desirability of benefiting the capital investor
in order to stimulate the economy, we also believe that it is in the na-
tional interest to aid the taxpayer who depends on personal service earn-
ings, whether as an employee or employer, when those earnings are
declining in his later years. 9 The professional corporation or association
will permit many such persons, who were previously ineligible, to be
benefited by the provisions carrying out this policy. Nevertheless, it is
the position of Professor Bittker that Congress has had ample oppor-
tunity to permit taxation of professionals as employees of a corporation
and has uniformly refused to do s040 He states:
I do think, however, that state legislation designed to outflank Congress
and the Treasury ought not to be encouraged, especially when it is directed
at a problem under active Congressional study, and has so meager a non-tax
content as to be virtually devoid of business purpose.m'
386 Kerr, "Tax Loopholes: fact or myth?" Look, March 13, 1962, p. 92.
837 Id. at 96, col. 4.
338 Evaluations of the social and economic justifications of several provisions of the IRC
including those relating to pension plans will be found in the Tax Revision Compendium,
supra note 326. See e.g., id. at 1301-95 (pension plans).
839 See Cliffe & Marshall, 'Financial Freedom and a Dynamic Economy," id. at 1391. The
authors appropriately note that the funds set aside under pension plans become available
for private capital investment. See also, Morrison, supra note 327, at 1337, 1342; Seligman,
supra note 327, at 1353, 1360.
340 Bittker, supra note 297, at 30-31.
341 Id. at 32.
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Basing congressional intent upon the inaction of Congress is a ques-
tionable practice, 42 and its inadequacy is demonstrated in this case by
the subsequent attempt, albeit a half-hearted one, to cater to the retire-
ment needs of the professional by the passage of the Self-Employed In-
dividuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962. Furthermore, while it is true
that the motivating purpose of the new state statutes was tax savings,
this should not destroy their validity.34 As previously indicated, the
state legislation was not designed to outflank Congress but was merely
an attempt to pick up the buck passed to the state by Congress in draft-
ing the tax code and by the Treasury in its interpretation of it. We
agree with the Florida court's opinion that:
This state legislation and those who seek to meet its requirements are not
to be catalogued as devious or evasive. We construe the legislation ...as
a frank and forthright effort to adapt certain business and professional rela-
tionships to the requirements of the Internal Revenue Service in order that
the members of such businesses or professions may be placed on an equal
footing with other taxpayers.44
It is common knowledge that many organizations choose their busi-
ness form with tax consequences in mind,345 and professional persons
should be subject to no greater condemnation for seeking the creation
of a new entity which will give them an equal opportunity for choice.
Moreover, there are non-tax benefits of practicing a profession in ia cor-
porate form,348 and these new entities will serve a useful social purpose
842 See Grayck, supra note 305, at 485-86. There also are indications that Congress and
the Treasury Department are interested in liberalizing the pension plan provisions to
benefit more taxpayers who render personal services. See IRC § 403(b), as amended, 75 Stat.
801 (1961) (extending benefits to employees of public educational institutions); Rev. Rul.
62-139, 1962 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 34 (liberalizing past service credits).
343 Contra, Bittker, supra note 297, at 28-30; see also Alexander, supra note 301, at 224-25.
Professor Bittker's position has been challenged on two grounds. One, if Congress objects to
the federal tax incidents of the state legislation, it can change the tax laws accordingly. Two,
Bittker is engaging in circular reasoning by saying it is doubtful whether the new entities
satisfy the Kintner regulations, these doubts should be resolved against the state statutes
because they try to effect federal tax policy, and the state statutes should not be permitted
to effect federal tax policy because it is doubtful whether they meet the Kintner regulations.
Grayck, supra note 305, at 484-85. See also notes 320-21 supra and accompanying text.
344 Matter of The Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 1961).
345'See Rohlich, Organizing Corporate and Other Business Enterprises § 5.05 (3d ed.
1958) ; Maier & Wild, supra note 307, at 142: "The tax tail is often so important that it
wags the dog as to the selection of the proper form of organization."
346 The benefits of practice as part of a group rather than as an individual include:
greater financial return, consultation with associates, opportunity for division of labor and
specialization, continuous service available to clients, team spirit tending to increase morale,
and, as indicated by recent surveys, greater adherence to the Canons of Ethics. See Cheat-
ham, Legal Profession 211-16, 487-89 (2d ed. ' 1955) ; Carrington & Sutherland, Articles of
Partnership for Law Firms, ABA Economics of the Law Practice Series, Pamphlet No. 6,
7-9. The professional corporation retains these benefits and may additionally provide
more efficient management and administration, and facilitated retirement or withdrawal
from a firm. See Eber, supra note 301, at 759; Jones, "Should Lawyers Incorporate?" 11
Hastings L.J. 150, 156 (1959); Kahn, "The Wisconsin Service Corporation Law of 1961,"
1962 Wis. L. Rev. 65, 81; Comment, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 746, 752-53 (1960). If corporate status
is attained under the tax laws, this will encourage the establishment of pension plans which
may in turn aid employee efficiency and loyalty, decrease turnover, and improve retirement
conditions. See Specter, supra note 326, at 336.
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by providing the professional with a method of doing business which
will not offend traditional professional relationships, and at the same
time, will permit him to enjoy many of the tax and other advantages of
the corporation.347 The label which the states assign to this new method
of doing business is of relatively little importance. Like the close cor-
poration to which they bear much resemblance, 343 the professional corpo-
rations and associations provide a variation of the "ordinary" business
corporation in order to accommodate it to another economically feasible
and socially desirable business arrangement. Thus, consistent with our
view of the functional approach to the law of business associations and
taxation, we believe that the new professional entities are worthy of
recognition, not as a devious means to an undeserved end, but as a novel
method of removing the traditional barriers to the carrying out of a
sound tax policy.
The professional corporation or association, however, is not a com-
pletely satisfactory answer, to the tax problems of the professional. Since
most professional persons, and certainly lawyers, could not use "dummy"
incorporators in forming an association or corporation, the sole prac-
titioner will not be benefited by the new state legislation. Furthermore,
many states may elect not to authorize formation of the new entities,
and the tax discrimination may be increased rather than diminished.349
Thus, we believe that a more satisfactory solution can be provided by
new federal legislation. The Keogh Bill as proposed was at best incom-
plete relief, and as passed in the form of the Self-Employed Individuals
Tax Retirement Act of 1962 is wholly inadequate. It has been seen that
347 The social utility of a reevaluation of the traditional prohibitions on the practice of
law in corporate form had been recognized by several commentators prior to the tax incentive
to achieve corporation status. See e.g., Cheatham, supra note 346, at 493-501; Note, 44
Harv. L. Rev. 1114 (1931) ; authorities cited at notes 169-71 supra.
348 See 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations §§ 1.02, 1.07, 1.12 (1958); Conway, "The New York
Fiduciary Concept in Incorporated Partnerships and Joint Ventures," 30 Fordham L. Rev.
297, 303-06, 320, 323-24 (1961); Specter, supra note 326, at 358. The professional corpora-
tion and association statutes may be evidence of a further breaking down of the traditional
categories of "corporation," "partnership" and "sole proprietorship" toward the evolution of
integrated General Business Association Acts. See Manning, "The 1961 Amendments to the
Connecticut Corporation Acts," 35 Conn. BJ. 460, 475-76 (1961).
349 See Bittker, "Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions
and Comments," 17 Tax L. Rev. 1, 31-32 (1961); Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 776, 792-94
(1962). But see Grayck, supra note 305, at 487-88 contending that this is a matter of state
concern, and that tax treatment of the business structures will be uniform from state to
state and consistent with that of a business organization and its employees. The lack of
uniformity in the state authorization of business structures and the consequent different tax
treatment of professional persons has been compared to the attempt of several states to
gain tax benefits for their citizens by adopting community property laws, which in turn
prodded Congress to amend the tax laws to bring about uniform treatment of married
couples. It was the hope of some that history would repeat itself and that Congress would
react to the professional corporation statutes by passing the Keogh Bill or other tax relief
for professionals. If these would-be prophets take comfort in the passage of the Self-
Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, they are being deceived by the rose
color in their crystal balls.
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the aim of the professional is to attain employee status under the tax
laws. This could be provided by a simple change in the definition of
"employee" to include one who is self-employed or a partner or other
type of associate in an unincorporated business organization. 50 This
would avoid the complex and confusing provisions of the 1962 amend-
ment as well as those of the Kintner regulations, and would permit the
professional person to take advantage of the same pension plan and
other tax benefits now available to other personal service taxpayers who
are not prevented by law or ethics from becoming corporate employees.
It would also lessen the influence of tax considerations in choosing a
business form and would encourage the establishment of pension plans
for the benefit of employees of non-corporate enterprises.
Even this solution is far from a tax panacea. It leaves unresolved
the problem of aiding the retirement needs of millions of non-profes-
sional taxpayers who are not now covered by adequate pension plans,
and it fails to curtail certain abusive practices under the pension plan
provisions of the tax code. 5' But we are less concerned with providing
optimum solutions to specific tax problems than with reorienting the
traditional methods of tax administration. We have tried to demonstrate
why and how a functional pragmatic approach should be substituted for
taxation by conceptual label. This requires a re-evaluation of the vari-
ous tax benefits now made available to determine what the policy sup-
porting each benefit is, whether it is socially and economically justified,
and whether the provisions of the code best effectuate the policy while
350 See Maier & Wild, supra note 307, at 142; Specter, supra note 326, at 356, 358;
Comment, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 746, 747 (1960) Note, 37 Ind. L.J. 124, 139 (1961). A more con-
ceptual but less comprehensive alternative would be to permit a partnership to be treated as
an entity under the pension plan provisions (as it is for certain other tax purposes) and thus
become capable of being the employer of the partners and other employees. See Specter,
supra; notes 177, 325 supra. Another avenue to the same place would be to permit a pro-
fessional partnership to elect to be taxed as a corporation under Subchapter R of the Code.
See Carrington & Sutherland, supra note 346, at 72-73. Still another approach to end the
tax discrimination is outlined in note 351 infra.
351 In addition to incomplete coverage, see note 331 supra, the abuses have been alleged
to include: failure of pension funds to vest in the employee, stock options, inconsistent
taxation of benefits when received especially regarding capital gains treatment of lump sum
payments, and lack of controls on investment of pension funds. See Griswold, supra note 333,
at 1327; Holland, supra note 326, at 1301, 1309-17; Lesser, supra note 328, at 1383, 1385,
1388; McConnell, supra note 324, at 1347, 1348-50; Morrison, supra note 326, at 1337,
1339-42. But see Dyer, supra note 326, at 1375; Seligman, supra note 327, at 1353.
A proposal which is claimed to correct some of the abuses and permit all taxpayers to
be covered whether employer or employee would permit each person to put a percentage
of his income (it may be fixed or vary with age) into an approved retirement plan and
take a tax deduction for such contribution. The investment income would be tax free until
received in retirement. See e.g., Cliffe & Marshall, supra note 339, at 1391; Dyer, supra at
1379; McConnell, supra at 1350; Seligman, supra at 1354, 1368. These proposals are ques-
tioned, however, because of the fear that they will reduce the incentive for employers to
establish pension plans for their employees, and that many employees will not or could not
establish plans for themselves. See Lesser, supra at 1386.
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minimizing its abuse.352 In terms of our present inquiry this may result
in defining a self-employed professional person as an employee for one
purpose but not for another. Such an approach lacks doctrinal con-
sistency but substitutes realistic plasticity. After all we no longer live
in a syllogistic world (and doubtless never did) and the law performs
its societal functions all the better when it takes note of reality with
greater frequency and dispatch.
852 Tax reform, like the weather, is much talked about, but has little done about it. If
this situation is (hopefully) to be changed, the reformers will find much realistic evaluation
and information in the Tax Revision Compendium. Useful general discussions are con-
tained at 1-167, and in Eisenstein, The Ideologies of Taxation (1961), reviewed, 56 Nw. L.
Rev. 688 (1962).
